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SECURITY COUNCIL IS RESHAPING NAVAL PURSUIT OF
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATORS, ROGUE STATES,
AND PIRATES
Brian Wilson*
ABSTRACT
Multinational action at the United Nations to combat illicit activity
represents the most consequential sanctions period involving the maritime
environment since the Athenian Empire’s Megarian Decree. From its inception,
the Security Council has authorized measures that have led to naval approaches
or boardings of more than 50,000 ships, the destruction of 3,500 vessels, and
the maritime rescue of 40,000 people in the pursuit of transnational security
threats. While the Security Council has addressed maritime challenges over the
past seven decades, a diplomatic renaissance began in 2008 with decisions
impacting naval engagements unfolding with unparalleled frequency: From
1946 to 2007, resolutions were adopted about once every 1.7 years, and since,
are now approved every 2.5 months. The Turtle Bay pivot is emblematic of an
increased emphasis in collaborative responses to contemporary transnational
security threats, yet questions remain, such as whether the Security Council is
diluting their unique authority and the vitality of law-of-the-sea principles
including freedom of navigation, innocent passage, and the general concept of
exclusive flag State jurisdiction. Varied interpretations of resolutions, ensuring
compliance, and overcoming challenges inherent in conducting at sea boardings
further complicate the coordinated pursuit of illicit activity. This Article surveys
hundreds of Security Council decisions to identify six categories of resolutions
that could involve the maritime environment, examines their influence and
intersection with one another, discusses potential future focus areas, and
concludes with recommendations to improve the utility of these mandates.
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INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Security Council, hereinafter referred to as the Security
Council or U.N.S.C., has become the venue of choice for states seeking
expanded authority to counter maritime security threats, recently adopting
dozens of resolutions that are both broad in scope and legally transformative.
Recent multilateral decisions in New York represent a lengthy journey from an
Athens trade embargo in 432 B.C.,1 yet the passage of almost 2,500 years
highlights the enduring role of sanctions in the maritime environment to impose
operational or economic consequence, diplomatically condemn activities, or
publicly signal disfavor of illicit actions.2 From evicting Iraq from Kuwait and
repressing Somali piracy to seeking to shut down North Korea’s illegal nuclear
program, the Security Council has become increasingly influential in naval
operations. The threats addressed highlight the urgency of multilateral
cooperation in an operating space that is vast, vulnerable to exploitation, and
economically critical.
Over the past decade, the Security Council has authorized the naval pursuit
of rogue states, nuclear proliferators, pirates, and migrant smugglers with
unparalleled frequency. From 1946 to 2007, the Security Council adopted
approximately thirty-six resolutions with a direct or indirect impact in the
maritime environment.3 In the following decade, from 2008 to 2017, the Security
Council approved more than fifty such resolutions.4 What previously occurred
about once every 1.7 years at Turtle Bay for six decades—the adoption of a
resolution with a direct or indirect maritime impact—now is routine, transpiring
every 2.5 months. The issue is not of interest solely to those in diplomacy or
academia: operations by naval forces in venues across the globe are being
1
DONALD KAGAN, PERICLES OF ATHENS AND THE BIRTH OF DEMOCRACY 207 (1998) (the decree “barred
the Megarians from the harbors of the Athenian Empire and from the marketplace in Athens.”); see also id.
(“The use of economic embargoes as a diplomatic weapon is common in the modern world . . . [and in this case,
the decree . . . ] became the sole issue on which peace or war depended.”).
2
See generally Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Impact of Unilateral Sanctions on the UN Collective
Security Framework: The Cases of Iran and Syria, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 3
(Ali Z. Marossi & Marisa R. Bassett eds., 2015).
3
See generally S.C. Res. 1718 (Oct. 14, 2006)(The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea); S.C. Res.
1540 (Apr. 28, 2004) (non-proliferation); S.C. Res. 1132 (Oct. 8, 1997) (Sierra Leone); S.C. Res. 875 (Oct. 16,
1993) (Haiti); S.C. Res. 787 (Nov. 16, 1991) (The former Yugoslavia; Bosnia and Herzegovina); S.C. Res. 661
(Aug. 2, 1990) (Iraq and Kuwait); S.C. Res. 552 (June 1, 1984) (Iran); S.C. Res. 221 (Apr. 9, 1966) (South
Rhodesia); S.C. Res. 181 (Aug. 7, 1963) (South Africa); S.C. Res. 95 (Sept. 1, 1951) (the Suez Canal); S.C. Res.
19 (Feb. 27, 1947) (the Corfu Channel).
4
See generally S.C. Res. 2253 (Dec. 17, 2015) (terrorism); S.C. Res. 2240 (Oct. 9, 2015) (migrant
smuggling and human trafficking); S.C. Res. 2216 (Apr. 14, 2015) (Yemen); S.C. Res. 2018 (Oct. 31, 2011)
(piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea); S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (Libya); S.C. Res. 1929
(June 9, 2010) (Iran); S.C. Res. 1816 (June 2, 2008) (Somali piracy).
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planned, approved, and conducted under the aegis of Security Council
direction.5
The expanded maritime focus that generally began in 2008 parallels a spike
in Security Council decisions following the end of the Cold War,6 with more
than ninety-three percent of all U.N.S.C. decisions occurring after 1990.7 The
Turtle Bay8 pivot reflects both a transformed political environment and a
contemporary diplomatic recognition that whereas the process of developing or
amending a treaty is usually lengthy, the Security Council is exclusively
positioned to act swiftly to address transnational security threats. The
considerable authorities possessed by the U.N.S.C., the primary organ of the
United Nations and discussed infra, are correctly characterized as giving it
latitude “like no other body in history.”9
Security Council resolutions have led to queries, boardings, and diversions,
among other naval enforcement measures, of more than 50,000 ships in the past
twenty-five years.10 Since the inception of the United Nations, measures taken
5

See S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 3; S.C. Res. 2253, supra note 4.
See Peter Wallensteen & Patrik Johansson, Security Council Decisions in Perspective, in THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 17 (David M. Malone ed., 2004); see also
Frank Berman, The Authorization Model: Resolution 678 and Its Effects, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM
THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 153 (David M. Malone ed., 2004) (referring to forty-five resolutions
authorizing the use of force adopted by the Security Council between 1990 and 2000) (“Although the end of the
Cold War predictably led to a burst of activity by the Security Council, it was not easily foreseeable that the
Council would maintain such a pace, or that it would contemplate mandating the use of force under its
authority.”).
7
Wallensteen & Johansson, supra note 6, at 19. One study of Security Council decisions adopted from
1946 to 2002 concluded that 93% of all Ch. VII resolutions were adopted since 1990. Id.
8
See generally JAMES ROMAN, CHRONICLES OF OLD NEW YORK: EXPLORING MANHATTAN’S
LANDMARK NEIGHBORHOODS (Museyon ed., 2d ed. 2016) (noting that the United Nations Headquarters, which
includes the Security Council, resides in an area of New York City referred to as Turtle Bay). The Turtle Bay
area was given its name when British naval officer Sir Peter Warren owned the property in the 1600s. Id. at 76
(“The original land grant referred to the property as ‘Deutal,’ the Dutch word for bent blade, in reference to the
shape of the land. In 1664, when the British captured New Amsterdam, ‘Deutal Bay’ was anglicized into Turtle
Bay.”).
9
DAVID L. BOSCO, FIVE TO RULE THEM ALL: THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN WORLD 3 (2009).
10
John Kriendler, NATO’s Changing Opportunities and Constraints for Peacekeeping, 41 NATO REV.
16, 20 (1993) (demonstrating that to implement Resolution 816 (1993) with respect to Bosnia-Herzegovina
within a three-month period in 1993 “over 12,000 ships had been challenged of which 803 were stopped; of
these, 176 were diverted and subsequently inspected and nine violators were detected.”); see also Stephanie M.
Smart, Maritime Interception Operations, in U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 735–36
(Geoffrey S. Corn, Rachel E. VanLandingham, & Shane R. Reeves eds., 2016) (explaining that the enforcement
of U.N. sanctions against Saddam Hussein and Iraq over twelve years (1991–2003) resulted in “42,000 ships
being queried, 3,000 [boardings], and 2,200 [ship diversions]. . . . [And,] during Operation Iraqi Freedom . . .
the United States and allies queried 5,000 ships, boarded 2,600 vessels, and diverted another 400.”); Lois E.
Fielding, Maritime Interception: Centerpiece of Economic Sanctions in the New World Order, 53 LA. L. REV.
6
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under the authority of a U.N.S.C. resolution have led to the destruction of more
than 3,500 vessels.11 And separately, implementation of U.N.S.C. resolutions
between 2015 and 2017 has led to the maritime rescue of approximately 40,000
people.12
U.N.S.C. authorization has also supported the naval pursuit of the Hansa
India, illegally transporting “tons of bullet casings” from the Islamic Republic
of Iran13 and the Francop, carrying “36 containers of arms and related materiel,
including . . . 12,000 anti-tank and mortar shells, more than 20,000
fragmentation grenades, and more than half a million rounds of ammunition.”14
Other noteworthy naval engagements conducted under the authority of a
U.N.S.C. resolution include the North Korean-flagged freighter M/V Kang Nam
1,15 believed to be carrying missile components, and of the Belize-flagged M/V
Light16 suspected of shipping missile components and technology from a North
Korean port; the blockading and diversion of the Cyprus-flagged M/V Vento Di

1191, 1192 (1993) (“The coalition naval force [in the Persian Gulf following adoption of U.N.S.C. Resolutions
661, 665, and 670] was composed of more than 100 ships and 25,000 personnel contributed from about twenty
countries.”).
11
MALCOLM W. CAGLE & FRANK A. MANSON, THE SEA WAR IN KOREA 294, 532 (1957). The number
of vessels destroyed under the authority of a Security Council resolution is based on the Korean War, Somali
counter-piracy efforts, and Mediterranean migration operations. Action taken by the “United Nations Blockading
and Escort Force,” among others, pursuant to U.N.S.C. Resolutions 82-84 (1950) destroyed 2,464 “enemy
vessels” from June 25, 1950–June 8, 1953 and an additional 824 “vessels and small craft” from June 25, 1950–
May 31, 1953. Id.; see also U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 2240, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc S/2016/766 (Sept. 7, 2016) (that the European Union “disposed of 241
vessels” as part of their mission to implement U.N.S.C. 2240 (2015) on Mediterranean migration) [hereinafter
Secretary-General on S.C. Resolution 2240]; Letter from Frederica Mogherini, Vice President of the European
Commission, to Baroness Verma, Chair of the EU External Affairs Sub-Committee (July 26, 2017) (noting that
by July 26, 2017, the vessels neutralized under Operation Sophia expanded the number to 463) (emphasis added).
12
See, e.g., Secretary-General on S.C. Resolution 2240, supra note 11, ¶ 13. Resolutions that address
safety of life at sea have not altered existing obligations to assist those in distress, though U.N.S.C. mandates
have supported national- and regional-level decisions to prioritize the deployment of naval assets to implement
its provisions. Id. (“As at 31 August 2016, the operation had rescued more than 25,400 men, women and children
at sea and contributed through its assets to many more.”); see also CAGLE & MANSON, supra note 11, at 69
(describing that in an operation on August 16, 1950, navy ships supporting the U.N. mission to implement the
U.N.S.C. resolutions in Korea evacuated more than 7,000 people); Letter from Frederica Mogherini, supra note
11 (stating that more than 39,000 lives had been “saved by Operation Sophia’s personnel since its launch in
2015.”).
13
See Rep. of the S.C., at 192, U.N. Doc. A/65/2 (2010); see also Press Release, Susan E. Rice, U.S.
Representative to the United Nations (Dec. 10, 2009); see also EFTHYMIOS PAPASTAVRIDIS, THE INTERCEPTION
OF VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS 108–11 (2013).
14
U.N. SCOR, 65th Sess., 6235th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6235 (Dec. 10, 2009).
15
Choe Sang-Hun, Test Looms as U.S. Tracks North Korean Ship, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/world/asia/22korea.html.
16
David E. Sanger, U.S. Said to Turn Back North Korea Missile Shipment, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/world/asia/13missile.html.

WILSON_PROOFS

6

12/17/2018 12:20 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

Ponente,17 suspected of carrying proscribed arms and related material into
Libya; counterpiracy operations on the high seas, in the Somali territorial sea,
and on land;18 the seizure of M/V Jin Teng, a Sierra Leone-flagged, North
Korean-owned cargo ship;19 and the seizure by the French frigate F/S Provence
in the northern Indian Ocean of a dhow illegally transporting to Somalia “several
hundred machine guns, anti-tank weapons and AK[-]47 assault rifles[;]”20
Moreover, naval forces from Australia, France, and the United States seized
more than 8,000 AK-47 assault rifles between 2015 and 2018 in multiple
interdictions of vessels carrying illicit weapons to Yemen.21
Naval measures conducted across the globe addressing a diverse array of
threats underline the utility of U.N.S.C. resolutions and the complexity of
maritime enforcement. There are limits, however, to Security Council
decisions.22 Regarding high seas interdictions, there are well-established law-of17

Tarros v. United States, 982 F. Supp. 2d 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
See Terry McKnight & Michael Kirsh, Preface to PIRATE ALLEY: COMMANDING TASK FORCE 151 OFF
SOMALIA xiii–xiv (2012); Terry McKnight & Michael Kirsh, Prologue to PIRATE ALLEY: COMMANDING TASK
FORCE 151 OFF SOMALIA xiii–xx (2012); Jim Miklaszewki, Foreword to Terry McKnight & Michael Hirsh,
PIRATE ALLEY: COMMANDING TASK FORCE 151 OFF SOMALIA ix–xii (2012) (detailing the challenges of
combatting transnational security threats with a firsthand account of commanding a multilateral maritime task
force).
19
Doug Stanglin, Philippines to Seize N. Korean Cargo Ship under U.N. Sanctions, USA TODAY (Mar.
5, 2016, 5:38 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/03/05/philippines-korean-cargo-ship-unsanctions/81359670/; see also VESSEL FINDER, https://www.vesselfinder.com/vessels/JIN-TENG-IMO9163166-MMSI-667001458 (last visited Sept. 19, 2018).
20
French Warship Seizes Somalia-Bound Weapons, NAVAL TODAY (Mar. 29, 2016), http://navaltoday.
com/2016/03/29/french-warship-seizes-somalia-bound-weapons (“Provence boarded the vessel and determined
that it was not registered in any country. The ship’s boarding team then searched it and discovered the weapons.
As illicit weapons were deemed to be destined for Somalia, they were seized under the United Nations Security
Council mandated arms embargo in accordance with UNSCR 2244(2015).”).
21
U.S. 5th Fleet Pub. Affairs, Jason Dunham Counts 2,521 AK-47s Seized, U.S. NAVAL FORCES
CENTRAL COMMAND (Sept. 6, 2018), http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/1621512/jasondunham-counts-2521-ak-47s-seized/. The article also noted that, “[b]ased on an analysis of all available
information, including crew interviews, a review of onboard records and an examination of the arms aboard the
vessel, the United States concluded that the arms from the four interdictions in 2015 and 2016 originated in Iran
and were intended to be delivered to the Houthis in Yemen in contravention of [U.N.S.C.] Resolution 2216.” Id.
22
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. &
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Order, 1993 I.C.J. ¶ 100 (Sept. 1993) (separate opinion by Lauterpacht, J.)
[hereinafter Lauterpacht Opinion]; see also Johann Ruben Leiae & Andreas Paulus, Ch. XVI Miscellaneous
Provisions, Article 103, 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY [hereinafter U.N. CHARTER
COMMENTARY] 2119–20 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3rd ed., 2012) (“it appears widely accepted in international
doctrine that conflicts between Charter law . . . and jus cogens result in the nullity of the Charter law in question.
As Judge Elihu Lauterpacht explained in his Separate Opinion in the Genocide Case: ‘the concept of jus cogens
operates as a concept superior to both customary international law and treaty. . . . Indeed, one only has to state
the opposite proposition thus—that a Security Council resolution may even require participation in genocide—
for its unacceptability to be apparent.’”). Judge Lauterpacht further stated, “[n]or should one overlook the
significance of the provision in Article 24 (2) of the Charter that, in discharging its duties to maintain
18
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the-sea23 principles crucial to global commerce, such as freedom of navigation
and the general concept of exclusive flag State jurisdiction, that must be
considered,24 and departed from where necessary in the pursuit of threats to the
peace. Fundamental law-of-the-sea principles are reflected in the Convention on
the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), the seminal document for maritime
issues.25 Development spanned nine years of negotiations on issues such as the
breadth of the territorial sea, innocent passage, transit passage rights, dispute
resolution, fisheries, and the 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone, among
other issues. This comprehensive instrument—adopted in 1982 and entered into
force in 1994—includes 320 articles and nine Annexes.26
Debate over almost every word between 1973 and 1982 resulted in a treaty
that balanced the rights of coastal States with navigational freedoms. That said,
contemporary threats such as the use of semi-submersible vessels to transport
illicit cargo, Global Positioning Systems (GPS) interference, and Automatic
Identification System (AIS) spoofing did not exist when the LOS Convention
was drafted. Moreover, an effort to interpret more than 200 undefined terms in
the LOS Convention is almost the same length as the treaty itself.27 Regardless
of limitations, the 1982 accord is recognized as the foundational source of law
for high seas enforcement measures,28 global mobility, and is the starting point
for discussions in Turtle Bay regarding threats to the peace involving or
impacting the maritime environment.
international peace and security, the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles
of the United Nations.” Lauterpacht Opinion, supra note 22, ¶ 101.
23
See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.T.S. 31363 [hereinafter LOS
Convention]. In discussions over the first U.N.S.C. resolution to address the contemporary threat posed by
Somali piracy, for example, members signaled their disapproval over actual or potential deviations from
recognized law-of-the-sea principles. S.C. Res. 1816 (June 2, 2008). Hoang Chi Trung (Viet Nam) remarked,
“the resolution shall not be interpreted as allowing any action that is contrary to international law, the Charter
and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to be taken within the maritime areas under the
jurisdiction of a coastal State.” U.N. SCOR63d Sess., 5902d mtg., at 4, U.N. Doc S/PV.5902 (June 2, 2008).
And Baso Sangqu of South Africa similarly asserted, “the resolutions of this Council must respect the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Id.
24
See S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 4, at ¶ 4 (“Affirming that international law, as reflected in the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 . . . sets out the legal framework applicable to
combatting piracy and armed robbery, as well as other ocean activities.”); see also S.C. Res. 1838, ¶ 14 (Oct. 7,
2008); S.C. Res. 1846, ¶ 15 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1851 (Dec. 16, 2008).
25
LOS Convention, supra note 23. The 1982 accord is not the only treaty focused on the maritime
environment in peacetime though it represents the foundational instrument of such matters.
26
See LOS Convention, supra note 23, Table of Contents.
27
See DEFINITIONS FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA: TERMS NOT DEFINED BY THE 1982 CONVENTION (George
K. Walker ed., 2012).
28
LOS Convention, supra note 23. This Article refers to measures taken by naval, coast guard, and
constabulary forces to implement U.N.S.C. resolutions as maritime enforcement vice maritime law enforcement
primarily because the former term more appropriately characterizes the action.
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Security Council resolutions involving the oceans—similar to addressing
other security challenges—generally focus on a specific threat, for example:
repressing piracy, stopping nuclear proliferation, or preventing the deadly
smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons.29 The response to each threat
is geographically, operationally, and politically unique. Further, some of the
resolutions with an impact on naval operations are incidental to the sanctions
they impose, while others primarily focus upon the maritime environment, and
almost all impose measures with extraterritorial application. Unfortunately,
existing alongside this appropriately diverse attention to the spectrum of security
threats is a stunning lack of attention to the unifying thread of all resolutions
with a maritime focus, a blindness that, albeit unintentional, deprives diplomats
of the collective lessons of their work. While the frequency of U.N.S.C.
decisions following the end of the Cold War has generated considerable
attention, little notice has been taken of the combined body of resolutions with
relevance to the maritime environment.
This Article distills common themes—and examines the impact—of
approximately ninety resolutions that have either directly or indirectly
authorized the use of naval power to confront a transnational security threat.
More broadly, this Article seeks to chronicle the expanded use of U.N.S.C.
resolutions, evolving threats to the peace in the maritime environment, and the
ongoing struggle to balance existing authorities with contemporary security
challenges.
Following an introduction, Section I explores the United Nations concept,
the U.N. Charter, the distinctive Security Council status, the law of the sea, and
the earlier resolutions with a maritime nexus. While the U.N. Charter expressly
recognizes the role of the sea30 in addressing threats to the peace, the Security
Council infrequently adopted resolutions with a maritime focus over its first six
decades. Section II discusses increased Security Council attention on threats and
illicit activity occurring on the ocean, including the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea nuclear and ballistic missile program; the maritime transport
of weapons of mass destruction; Somali piracy; migrant smuggling and
trafficking in persons in the Mediterranean Sea; enforcement of embargos; and

29
See United Nations Documents on Piracy, OCEANS & LAW OF THE SEA UNITED NATIONS, https://www.
un.org/depts/los/piracy/piracy_documents.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2018); UN Security Council Resolutions
on North Korea, ARMS CONTROL ASSC., https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-CouncilResolutions-on-North-Korea (last visited Sept. 20, 2018); Security Council Extends Authorization to Intercept
Vessels Suspected of Smuggling Migrants through Libya for Third One-Year Period, U.N., https://www.un.org/
press/en/2017/sc13015.doc.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
30
U.N. Charter arts. 41–42.
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violence in the Gulf of Guinea. Section II further examines how these resolutions
intersect with one another and impact boarding authorities on the high seas.31
Section III discusses judicial opinions involving naval enforcement measures
taken in accordance with a U.N.S.C. resolution, and this Article concludes with
recommendations for the Security Council in addressing future maritime threats.
I.

THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

A. Background, Overview, Legal Considerations, and the Law of the Sea
There are 193 Member States to the Charter of the United Nations—a
“greater Magna Carta.”32 The concept of “collective security” is not new, but the
United Nations forged a distinctive path, remaining relevant, impactful, and at
times imperfect for more than seven decades.33
The U.N. construct for global order has sparked uncertainty and criticism
since its entry into force in 1945.34 The second U.N. Secretary-General, Dag
Hammarskjöld—who, called the greatest statesman of the twentieth century,35
tragically died in office in 1961—explained the United Nations concept with a
concise metaphor that remains relevant today: “Everything will be alright—you
know when? When people, just people, stop thinking of the United Nations as a
weird Picasso abstraction and see it as the drawing they made themselves.”36
31
The use of the term “high seas” in this Article refers to the maritime area seaward of a coastal State’s
twelve nautical mile territorial sea. See LOS Convention, supra note 23; see also United States v. Beyle, 782
F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2015) (affirming a conviction for piracy and murder, among other charges and holding that
“the high seas includes areas of the sea that are outside the territorial seas of any nation.”).
32
See U.N. MEMBER STATES (Dec. 1, 2017), http://www.un.org/en/member-states/index.html; James
Traub, The Best Intentions, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2006) (noting that John Foster Dulles believed the United
Nations [could] be “a greater Magna Carta”).
33
BOSCO, supra note 9, at 5 (“The doctrine of collective security, which has influenced generations of
diplomats, insists that international security is indivisible: a breach of the peace anywhere threatens the peace
everywhere. After all, it was a clash in the Balkans that produced the First World War and the invasion of Poland
that sparked the second”). [
34
See BOSCO, supra note 9, at 6 (“Too often, the conversation about the council ends with a rueful
acknowledgement of its limitations. For all of its shortcomings, however, the council has been a qualified success
as a loose concert of the most powerful states. It has created a space and process through which the world’s great
powers struggle to contain conflicts and achieve compromise”).
35
ROGER LIPSEY, HAMMARSKJöLD: A LIFE 585 (Univ. Mich. Press 2015) (quoting U.S. President John
F. Kennedy) (“I realize now that in comparison to him [Hammarskjold], I am a small man. He was the greatest
statesman of our century.”).
36
See Dag Hammarskjold: A Man of the Next Generation, UNESCO, (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.
unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/dag_hammarskjoeld_a_man_of_the_next_generation/;
THOMAS M. NICHOLS, EVE OF DESTRUCTION: THE COMING AGE OF PREVENTIVE WAR 120 (2008) (noting that
Henry Cabot Lodge remarked that the United Nations was “created to prevent you from going to hell. It [wasn’t]
created to take you to heaven.”); see also U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy,
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Even the development of the site on which the U.N. resides, the Turtle Bay
neighborhood of Manhattan,37 parallels that of the institution: circuitous,
uneven, and inspired.
A central element of the United Nations framework is the Security Council,
a body vested with astonishing authority.38 The fifteen-member39 U.N.S.C.
includes five permanent members (the P5), each of whom has veto power over
resolutions.40 The creation of the P5 underscores the importance drafters
attached to securing the support of major powers. With “primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security,”41 the Security Council
authorizes the use of force to ensure compliance under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter.42 Though the issue of whether an event constitutes a threat to the peace
has sparked vigorous debate,43 it is well settled that the decision resides with the
Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (Jan. 31, 1992) (“The United Nations is a
gathering of sovereign States and what it can do depends on the common ground that they can create between
them.”).
37
See ROMAN, supra note 8, at 76–78 (demonstrating that the near 400-year journey to develop the area
known as Turtle Bay overcame multiple setbacks to forge the community that now exists in this Manhattan
enclave).
38
U.N. Charter, supra note 30, art. 39, ¶ 1 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.”). Article 41 provides, “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations
to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail,
sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”
Id. at art. 41, ¶ 1; see also Rossana Deplano, The Use of International Law by the United Nations Security
Council: An Empirical Framework for Analysis, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 2085, 2085–2112 (2015); Alfred H.A.
Soons, A ‘New’ Exception to the Freedom of the High Seas: The Enforcement of U.N. Sanctions, REFLECTIONS
ON PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Terry D. Gill & Wybo P. Heere eds., Martinus Nijhoff,
2000).
39
U.N. Charter, supra note 30, art. 23, ¶ 1 (“The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the
United Nations.”).
40
See ANDREW BOYD, FIFTEEN MEN ON A POWER KEG: A HISTORY OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL 69
(Stein and Day 1971); see also Stephen C. Schlesinger, ACT OF CREATION: THE FOUNDING OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 270 (2003) (listing the People’s Republic of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States as the permanent members of the Security Council); see generally, LORAINE SIEVERS & SAM
DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 295 (Oxford University Press 4th ed. 2014) (examining
voting protocols, among other procedural issues).
41
U.N. Charter, supra note 30, art. 24, ¶ 1.
42
Id. art. 42, ¶ 1 (“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would
be inadequate . . . it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air,
sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”).
43
See U.N. SCOR, 72nd Sess., 8130th mtg. at 2–3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8130 (Dec. 11, 2017). Evgeniy
Zagaynov (Russian Federation), along with colleagues from the People’s Republic of China and Egypt, opposed
the U.N.S.C. discussion of human rights. Id. “We believe they are not within the Council’s remit [and] the
Security Council has never been part of the United Nations toolkit for protecting and promoting human rights.”
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Security Council.44 Because Member States “agree to accept and carry out the
decisions of the Security Council. . . ,”45 their decisions “impose binding
obligations on all States.”46
While the vast majority of resolutions discussed in this Article have a
maritime nexus, legal opinions involving the land- and air-based enforcement of
U.N.S.C. measures are instructive. Courts in multiple venues have assessed
Member State obligations, interpreted resolutions, and sought to reconcile
potentially conflicting obligations. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in
1971, for instance, authored an advisory opinion of Resolution 276 (1970)
specifically regarding the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, and
generally whether Member State compliance was compulsory, an issue that has
relevance to contemporary maritime enforcement. In accordance with Security
Council direction, Peace Palace jurists opined that:
The continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal,
South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from
Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the
Territory . . . [and that] States Members of the United Nations are

Id. Nikki Haley (United States) disagreed, stating, “We continue to think there is a separation between peace
and security and human rights, and there is not.” Id. at 2.
44
U.N. Charter, supra note 30, arts. 24, 25, 48; see Questions of Interpretation and Application of the
1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.) 1998 I.C.J. 9, at 75,
76, 79 (Feb. 27) (dissenting opinion of President Schwebel) (“The drafters of the Charter above all resolved to
accord the Security Council alone extraordinary power . . . . The very heart of the Charter’s design for the
maintenance of international peace . . . . It may be finally recalled that, at San Francisco, it was resolved ‘to leave
to the Council the entire decision, and also the entire responsibility for that decision, as to what constitutes a
threat to peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.’”); see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION
AND SELF-DEFENCE 284 (Cambridge University Press 3d ed. 2007) (the decision regarding whether a threat
warrants United Nations intervention “is completely within the discretion of the Security Council.”).
45
U.N. Charter, supra note 30, art. 25, ¶ 1 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”) U.N. Charter, supra
note 30, art. 48, ¶ 1 (“The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance
of international peace and security shall be taken by the all the Member of the United Nations or by some of
them, as the Security Council may determine”) (emphasis added); see also U.N. Charter, supra note 30, art. 24,
¶ 1.
46
See Counter-Memorial of the United Kingdom, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie ( Libya v. U.K.), 1999 I.C.J. Pleadings 1
(Mar. 1999); see also Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State
Responsibility, 43 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 55, 85 (1994) (“Sanctions adopted by the Security Council under Article
41 may be assimilated to non-self-executing treaty obligations; as such they require domestic implementation.
It is the duty of the members of the UN to adapt their municipal law to their international obligations, although
not many have enacted special legislation to give effect to UN decisions.”).
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under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa’s presence
in Namibia. . . .47

The scope of Security Council authority would again be raised at the Peace
Palace. In the Lockerbie proceedings involving Libya and the United
Kingdom—and separately, the United States—the ICJ examined, among other
issues, whether the Security Council exceeded its remit in Resolution 748 (1992)
by directing that “all States shall . . . deny permission to any aircraft to take off
from, land in or overfly their territory if it is destined to land in or has taken off
from the territory of Libya.”48 A fundamental question was “whether the ICJ
was precluded from dealing with a case of which the Security Council was
already seized.”49 The U.N.S.C. imposed sanctions and other enforcement
measures on Libya as a result of the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103,
which killed 270 people.50
Libya claimed Resolutions 748 and 883 (1993) were unlawful because they
were inconsistent with provisions of a multinational aviation treaty and more
broadly, violative of international law.51 A preliminary issue focused on whether
the ICJ had competence over the dispute in view of the Security Council’s
resolutions.52 The United Kingdom emphasized:
[E]ven if the Montreal Convention did confer on Libya the rights it
claims, they could not be exercised in this case because they were
superseded by Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993)
which, by virtue of Articles 25 and 103 of the United Nations Charter,
have priority over all rights and obligations arising out of the Montreal
Convention.53

47
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 133 (June
21) (emphasis added).
48
S.C. Res. 748 (Mar. 31, 1992), ¶ 4. The Security Council included a humanitarian exception. Id.; see,
e.g., S.C. Res. 731 (Jan. 21, 1992); see also Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), Preliminary Objection, 1998 I.C.J. 9
(Feb. 1998) [hereinafter Lockerbie Preliminary Objections of 27 February 1998].
49
Anne Peters, Ch. V Functions and Powers, Article 24, 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY [hereinafter U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY] 762–86, (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed., 2012).
50
See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), Preliminary Objections, 1995 I.C.J. 17 (June 1995). “On 21
December 1988 a Boeing 747 aircraft of Pan American Airways exploded in flight over the town of Lockerbie
in southern Scotland. The aircraft crashed, killing all 259 passengers and crew and eleven residents of
Lockerbie.” Id. ¶ 2.28.
51
See Lockerbie Preliminary Objections of 27 February 1998, supra note 48, at 9, ¶ 14.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 18, ¶ 37.
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The Court did not dismiss the complaint, basing their holding on unnecessarily
narrow analysis that purportedly sought to avoid a substantive matter—the
preeminent status of Security Council resolutions54—in a preliminary
proceeding.55
By not declining jurisdiction in the provisional measures stage (against
the objections of the United Kingdom and the United States which had
argued the [Libyan] request should be qualified as inadmissible
because of the risk of contradiction between the resolution and the
provisional measures) the Court implicitly gave a negative answer and
implicitly confirmed the Libyan claim of an absence of hierarchy
between the two organs.56

The Lockerbie proceedings were subsequently discontinued with prejudice
by agreement of the parties,57 “so the merits of the two parallel cases were never
reached.”58 And while the “proceedings triggered a wealth of scholarship on the
question of the relationship between the Security Council and the ICJ,”59 ICJ
President Stephen M. Schwebel provided a powerful legacy of this case, and in
his dissent persuasively explained:
However understandable that complaint [of Libya] may be, it cannot
furnish the Court with the legal authority to supervene the resolutions
of the Security Council. The argument that it does is a purely political
argument; the complaints that give rise to it should be addressed to and
by the United Nations in its consideration of the reform of the Security
Council. It is not an argument that can be heard in a court of law.60

54
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 151, 167 (July 20)
(regarding the broad scope of U.N.S.C authority, Ch. VII “speak[s] of situations as well as disputes, and it must
lie within the power of the Security Council to police a situation even though it does not resort to enforcement
against a State.”).
55
Lockerbie Preliminary Objections of 27 February 1998, supra note 48, at 24, ¶ 53. “In the view of the
Court, this objection does much more than ‘touch[ing] upon subjects belonging to the merits of the case’ . . . it
is ‘inextricably interwoven” with the merits.” Id. at 23, ¶ 49 (citations omitted). Further, “[i]f the court were to
rule on that objection, it would therefore inevitably be ruling on the merits.” Id.
56
Peters, U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 49, at 770.
57
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), Order, 2003 I.C.J. 17 (Sept. 10, 2003).
58
Peters, U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 49, at 770.
59
Id. at 770, n.41.
60
Libya v. U.K., supra note 44, at 81. “The history of the United Nations Charter thus corroborates the
view that a clear limitation on the plenitude of the Security Council’s powers is that those powers must be
exercised in accordance with the well-established principles of international law. It is true this limitation must
be restrictively interpreted and is confined only to the principles and objects which appear in Chapter I of the
Charter . . . .” Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), Order, 1992 I.C.J. Rep. 3, at 65 (Apr. 14, 1992) (dissenting opinion
by Weeramantry, J.).
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Another fundamental issue is Security Council authorization to employ “all
necessary measures” or “all necessary means” in resolutions adopted under
Chapter VII.61 Regarding the Security Council’s distinctive role to authorize
force, then-U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan remarked, “While such action
should only be taken when all peaceful means have failed, the option of taking
it is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a guarantor of
international security.”62
While U.N.S.C. members have extensively discussed the use of force during
debate on resolutions to combat Somali piracy,63 among other threats, operative
provisions generally do not include express references to the use of force or
explicit standards.64 Though the phrases all necessary means and all necessary
measures in Security Council resolutions are commonly understood to include
the use of force, the European Union (EU), for instance, clarified “all necessary
measures” includes the “use of force.”65 The issues of whether Security Council
authorization is a necessary prerequisite to the use of force, and separately, of
the impact of U.N. Charter articles 2(4)66 and 51 are largely outside the scope of
this Article. That said, the Court of Justice of the European Union in Yusuf v.
Council of the E.U. acknowledged Security Council primacy in determining

61
U.N. Charter, supra note 30, art. 42. The ability of the Security Council under U.N. Charter Chapter
VII to maintain “international peace and security” and decide “what measures shall be taken” is based on Articles
24, 25, 39, 40–42, and 48. Id. arts. 24, 25, 39, 40–42, 48; see also, eg., S.C. Res. 2295, ¶ 17 (June 29, 2016) (“all
necessary means”); Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of
Somalia, 20 EJIL 399, 412 (2009).
62
U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, ¶¶ 42–43, U.N. Doc. A/47/277 (Jan. 31, 1992) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Agenda for Peace].
63
U.N. SCOR, 63 Sess., 6036 mtg. at 4, UN. Doc. S/PV.6046 (Dec. 16, 2008). David Miliband (United
Kingdom) asserted that “any use of force must be both necessary and proportionate [including . . . ] an
assessment that the measures taken must be appropriate.”
64
See S.C. Res., 1816 ¶ 7 (June 2, 2008). Operative paragraph 7 authorized “all necessary means to
repress acts of piracy and armed robbery,” within the territorial waters of Somalia. Id. (emphasis added). While
U.N. Charter arts. 39–42 uses the term “measures” regarding the Member State actions which may be authorized
by the Security Council under Chapter VII, there is no legal difference between “measures” and “means.” But
see S.C. Res. 221, ¶ 5 (Apr. 9, 1966) (addressing Southern Rhodesia authorized “the use of force if necessary”)
(emphasis added).
65
Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, art. 2, 2008 O.J. (L 301) 33 (EU) (discussing a European Union
military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery
off the Somali coast). “Under the conditions set by the relevant international law and by UNSC Resolutions
1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008), Atalanta shall, as far as available capabilities allow . . . take the
necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of
piracy and armed robbery which may be committed in the areas where it is present. . . . “ Id. (emphasis added);
see also Treves, supra note 61, at 412.
66
U.N. Charter, supra note 30, art. 2(4) (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
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threats to international peace and security is “subject only to the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defence mentioned in Article 51 of the UN
Charter.”67
Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, for instance, British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher maintained that the “right of self-defense—
safeguarded in Article 51 of the Charter—was more than enough.”68 French
president Francois Mitterrand, however, sought a U.N.S.C. resolution. “Article
51 doesn’t mind public opinion. . . . Fifty-five million French people are not
international lawyers.”69 Following adoption of Resolution 2240 (2015)
addressing human trafficking and migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean Sea,
U.N.S.C. President Oyarzun Marchesi (Spain) remarked, “[a]ll EU member
States contributing to the operation now have the authority to interdict them and
their boats on the high seas.”70 Separately, while piracy is a universal crime,71
Security Council resolutions to counter the Somali threat were hailed as
providing a “legal basis” to commence operational efforts, and a U.S.
Government report released by President Barack Obama noted the “United
States . . . used force pursuant to a U.N. Security Council resolution under
Chapter VII . . . to combat piracy in and off the coast of Somalia. . . .”72
67

Case T-306/01, Yusuf v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-3533, ¶ 270; U.N. Charter, supra note 30, art. 51.
BOSCO, supra note 9, at 160. Thatcher further remarked, “I did not like unnecessary resort to the UN,
because it suggested that sovereign states lacked the moral authority to act on their own behalf. If it became
accepted that force could only be used—even in self-defense—when the United Nations approved, neither
Britain’s interests nor those of international justice and order would be served.” Id. at 156. Contra ALEXANDER
PROELSS, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY 58 (2017) (noting that “no
state participating in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia has ever relied upon its right of self-defense
in terms of Article 51 U.N. Charter or under customary international law, and that right has not been mentioned
once.”).
69
BOSCO, supra note 9, at 160. Mitterrand’s caution would prove prescient. “Polls suggest that many
Europeans view Security Council approval as a prerequisite to the legitimate use of force.” Id. at 254; see also
U.N. Charter, supra note 30, art. 2(4) (“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political interdependence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”); BENN STEIL, THE MARSHALL PLAN: DAWN OF THE COLD
WAR 392 (2018) (commenting on the NATO engagements in Serbia in 1999, Russian President Mikhail
Gorbachev asserted the military action was conducted “against a sovereign country without authorization by the
UN Security Council, in violation of the U.N. Charter and international law.”).
70
U.N. SCOR 70th Sess., 7531 mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7531 (Oct. 9, 2015).
71
U.S. v. Hasan et al., 747 F. Supp. 2d 642 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“Piracy is well-established and specifically
and clearly codified in Article 15 of the Convention on the High Seas of 1958 and in Article 101 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982. . . . [T]his definition is both reflective of customary
international law and universally accepted by states.”).
72
WHITE HOUSE, REP. ON THE LEGAL AND POL’Y FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF
MIL. FORCE AND RELATED NAT’L SECURITY OPERATIONS 8, 51 (Dec. 2016); see also European Union Naval
Force Press Release, European Union Marks Eight Years of Counter-Privacy Commitment to Protect World
Food Programme Vessels and Deter Pirate Attacks off Coast of Somalia, but Warns No Room for Complacency
(Dec. 13, 2016) (noting the “UN Security Council Resolutions in place”) (emphasis added); James Kraska &
68
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Thus, regardless of whether LOS Convention provisions, for example,
supporting piracy repression,73 “presupposes that force may be used to reach
these objectives,”74 there is diplomatic, legal, and operational value in a
U.N.S.C. resolution. Security Council authorization to employ force in the
maritime domain, however, has not always been welcomed. In discussions on
Resolution 2240 (2015), for instance, addressing smuggling migrants and human
trafficking, U.N.S.C. member Rafael Ramírez (Venezuela) remarked, “[T]he
use of military force to deal with the humanitarian situation of migrants is a
serious mistake.”75
The scope of Security Council authority has also been examined in the
context of resolutions that might conflict with other treaties, agreements, or
international obligations, discussed briefly above in the Libya proceeding at the
ICJ.76 Provisions that vary from the LOS Convention on navigational rights or
flag State authorities, for example, could trigger a challenge regarding the
preeminence of the U.N. Charter in relation to separate instruments. On this
matter, Member States opted to elevate the U.N. Charter to a superior status in
international law with article 103,77 which provides: “In the event of a conflict
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations…and their
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the
present Charter shall prevail.”78 This ostensibly well-settled issue has

Brian Wilson, The Pirates of the Gulf of Aden: The Coalition Is the Strategy, 43 STAN J. INT’L L. 202, 284
(2009).
73
LOS Convention, supra note 23, § 105 (“On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction
of any State, every State may seize . . . a ship . . . taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the
persons and seize the property onboard.”).
74
Treves, supra note 61, at 412–13; see also LOS Convention, supra note 23, §§ 105, 110.
75
U.N. SCOR 70th Sess., supra note 70, at 4–5. Ramírez further stated “Venezuela . . . rejects the notion
of making migrants, refugees and asylum seekers into a security issue, as has been done on this occasion. The
resolution adopted authorizes the use of force, which, in our view, is a disproportionate action that sets a
dangerous precedent for the treatment of the issue in the future.” Id. Cherif Mahamet Zene (Chad), remarked, “
. . . we dare to hope that the reference in the text to Ch. VII of the Charter of the United Nations authorizing the
use of armed force will not give rise to extensive interpretations, as has unfortunately been the case in the past.”
Id. at 3. Dmitry Polyanskiy (Russia), remarked, “While we believe that climate change is a grave threat to us all,
the [Security] Council has neither the specialized expertise nor the tools to put together viable solutions for
effectively combating climate change.” U.N. SCOR 73d Sess., 8307 mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8307 (July 11,
2018). Polyanskiy asserted the Security Council meeting “is yet another attempt to link the issue of preserving
the environment to threats to international peace and security.” Id. at 15.
76
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 29, 31–33, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331;
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 532–33 (Oliver Dorr & Kirsten
Schmalenbach eds., 2012).
77
U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 22, at 2112.
78
U.N. Charter, supra note 30, art. 103.
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nevertheless triggered enormous judicial, academic, and diplomatic attention.79
The Covenant of the League of Nations included a comparable provision, though
the 1919 instrument provided a more powerful declaration regarding its
authoritative force in relation to other legal responsibilities.80 The Covenant
abrogated all inconsistent obligations whereas the U.N. Charter prevails only in
the event of conflict with an international agreement.81 Contemporary judicial
attention has centered on reconciling obligations under the Charter with
potentially contradictory legal commitments.
UN Charter article 103 is
[B]est regarded as an admonition to preserve the unity of international
law under the umbrella of the Charter and to deal with its different
actors and legal instruments by way of reciprocal respect instead of
incurring the risk of harming the authority of both the UN and
international law in general by engaging in an unhelpful
confrontation.82

Judicial approaches such as a presumption of compatibility and systemic
integration have been employed to avoid conflict with the U.N. Charter.83
An Ottawa federal court in Abdelrazik v. Canada examined a government
decision84 not to renew the passport of a citizen because the applicant was
79
U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 22, at 2111–12 (citing more than fifty articles that examined
article 103).
80
League of Nations Covenant art. 20; see also U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 22, at 2115–
16.
81
U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 22, at 2115–16 (“A formula according to which the U.N.
Charter would have prevailed over any other international obligations to which they are subject was not adopted.
Pursuant to this provision, the Charter would have superseded all other international obligations. The drafters
were reluctant to explicitly include customary international law and other legal sources in the prevalence of the
Charter.”). The Article 103 formulation “that obligations inconsistent with the Charter would not be
automatically abrogated but that the Charter would only prevail in the case of a conflict, suggests that the authors
of the Charter preferred suspension rather than outright nullification of conflicting obligations.” Id.
82
Id. at 2114.
83
Id. at 2118; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 76, art. 29, 31–33; VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, supra note 76, at 541–43. While the elements of
interpreting a treaty are not identical to interpreting a U.N.S.C resolution, “[t]he first element of the general rule
of treaty interpretation requires giving ordinary meaning to the ‘terms of the treaty’ . . . . [And] the terms of a
treaty have to be interpreted ‘in their context.’” Id. Along with examining the “object and purpose,” the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties “requires every treaty be interpreted in “good faith.’” Id. at 545–49. The LOS
Convention provides that “States Parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention
. . . .” LOS Convention, supra note 23, art. 300.
84
Abdelrazik v. Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs) (2009), [2010] 1 F.C.R. 267, 268–69 (“The
applicant travelled to Sudan in 2003 with a valid Canadian passport but his passport expired during his time
there and was not renewed. This fact and other circumstances prevented his return home to Canada. In Sudan,
he was arrested, detained and allegedly tortured by the Sudanese authorities.”).
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identified by the U.N. 1267 Committee as an associate of Al-Qaida and, as such,
subject to a global travel ban. This U.N. entity was tasked with implementing
“Security Council Resolutions aimed at controlling international terrorism.”85
Abdelrazik considered the 1267 Committee regime, as applied to the
appellant, a denial of basic legal remedies86 and directed that the government
issue an emergency passport but did not base its judgment on resolving a conflict
between the U.N.S.C. resolution and other legal obligations.87 Rather, after
acknowledging that the Charter confers on the Security Council primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and that
Canada is obligated to “implement and observe” its decisions, the judge opined
that the sanction as interpreted by the court, “presents no impediment to Mr.
Abdelrazik returning home to Canada.”88 The principle of systemic integration89
provides judges with a framework to support compatibility, but as applied in
Abdelrazik it enables jurists to subjectively circumvent Security Council
direction.
In contrast, the Court of Justice of the European Union in Yusuf held that
Security Council resolutions
fall, in principle, outside the ambit of the Court’s judicial review and
that the Court has no authority to call in question, even indirectly, their
lawfulness in the light of [European] Community law. On the contrary,
the Court is bound so far as possible, to interpret and apply that law in
a manner compatible with the obligations of the Member States under
the Charter of the United Nations.90

In what was characterized as a subordination approach to balancing Security
Council resolutions with national legal obligations, the court in Yusuf held that
a review could be conducted only in extraordinary instances “with regard to jus
cogens, understood as a body of higher rules of public international law binding

85
Id. at 282, ¶ 23. The Abdelrazik court considered S.C. Res. 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1390 (2002),
1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1735 (2006), and 1822 (2008). See id.
86
Id. at 293, ¶ 51.
87
Id. at 321–22, ¶¶ 128–29. The court avoided a conflict, in part, by asserting “the 1267 Committee seems
to have wisely recognized that if it is to permit a citizen to return home, it cannot require countries to prevent
his transit through their territory.” Id. at 321, ¶ 128.
88
Id. at 322, ¶ 129 (“This interpretation is consistent with the objective of the travel ban as stated by the
1267 Committee in its document ‘Travel Ban: Explanation of Terms.’”).
89
See Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3) (C) of the Vienna
Convention, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 279, 290 (2005); CARLOS IVAN FUENTAS, NORMATIVE PLURALITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A THEORY OF THE DETERMINATION OF APPLICABLE RULES (2016), Ch. 4: Human Rights
as a New Paradigm.
90
Yusuf, supra note 67, ¶ 276.
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on all subjects of international law, including the bodies of the United Nations,
and from which no derogation is possible.”91 The court did not find “any jus
cogens violation and firmly applied article 103 of the Charter as a conflict and
superior rule.”92 The Yusuf judgment provides a persuasive, lucid, and objective
judicial approach for analyzing resolutions grounded on a presumption of
Security Council supremacy and the overarching principle of jus cogens.
The European Court of Human Rights in Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom
prominently focused on U.N. Charter article 103.93 Even though Al-Jedda did
not involve the maritime environment, determining the primacy of potentially
conflicting international instruments has relevance to naval enforcement
measures that involve law-of-the-sea principles and the LOS Convention.94 AlJedda involved an applicant that was detained in Iraq for approximately three
years for “reasons of security” who claimed that his detention breached the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).95 The United Kingdom
responded that the ECHR “did not apply to the applicant because his detention
was authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, and that,
as a matter of international law, the effect of the Resolution was to displace
[ECHR] Article 51.”96
An earlier review of this issue by the House of Lords in the United Kingdom
“unanimously held that article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations gave
primacy to resolutions of the Security Council, even in relation to human rights
agreements.”97 Lord Bingham stated that the reference in article 103
to any other international agreement leaves no room for any excepted
category. . . . Thus, there is a clash between on the one hand a power
or duty to detain exercisable on the express authority of the Security
Council and, on the other, a fundamental human right which the UK
has undertaken to secure to those (like the appellant) within its
jurisdiction. How are these to be reconciled[?] . . . By ruling that the
UK may lawfully, where it is necessary for imperative reasons of
security, exercise the power to detain authorized by UNSCR 1546 and
successive resolutions, but must ensure that the detainee’s rights under
91
Kushtrim Istrefi, The Application of Article 103 of the United Nations Charter in the European Courts:
The Quest for Regime Compatibility on Fundamental Rights, 5 EUR. J. LEG. STUD. 81, 91–93 (2012–2013); see
also Yusuf, supra note 67, ¶ 277.
92
Istrefi, supra note 91, at 84.
93
Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (App. No. 27021/08), July 7, 2011; see also Istrefi, supra
note 92, at 84.
94
Al-Jedda, supra note 93.
95
Id. at 3–5, ¶¶ 11, 16.
96
Id. at 5, ¶ 16.
97
Id. at 9, ¶ 20.
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[European Convention on Human Rights] Article 5 are not infringed
to any greater extent than is inherent in such detention.98

The resolution did not expressly authorize detention but sanctioned the use
of all necessary measures.99 Clearly troubled by the length of detention but not
seeking to declare a U.N.S.C. resolution invalid, the Strasbourg jurists
reductively concluded there was not a conflict, finding instead, “there must be a
presumption that the Security Council does not intend to impose any
international obligation on Member States to breach fundamental principles of
human rights.”100
The Al-Jedda opinion further held that the “court does not consider that the
language used in [1546] indicates unambiguously that the Security Council
intended to place the member States . . . under an obligation to use measure of
indefinite internment without charge and without judicial guarantees, in breach
of their undertakings under international human rights instruments, including the
Convention.”101 Al-Jedda’s reliance on perceived ambiguity in Resolution
1546’s text102 essentially endorses a problematic—and misguided—requirement
that the Security Council detail every military activity where human rights might
potentially be implicated.
On the issue of whether a U.N.S.C. resolution has primacy in relation to
other treaties, notably the ECHR, the partly dissenting opinion of Judge
Poalelungi persuasively reasoned that “to conclude otherwise would seriously
undermine the effectiveness of the United Nations’ role in securing world peace
and would also run contrary to State practice.”103 The U.N.S.C. resolution
decided that the multinational force “shall have the authority to take all
necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in
Iraq . . . “104 Judge Poalelungi further noted, “It is unrealistic to expect the
Security Council to spell out in advance, in detail, every measure which a

98

Id.
S.C. Res. 1546, ¶ 10 (June 8, 2004) (“[T]he multinational force shall have the authority to take all
necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq . . . including by preventing
and deterring terrorism . . . .”).
100
Al-Jedda, supra note 93, ¶ 102.
101
Id. ¶ 105. But see Yusuf, supra note 67, ¶ 231 (“From the standpoint of international law, the obligations
of the Member States of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations clearly prevail over every
other obligation of domestic law or of international treaty law including, for those of them that are members of
the Council of Europe, their obligations under the ECHR and for those that are also members of the [European]
Community, their obligations under the EC Treaty.”).
102
Al-Jedda, supra note 93, at 60, 63, ¶¶ 102, 109
103
Id. at 67 (separate opinion Poalelungi, J.).
104
S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 99.
99
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military force might be required to use to contribute to peace and security under
its mandate.”105 Judge Poalelungi correctly concluded that the solution to legal
challenges does not lie in the Security Council’s providing express operational
details.106 Al-Jedda, Abdelrazik, and Yusuf could have resonance in planning for,
and judicial review of, naval enforcement measures. Application of the Al-Jedda
analysis, for example, to maritime interdictions could result in operational
uncertainty, degraded impact, or diminished support. Though damages have
been sought following naval measures to enforce Security Council
resolutions,107 Judge Poalelungi is unaware of a court that expressly held a
conflict exists between obligations under the LOS Convention and U.N.S.C.
direction.108
Resolutions authorizing enforcement measures without the consent of the
flag State—and extraterritorially—are tethered to Chapter VII, articles 39, 41,
and 42 of the U.N. Charter.109 Whether a conflict could even exist between the
U.N. Charter and the LOS Convention will likely be a foundational judicial
inquiry. The 1982 maritime instrument specifically references the U.N. Charter,
and in article 110 acknowledges the controlling influence of other instruments
on the right of visit.110 Moreover, the LOS Convention’s Preamble states in part:
105
Al-Jedda, supra note 93, at 67 (separate opinion Poalelungi, J.) (“The point at which the majority part
ways with the domestic courts is in finding that the language used in Resolution 1546 did not indicate sufficiently
clearly that the Security Council authorized member States to use internment. I regret that I find the judgment
of the House of Lords more persuasive on this issue . . . Internment is a frequently used measure in conflict
situations, well established under international humanitarian law, and was, moreover, expressly referred to in
the letter of Colin Powell annexed to Resolution 1546.”).
106
Id.
107
See Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States, 777 F.3d 175, 179 (4th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 997 F. Supp. 2d 307,
308–09 (D. Md. 2014); Tarros, 982 F. Supp. 2d at 330.
108
U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 22, at 2135. Another area of judicial inquiry with article 103
involves the legal consequences of a conflict. Id. “The wording of Art. 103 only provides that the Charter shall
‘prevail’ and leaves open the legal consequences of a conflict. It does not expressly state whether the ‘other
international arrangement’ is ‘void, voidable, suspendable, or unenforceable’ and to what extent the other
arrangement should be superseded or nullified.” Id.
109
DINSTEIN, supra note 44, at 282. (“Conceptually, Article 41 may be viewed as an outgrowth of the
[1919] Covenant of the League of Nations. However, the framers of the [UN] Charter were not content with
non-forcible sanctions. A far-reaching leap forward was made in Article 42: Should the Security Council
consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may
take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace or
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of
Members of the United Nations . . . .[U]nder Article 42, the Council may exert force, either on a limited or on a
comprehensive scale.”); see also Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 46, at 61 (quoting H. Kelsen, The Law of the
United Nations (1950), 294) (“[T]he purpose of the enforcement action under Article 39 is not to maintain or
restore the law, but to maintain or restore the peace, which is not necessarily identical with the law.”). “Security
Council resolutions also require that States apply the measures extraterritorially.” Gowlland-Debbas, supra note
46, at 86.
110
LOS Convention, supra note 23, at 25, 31, 37, 63, 70, 129, 138.
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[b]elieving that the codification and progressive development of the
law of the sea achieved in this Convention will contribute to the
strengthening of peace [and] security…and will promote the economic
and social advancement of all peoples of the world, in accordance with
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations as set forth in the
Charter. . . .111

The direct reference in the LOS Convention to the U.N. Charter creates an
important connection between these two instruments.112 Regarding their
intersection for purposes of analysis under an article 103 challenge, the maritime
accord is recognized as “subsidiary to the UN Charter.”113 Agreement on the
LOS Convention was reached because of extraordinary multilateral cooperation.
Tommy Koh, President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea (1980–82), foresaw the LOS Convention’s strategic importance, stating
it would “promote the maintenance of international peace and security because
it [replaced] a plethora of conflicting claims by coastal States with universally
agreed limits on the territorial sea, on the contiguous zone, on the exclusive
economic zone, and on the continental shelf.”114
Multinational agreement, in the maritime environment, had never been
reached on the numerous topics included in the LOS Convention.115 Importantly,
diplomats prohibited reservations unless expressly permitted by the LOS
Convention, thus forcing States Parties to accept all of the terms within the
document.116 This “package deal”117 highlights the imperative for navigational
consistency across the oceans, a consideration that remains essential in U.N.S.C.
development of resolutions that involve law-of-the-sea principles. Summaries of
the negotiating history of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea, including a contemporary analysis of its provisions, span more than

111
Id. at 25. The LOS Convention’s Preamble also provides that “matters not regulated by this Convention
continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law.” Id.
112
PROELSS, supra note 68, at 15. Commentators agree that the LOS Convention’s preamble “establishes
a kind of systemic link between the Convention and the Charter.” Id.
113
Id. referencing Shirley v. Scott, The LOS Convention as Constitutional Regime for the Oceans,
STABILITY AND CHANGE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE ROLE OF THE LOS CONVENTION (Alex G. Oude Elferink,
ed.) (2005), at 19–20 (citations omitted).
114
Statement by TOMMY T. B. KOH, A CONSTITUTION FOR THE OCEANS, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1982: A COMMENTARY 1, 11 (Myron H. Nordquist, ed., Center for
Oceans Law and Policy, 1985) (also referred to as the Virginia Commentary).
115
Id. at 12.
116
LOS Convention, supra note 23, art. 309 (“No reservations or exceptions may be made to this
Convention unless expressly permitted by other articles of this Convention.”).
117
C.A. Stavropoulos, Procedural Problems of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, reprinted in
Nordquist, supra note 114, vol. 1, at lxv.
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7,000 pages.118 These strikingly detailed compilations further confirm an
operating environment that benefits from consistency.
Judge Vladimir Golitsyn, then-President of the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea (ITLOS), emphasized the 1982 maritime accord, however,
“cannot and has never been intended to provide an answer to every issue arising
in connection with the use of the oceans and their governance.”119 As a
peacetime instrument, the preamble to the LOS Convention recognized, “matters
not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and
principles of general international law.”120 And, because the LOS Convention,
as characterized by Judge Golitsyn, “is a ‘living’ instrument . . . subject to an
ongoing process of change and adaptation to new challenges.” 121
The LOS Convention codified the concept of exclusive flag state
jurisdiction,122 which provides ships are generally subject only to the jurisdiction
of the country of their registry, though this concept is not absolute.123 Article
110 entitled “right of visit” in the 1982 maritime accord states that a warship is
not justified in boarding a foreign flagged ship on the high seas “except where
acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty . . . “ or when
reasonable grounds exist to believe an act of piracy, slave trade, or unauthorized
broadcasting has occurred or the vessel is without nationality.124 Because
Security Council enforcement measures are authorized by the U.N. Charter, such
action is based on powers conferred by treaty.125

118

Summaries of the LOS Convention are available at, for example, PROELSS, supra note 65.
PROELSS, supra note 68, at V.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
See LOS Convention, supra note 23, art. 92 (Statute of Ships). See also, the Convention on the High
Seas, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force September 30, 1962), art. 6 (“ships shall sail under the flag of one
State only and save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in these articles, shall
be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.”); U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., 21st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.13/L.58 (Apr. 27, 1958).
123
See generally James Kraska, Broken Taillight at Sea: The Peacetime International Law of Visit, Board,
Search, and Seizure, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J., 1–45 (2010) (examining recognized exceptions to the general
concept of flag State jurisdiction, which includes Security Council resolutions). The ability to board a foreignflagged vessel on the high seas without flag State consent is separate from the issue of asserting jurisdiction over
a foreign flagged vessel. Id.
124
Id. (emphasis added); see also PROELSS, supra note 68, at 768 (quoting MYRES MCDOUGAL/WILLIAM
BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS (1962)) (“The suggestion in the Convention that treaties provide
the only instances in which one state may apply authority to the ships of another is seriously misleading.”); LOS
Convention, supra note 23, art. 27(1)(c) (regarding the ability of a master to consent to a boarding).
125
See U.N. Charter, supra note 30, arts. 24, 25, 39–42.
119

WILSON_PROOFS

24

12/17/2018 12:20 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

Rüdiger Wolfrum, then-President of ITLOS, affirmed the significance of a
Security Council resolution—adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter—
either explicitly or implicitly authorizing naval action in stating that “[f]lag
[s]tates may not object to ships under their flags being investigated by warships
of other States, as long as the measures taken are proportionate.”126 More than
simply representing a judicial or academic interpretation, U.N.S.C. members
have similarly acknowledged that “the Charter of the United Nations, including
in its Articles 25 and 103, grants resolutions of the Security Council priority over
the obligations of States under [other] international agreements,”127 and that
compliance is compulsory.128
The primacy of a U.N.S.C. resolution in relation to the LOS Convention is
generally settled. Regardless of a perceived conflict, courts will likely continue
to be asked whether the resolution was sufficiently clear regarding its
operational impact as well as whether its execution was negligent,
disproportionate, or exceeded the scope of the Security Council’s direction. It is
also probable that courts will continue to be asked to examine (or revisit rulings
on) compliance with human rights obligations in maritime enforcement
actions.129
Separate, though complementary, issues involve the collective impact of
authority to conduct high seas boardings without flag state consent, to enter a
coastal state’s territorial sea to take enforcement measures, or to sink a vessel
engaged in illicit activity, among other actions. When the U.N.S.C. authorized
entry into the Somali territorial sea to defeat piracy, for instance, the mandate
expressly declared it “shall not be considered as establishing customary
international law.”130 Importantly, this authority was provided because of a
request by Somalia as the coastal state. Discussions on Resolution 1816 (2008)
included its impact on the law of the sea, with members asserting that the
resolution:

126
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Freedom of Navigation: New Challenges (statement of
Rüdiger Wolfrum, President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)) (Jan. 8, 2008)
[hereinafter Wolfrum].
127
U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7286th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7286 (Oct. 24, 2014).
128
See U.N. Charter, supra note 30, arts. 24, 25, and 48.
129
See Brian Wilson, Human Rights and Maritime Law Enforcement, 52 STAN. J. INT’L L. 243, 246, 252,
295 (2016).
130
S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 4, ¶ 9; see also S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 25, ¶ 11; S.C. Res. 1851, supra
note 25, ¶ 10 (among others).
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•

shall not be interpreted as allowing any action that is contrary to
international law, the Charter, and the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea;131

•

must respect the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea;132 and

•

should apply only to the territorial waters of Somalia and not be
expanded to cover other regions.133

Within a year of the adoption of four resolutions addressing piracy in 2008,
however, Judge Tullio Treves of the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea wrote, “[o]f course, it cannot be ruled out that, if authorizations similar to
those granted as regards the Somali situation were to be routinely granted in
other situations, the possible formation of a customary rule could be at least
discussed.”134 That is exactly what has transpired for approximately a decade.
From 2008 to 2017, resolutions that implicated law-of-the-sea principles
would be routinely granted—more than once per year—by the Security Council
to address Somali piracy, as well as: other threats that ranged from the illicit
transport of crude oil from Libya, instability in Libya, the movement of charcoal
from Somalia to support Al-Shabaab, North Korea’s illicit nuclear program, and
migrant smuggling or trafficking in persons.135 The Security Council approved
more resolutions, involving law of the sea principles in this decade than in the
previous sixty-one years combined. In each mandate adopted from 2008 to 2017,
the Security Council noted that the authority provided would not be considered
as establishing customary international law as reflected in the LOS
Convention.136 The resolution addressing the illicit movement of Libyan crude
oil, for example, states the authorization
[S]hall not affect the rights or obligations or responsibilities of
Member States under international law, including rights or obligations
131

U.N. SCOR, 5902d mtg., supra note 23, at 4.
Idˆ
133
Id. at 5.
134
Treves, supra note 61, at 405.
135
See S.C. Res. 2383, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2383 (Nov. 7, 2017); S.C. Res. 2375, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/2375 (Sept. 11, 2017); S.C. Res. 2292, at 1–2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2292 (June 14, 2016); S.C. Res. 2182,
at 2–3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2182 (Oct. 24, 2014); S.C. Res. 2146, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2146 (Mar. 19, 2014)
(Security Council members expressly noting, during debate on resolutions with a maritime impact, that such
resolutions were either consistent with LOS Convention principles or were adopted solely to address the
identified security challenge and would not have application to any other threat).
136
See S.C. Res. 2383, supra note 135; S.C. Res. 2375, supra note 135; S.C. Res. 2292, supra note 135,
¶ 9; S.C. Res. 2182, supra note 135, ¶ 21; S.C. Res. 2146, supra note 135, ¶ 9.
132
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under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, including
the general principle of exclusive jurisdiction of a flag state over its
vessels on the high seas, with respect to other vessels and in any other
situation, and underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be
considered as establishing customary international law.137

Debate regarding Resolution 2240 (2015), which dealt with migrant
smuggling and trafficking in persons, prompted Security Council member
Christian Barros (Chile) to declare that:
the resolution just adopted grants [s]tates or regional organizations,
under exceptional circumstances and for a limited period of time, the
right to intercept vessels on the high seas, along the coast of Libya,
only in those cases in which there exist reasonable grounds to suspect
trafficking in migrants or human trafficking and always within the
legal framework of the norms established by United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea.138

During discussions of Resolution 2292 (2016) regarding an arms embargo
involving Libya, Security Council President Francois Delattre noted that it was
“carefully set out” for “very specific contexts” and was guided by the principle
of flag state consent.139
Notwithstanding repeated assertions by Security Council members that
resolutions adopted will not disrupt general law-of-the-sea principles, there has
been no holistic examination of the impact of approximately two-dozen such
mandates over a decade (2008–2017). Turtle Bay debates concerning Somali
security challenges, Al-Shabaab, unsecured arms, and the illicit maritime
movement of charcoal are emblematic of the struggle to reconcile law-of-thesea principles with providing timely sufficient measures to confront an emergent
threat.
Resolution 2182 (2014) authorizes Member States to “inspect . . . on the high
seas . . . vessels bound to or from Somalia which they have reasonable grounds
to believe” are engaged in proscribed activity.140 This mandate also called on
state forces intending to board a foreign-flagged vessel on the high seas first to
make “good faith efforts” to obtain the consent of the flag state, but it did make
acquiescence compulsory.141 Mahmoud Hmoud (Jordan) accurately recognized,
137

S.C. Res. 2146, supra note 135, ¶ 9 (emphasis added).
U.N. SCOR7531st mtg., supra note 70, at 6–7.
139
U.N. SCOR, 71st Sess., 7715th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7715 (June 14, 2016) (calling for the
enforcement of the arms embargo as a response to the situation in Libya).
140
S.C. Res. 2182, supra note 135, ¶ 15.
141
Id. ¶ 16.
138
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“[t]he [LOS] Convention specifically addresses the matter of the interdiction of
vessels on the high seas, yet the provisions of [R]esolution 2182 (2014) go
beyond those of the Convention.”142 Despite the resolution’s operative
provisions, Security Council member Wang Min (China) asserted, “[a]ny
inspection of such vessels needs the prior consent of the flag [s]tates
concerned.”143 Varied understandings of imprecise terms inevitably will have a
deleterious impact on operation, and a 2015 report to the Security Council
acknowledged “it is understood that among the challenges [of implementation]
is the question of how to interpret and apply certain provisions of the
authorization . . . .”144
The text of a single resolution will not change customary international
law.145 Expansive authority granted in Security Council resolutions over a
sustained period, coupled with continuous naval engagements by Member States
for a decade (2008–2018) implementing those resolutions, among other actions,
are influential considerations.146 While potential deviations from the general
concept of exclusive flag state jurisdiction following Security Council
resolutions, for example, are not “sufficiently widespread [or] representative” to
establish that customary international law in the maritime environment is
evolving, their “consistent” 147 employment across a diverse array of threats has,
albeit unintentionally, firmly made this issue a reasonable question.
Judicial review of naval measures taken under the aegis of a Security
Council resolution underscores the clarity imperative, a key consideration that
142
U.N. SCOR, 7286th mtg., supra note 127, at 3. The resolution, Mahmoud Hmoud added, authorized
“any State to inspect ships not only off the coast of Somalia but also on the high seas is subject to legal and
political constraints and limitations . . . [and may] be open to abuse and threaten the maritime trade on the high
seas in one of the world’s most sensitive regions . . . giving such authorization to any State raises many questions.
Allowing any State to undertake such inspections on the basis of ‘reasonable grounds’ is no guarantee against
abuse of that authorization or obstruction of maritime navigation.” Id.
143
Id. at 4.
144
U.N. Chair of the S.C. Committee pursuant to Resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning
Somalia and Eritrea, Letter dated Oct. 9, 2015 from the Chair of S.C. Committee to President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/801 (Oct. 19, 2015). The U.N.S.C. report noted the uncertainty extended into
“dealing with individuals found on board interdicted vessels, and the documentation and disposal of weaponry,
including in the context of European Union legal requirements.” Id.
145
See U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., Identification of Customary International Law mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.872 (May 30, 2016).
146
Id. Hasan Kleib (Indonesia), who remarked, “the draft resolution [1816] shall be consistent with
international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982, and
shall not envisage any modification of the existing, carefully balanced international law of the sea, which is
encapsulated in the constitution of the ocean, that is, UNCLOS, which was brought into being after decades of
negotiation.” U.N. SCOR, 5902d mtg., supra note 23, at 2. Moreover, “A burden of responsibility rests upon us
all to maintain the Convention’s integrity and sanctity.” Id.
147
U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., Identification of Customary International Law, supra note 145, at 3.
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also exists in other international instruments.148 European Union guidance on
drafting legislation emphasizes the importance of text that is “clear, simple,
concise, and unambiguous.”149 Because U.N.S.C. mandates may authorize naval
measures, language that is not clear, simple, concise, and unambiguous can have
adverse operational implications well beyond the diplomatic deliberations of
Turtle Bay. In part, the process of drafting a document with fifteen co-authors is
tremendously unwieldy as just one member of the Security Council could have
dozens of comments, and more than fifty edits from a single nation would not
be unusual. Resolutions are not the only instruments with ambiguity—in fact,
diplomats frequently choose ambiguous terms intentionally150—but unlike
treaties, U.N.S.C. decisions don’t typically possess extensive and documented
negotiating histories.151 Statements made by Security Council members during
debatesindicate varied, and at times, conflicting, understandings of the authority
being provided.152

148
See generally Susan Biniaz, Comma but Differentiated Responsibilities: Punctuation and 30 Other
Ways Negotiators Have Resolved Issues in the International Climate Change Regime, Working Paper: SeaLevel Rise and Changing Times for Florida Local Governments, SABIN CTR. CLIMATE CHANGE, COLUM. L. SCH.
(2016) (discussing why intentionally ambiguous text is used in multilateral instruments). “It may seem
counterintuitive to the outside world that negotiators would ever deliberately draft a formulation that admits of
two different interpretations. After all, they should in theory be aiming for clarity, particularly when preparing
a legal instrument. However, clarity is not always an option, and the alternative to ambiguity may be failure to
reach agreement. In some cases, negotiators may consider no agreement preferable to the risks inherent in
perpetuating opposing interpretations. In those cases where ambiguity is preferable, though, its use is considered
‘constructive.’” Id. at 2.
149
1993 O.J. (C 166) 1, ¶ 1. “Unnecessary abbreviations, community jargon and excessively long
sentences should be avoided.” Id. And, “the rights and obligations of those to whom the act is to apply should
be clearly defined.” Id. at ¶ 4; see also Michael C. Wood, The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, 2
MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N.L. 73, 81–82 (1998) (“There is no equivalent resolution of the Security Council. In an
ideal world, each [S.C.] resolution would be internally consistent, consistent with earlier Council action on the
same matter, and consistent with Council action on other matters. Each resolution would be concise, and avoid
superfluous or repetitive material. Consistency and conciseness are elements of clarity, but the latter also
requires, more generally, the precise and unambiguous use of language. It is, of course, only possible to use clear
language when the policy is clear.”).
150
See Dean Peter F. Krogh, Foreword to HUGH FOOT CARADON, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
242: A CASE STUDY IN DIPLOMATIC AMBIGUITY (1981).
151
See David M. Malone, Conclusion, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST
CENTURY 641 (David M. Malone ed., 2004). The Security Council’s “reliance on informal consultations rather
than open meetings as the locus for decision making remains marked.” Id.
152
See S.C. Res. 2182, supra note 135. One example of several, discussed in more detail infra, which
advanced a formula to address high seas boardings of foreign flagged vessels that included a requirement to first
make “good faith” efforts to obtain flag state consent. Id. ¶ 16. The resolution does not define “good faith,”
though it requires a report be sent to the United Nations with “the results of the inspection” along with details of
“efforts made to seek the consent of the vessel’s [f]lag [s]tate.” Id. ¶ 20. Based on the entirety of the resolution,
it is apparent that flag state consent must be sought prior to a boarding, but it is most reasonable to conclude that
approval is not a prerequisite to a boarding. Id. But see U.N. SCOR, 7286th mtg., supra note 127, at 4 (“Any
inspection of such vessels needs the prior consent of the flag [s]tates concerned.”). Mahmoud Hmoud (Jordan)
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The International Court of Justice in an Advisory Opinion on U.N.S.C.
Resolution 276 (1970) remarked, “The language of a resolution of the Security
Council should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its
binding effect. In view of the nature of the powers under Article 25, the question
whether they have been in fact exercised is to be determined in each case, having
regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to
it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might
assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security
Council.”153
Regardless of interpretive challenges, resolutions are the primary decisionmaking lever of the Security Council and the principal focus of this Article. In
addition, its President may issue a statement, and the General Assembly,154 as
well as the U.N.S.C., can direct a report, among other actions.155 Panels of
Experts, when commissioned by the Security Council, have effectively
documented Member State implementation and assessed its impact. The three
intersecting elements discussed supra—the ability to authorize sanctions,
diplomatic action, or military operations; compulsory Member State support;
and express recognition that obligations under the Charter, which include
U.N.S.C. resolutions, have a preeminent status156—provide the Security Council

conceded the resolution included ambiguous provisions which, “may . . . be open to abuse and threaten the
maritime trade on the high seas in one of the world’s most sensitive regions.” Id. at 3.
153
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, supra note 47,
¶ 114.
154
BOSCO, supra note 9. When designing the permanent United Nations headquarters in the early 1950s,
architect Wallace K. Harrison and his team sought clarification on the roles and primacy of the Security Council
and General Assembly. Id. at 64–65. They were told, “In practical terms, the Security Council is undoubtedly
the most important. . . . It meets constantly, with two or three hundred in attendance and full press coverage.
However, while the Assembly meets only twice a year it is symbolically the most important organ.” Id.
155
See Press Release, Security Council., Security Council Condemns Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea’s Missile Launches; Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1695, U.N. Press Release SC/8778 (July 15,
2006) (statement of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton who noted requirements under S.C.
Resolution 1695 (2006) to “prevent missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and technology [from]
being transferred to DPRK’s missile or WMD programmes,” sent “a much stronger signal than the weak and
feckless response of the Council in 1998, which had only issued a press statement.”).
156
U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 22, at 2120 (discussing secondary United Nations Charter
law, which includes Security Council (SC) resolutions). “Secondary law as contained in SC resolutions is also
to be interpreted in line with [U.N. Charter] Purposes and Principles. With regard to possible conflicts between
secondary UN law and international agreements, not only shall every treaty be interpreted in harmony with
secondary UN law under the presumption that a conflict was not intended, but the secondary UN law itself is
also to be interpreted in this way.” A contrary interpretation would result in a situation where “States acting
under SC authorization would always be in risk of violating other international legal agreements while carrying
out action on behalf of the UN. Such legal uncertainty could reduce the willingness of member States to provide
means for implementing resolutions, in particular by contributing troops, for fear of violating conflicting
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with extraordinary capabilities and unequaled versatility to address threats in the
maritime environment. The initial employment of these authorities at Turtle
Bay, discussed below, has resonance today as the foundation for multilaterally
confronting contemporary maritime threats.
B. The Earlier Years: The U.N.S.C. and the Maritime Environment
The United Nations Charter, as well as the earliest Security Council
decisions, recognized the role of the maritime environment in maintaining
international peace and security.157 A conflict over the right to transit through a
strip of water strategically positioned between the Ionian and Adriatic Sea
emerged in 1946 between the United Kingdom, which deployed warships to
Greece to support its fight against communism, and Albania.158 Tirana
contended that the eastern side of the Corfu Channel, which constituted an
essential portion of the Royal Navy’s route to Greece, was within its territorial
sea and that accordingly it could restrict movement in this area as well as place
mines.159 The British correctly asserted the channel met the elements of an
international strait entitled to navigational freedoms.160 The deadly crisis had
multilateral implications, but an initial inquiry arose for the Security Council, a
newly formed institution, involving whether addressing the Corfu Channel
dispute was within its mandate.
The U.N.S.C. decided that Corfu Channel was appropriate for consideration
and for the first time addressed a maritime threat.161 Although actions at Turtle
Bay consisted primarily of directing a report and recommending referral to the
International Court of Justice,162 the involvement of the Security Council in this

obligations under other agreements. Thus, authorizations of the SC would be in danger of remaining
unenforced.” Id. at 2123.
157
U.N. Charter art. 41, ¶ 1. In part, art. 42 provides, “[s]hould the Security Council consider that measures
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by . . .
sea . . . as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by . . . sea . . . of Members of the United Nations.” Id. art. 42,
¶ 2.
158
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4 at 12–15 (Apr. 9, 1949); see also Other
Documents Submitted, Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. Documents 5 at 65 (regarding the U.K. mission
in Greece) http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/1/10913.pdf.
159
U.K. v. Alb., 1949 I.C.J. Rep., supra note 158, at 12.
160
Id. at 10, 36.
161
S.C. Res. 19, ¶¶ 1–2 (Feb. 27, 1947) (appointing a committee “to examine all the available evidence
. . . and to make a report”); see also S.C. Res. 22 (Apr. 9, 1947) (recommending the dispute be referred to the
International Court of Justice).
162
The International Court of Justice resolved this conflict in The Corfu Channel case. U.K. v. Alb., 1949
I.C.J. Rep., supra note 158, at 4.
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case presaged its influential role in confronting security threats with a maritime
nexus.
Member States turned to the U.N.S.C. following the invasion of the Republic
of Korea. At the time, U.S. Senator Tom Connally (Texas) remarked that the
institution’s response against unlawful aggression represented “the clearest test
case that the United Nations has ever faced.”163 The Security Council
recommended that Member States “furnish such assistance to the Republic of
Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international
peace and security in the area.”164 Though the Security Council did not
specifically reference naval measures in its resolutions on Korea, warships were
appropriately and significantly involved.165
President Harry Truman stated that United States action was in support of,
and in conformity with, United Nations Security Council resolutions,166
including an order to U.S. military commanders to conduct a naval blockade.167
The importance of the U.N. mandate to support national-level action was
recognized by President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who
“assured” congressional leaders that U.S. “reliance must be…upon the
commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United
Nations.”168 More than 100 warships from ten countries deployed in support of

163
Id.; Notes Regarding Meeting with Congressional Leaders (June 27, 1950) (on file with Elsey Papers,
Harry S. Truman Administration File), https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/
koreanwar/documents/index.php?documentdate=1950-06-27&documentid=ki-2-40&pagenumber=1
(Sen.
Connally added, “[i]f the United Nations is ever going to do anything, this is the time, and if the United Nations
cannot bring the crisis in Korea to an end, then we might as well wash up the United Nations and forget it.”).
164
S.C. Res. 83, ¶ 6 (June 27, 1950); see also S.C. Res. 82, ¶ 8 (June 25, 1950) (calling upon Member
States “to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from
giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.”).
165
See Press Statement, White House (June 30, 1950) (“In keeping with the United Nations Security
Council’s request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the North Korean invaders and restoring
peace in Korea, the President announced that he had . . . ordered a Naval blockade of the entire Korean coast.”)
(on file with Elsey Papers, Harry S. Truman Administration File), https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/
study_collections/koreanwar/documents/index.php?documentdate=1950-06-30&documentid=ki-423&pagenumber=1.
166
Id.
167
Army Department Message, Joint Chiefs of Staff to Douglas MacArthur (July 1, 1950) (on file with
Elsey Papers, Harry S. Truman Administration File Korea). “In keeping with the United Nations Security
Council’s request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the Northern Korean invaders and restoring
peace in Korea the [U.S.] President announced that he had ordered a Naval blockade of the entire Korean coast
. . . . To implement this order [sic] you are authorized to use such means and forces as are available to you to
deny unauthorized ingress and egress from the Korean coast.” Id.
168
Id.; Remarks by Dean Acheson Before the National Press Club (1950) (on file with Elsey Papers, Harry
S. Truman Administration File Korea).
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the United Nations mission.169 U.S. Navy Admiral Arleigh Burke stated “[we]
had absolute control of the sea . . . . It was never contested in Korea.”170 Naval
supremacy included the destruction of 3,288 ships,171 the continuous,
uninterrupted maritime transport of essential logistics, and the deployment of
military personnel to the Korean Peninsula.172
Maritime engagements decisively advanced the broader Security Council
goal of repressing North Korean aggression, underscoring the intersection of
naval power and the maintenance of peace.173 Notably, U.N.S.C. resolutions on
Korea did not provide explicit operational details, an approach that would be
replicated in subsequent mandates.
Another early security challenge with a maritime nexus involved the partial
closure of the Suez Canal by Egypt and its targeting of vessels flying Israeli flags
or calling on Israeli ports. The Security Council found that Egyptian interference
with goods destined for Israel was “an abuse of the exercise of the right of visit,
search and seizure.”174 Resolution 95 (1951) called on Egypt to “terminate the
restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods
through the Suez Canal wherever bound and to cease all interference with such
shipping beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and
the observance of the international conventions in force.”175 This decision did

169
See KOREAN WAR PROJECT, http://www.koreanwar.org/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2018) (listing deployed
U.S. battleships, carriers, cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts, radar picket destroyers, fleet flagships, fleet
oilers, frigates, dock landing ships, medium landing ships, rocket landing ships, tank landing ships,
minesweepers, and Coast Guard cutters); see also CAGLE & MANSON, supra note 11, at 6 (noting that other
countries providing “combatant vessels” to the UN mission as part of “United Nations Blockading and Escort
Force,” included Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, Thailand, Great Britain, Netherlands, New Zealand, and
the Republic of Korea.).
170
STEPHEN HOWARTH, TO SHINING SEA: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 1775–1991 491
(1991).
171
CAGLE & MANSON, supra note 11, at 532. Action taken by the “United Nations Blockading and Escort
Force” destroyed 2,464 “enemy vessels” from June 25, 1950 to June 8, 1953 and an additional 824 “vessels and
small craft” from June 25, 1950 to May 31, 1953. Id. at 294, 532.
172
Id. at 491–92 (“Six of every seven person who went to Korea went by sea [and] fifty-four million tons
of dry cargo, 22 million tons of petroleum products went to Korean by ship.”).
173
Id. at 493–94. U.S. Navy Vice Admiral C. T. Joy described his impressions of the Korean War’s legacy,
“[a]s for the future, it should be clear that there is nothing inevitable about the onward and upward progress of
the United States or the United Nations. In fact, there is nothing inevitable about our survival. History is littered
with the graves of civilizations that assumed all is well. All is not well. We will survive and progress to the
extent that we are aware of the enemy who threatens us, and to the extent that we stay strong enough to meet
him in the arena of his choosing. . . . But if Korea has taught us that in unity lies the strength that will preserve
our freedom, then Korea has not been in vain . . . .” Id.
174
S.C. Res. 95, ¶ 7 (Sept. 1, 1951).
175
Id. at ¶ 10.
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not authorize the use of force to compel compliance, and Egypt’s failure to
implement this resolution significantly limited its impact.176
Resolution 95 also stated that under the circumstances, interference with
vessels—visit, search, and seizure—could not be “justified on the ground that it
is necessary for self-defense.” This action provides the first explicit U.N.S.C.
recognition, though stated in the negative, of the right of self-defense in the
maritime environment. The conflict would span several decades. Aside from
intractable political issues, Egyptian action sparked a new crisis by nationalizing
the Suez Canal Company in 1956.177 While transits had always provided
financial benefits, today the Suez Canal is an economic powerhouse recording
revenues in 2017 in excess of $5.3 billion U.S. dollars.178 With the belief that
United Kingdom property was seized and its economic and security interests
challenged, U.K. foreign minister Selwyn Lloyd acknowledged, “[t]he Canal is
geographically part of Egypt. It is under Egyptian sovereignty. . . . [However,]
that does not mean the absence of international rights.”179 With military
interventions by Israel, Britain, and France, a volatile situation was poised to
explode. Following extensive interventions by Dag Hammarskjöld, the U.N.S.C.
adopted Resolution 118 (1956), which endorsed six principles to guide Canal

176
See Leo Gross, Passage Through the Strait of Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba, 33 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 125, 134–35 (1968) (“Egypt’s non-compliance with this resolution is a matter of record. When Israel on
January 28, 1954, complained to the Security Council about illegitimate interference with shipping passing to
and from Israel through the Gulf of Aqaba, it was not contested by Egypt that the 1951 resolution applied to that
waterway as well. Egypt on that occasion rejected again the 1951 resolution as well as the proposed resolution
on the Israeli complaint, which in any event failed of adoption as a permanent member of the Council, the Soviet
Union, voted against it.”), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol33/iss1/9. Further, a U.S. representative to the
United Nations called the navigational provisions of S.C. Resolution 95 (1951) a “fundamental principle.” Id. at
135.
177
A key issue with the Suez Canal crisis involved its nationalization. United Kingdom foreign minister
Selwyn Lloyd conceded that the Egyptian actions were “legal and not a sufficient argument for the use of
force. . . . [Moreover, Colonel Nasser’s actions] amounted to more than a decision to buy out shareholders. Our
case must be presented on wider international grounds.” RADHIKA WITHANA, POWER, POLITICS, LAW:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STATE BEHAVIOR DURING INTERNATIONAL CRISES 141 (2008). The legal adviser to
the United Kingdom Foreign Office, Sir Gerard Fitzmaurice, agreed on the issue of the use of force: “[w]e are
already on an extremely bad wicket legally as regards using force in connection with the Suez Canal. Indeed,
whatever illegalities the Egyptians may have committed in nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, these do not
in any way . . . justify forcible action on our part.” Id. at 142.
178
Mamish: Suez Canal revenues hit dlrs 5.3 bln in 2017, STATE INFORMATION SERVICE: YOUR GATEWAY
TO EGYPT (Jan. 5, 2018, 1:42 PM) (citing to information provided by Mohab Mamish, Chairman of the Suez
Canal Authority and the Suez Canal Economic Zone), http://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/123091?lang=en-us.
179
BOSCO, supra note 9, at 73 (quoting Selwyn Lloyd).
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operations.180 The compromise at Turtle Bay avoided an escalation, though the
situation remained uneasy for years.181
The significance of the Security Council in the maritime environment was
again demonstrated in the Cuban missile crisis of 1961. Dozens of Sovietflagged ships approached Cuba apparently carrying ballistic missiles for
deployment there; American warships ringed the island, forming a blockade
line.182 Debate on this issue yielded some of the most spirited exchanges in the
history of the Security Council, but members did not adopt a resolution.
Secretary of State David Dean Rusk remarked in 1961, “[a]lthough the Cuban
missile crisis was directly resolved between Washington and Moscow, it was
very important that the Security Council [took] it up. Prolonged discussion
lessened the chance that one side would lash out in a spasm and do something
foolish. The [U.N.] earned its pay for a long time to come just by being there for
the missile crisis.”183
Resolution 221 (1966) represented the first Security Council enforcement
measure to reference expressly the maritime environment. The U.N.S.C.
addressed the deteriorating security situation in Rhodesia, which included “the
unilateral declaration of independence made by a racist minority,”184 by calling
on states to divert their vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined
for Southern Rhodesia and on the United Kingdom to conduct maritime
interdictions.185 Resolution 221 specifically called on the United Kingdom to
“prevent . . . the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil

180
S.C. Res. 118, ¶ 2 (Oct. 13, 1956) (providing that “any settlement of the Suez question should meet the
following requirements: (1) There should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination. . . .
(2) The sovereignty of Egypt should be respected; (3) The operation of the Canal should be insulated from the
politics of any country; (4) The manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between
Egypt and the users; (5) A fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development; [and] (6) In case of
disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled
by arbitration. . . . “).
181
LIPSEY, supra note 35, at 293. Some diplomats at the Security Council were “adamant . . . that only
war could solve the problem.” Id.
182
BOSCO, supra note 9, at 94.
183
Id. at 97.
184
S.C. Res. 216, ¶ 1 (Nov. 12, 1965).
185
S.C. Res. 221, ¶ 4 (Apr. 9, 1966). The Resolution also called upon the “Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to prevent by the use of force if necessary, the arrival at Beira
of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia, and empowers the United
Kingdom to arrest and detain the tanker known as Joanna V upon her departure from Beira in the event her oil
cargo is discharged there.” Id.
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destined for Southern Rhodesia . . . .”186 Its adoption sparked divergent views on
the fundamental role of the Security Council, with comments ranging from
“unique” to “unlawful.”187
The resolution supported an interdiction by the Royal Navy Rothesay-class
frigate HMS Plymouth of the tanker Manuela destined for the Port of Beira.188
The master of Manuela, carrying 16,000 tons of oil, upon receiving the boarding
officer and an “armed escort of two seamen . . . refused [an order] . . . not to
proceed to Beira.”189 The master diverted from the Port of Beira only after the
United Kingdom boarding team was augmented by twelve armed seamen, who
remained on the vessel until the next day to ensure compliance.190 A use-of-force
policy was also developed nationally for the Royal Navy mission.191
Resolution 221 contained unusual elements, notably its reference solely to
United Kingdom enforcement measures on the high seas,192 and it omitted the
authority relied upon, yet the British naval interdiction was rightly branded a
landmark in international law.193 Resolution 221 also highlighted that U.N.S.C.
authorization to use force is not tantamount to its employment. Regarding
impact, the “naval blockade to enforce the Rhodesia sanctions regime . . . rapidly
failed once it became clear that force would not be used to back it up.”194 It is
not surprising that one of the Security Council’s earlier resolutions that
authorized the use of force involved the maritime environment: the oceans are
pivotal to security, resources, and global trade, and also, unfortunately, a venue
for conflict and illicit activity.

186
S.C. Res. 221, supra note 3, ¶ 4. This paragraph further authorized the United Kingdom to “arrest and
detain the tanker known as Joanna V upon her departure from Beira in the event her oil cargo is discharged
there.” Id.
187
J. E. S. Fawcett, Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 103, 118 (1965–
66).
188
Richard Mobley, The Beira Patrol, Britain’s Broken Blockade against Rhodesia, 55 NAVAL WAR C.
REV. 63, 71 (2002). Though S.C. Resolution 221, ¶ 4 expressly identified the Joanna V, the Resolution
authorized the United Kingdom to prevent “by the use of force if necessary,” other vessels transporting oil to
Southern Rhodesia. Id. at 72 (quoting S.C. Res. 221, ¶ 4).
189
H. L. Cryer, Legal Aspects of the “Joanna V” and “Manuela” Incidents, 1966 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L.
85, 85, 91 (April 1966).
190
Id. at 91.
191
Id. at 97 (“The amount of force used by the Royal Navy appears to have been carefully controlled to
ensure that proportionate means only were employed to ensure compliance with the resolution . . . .”).
192
S.C. Res. 221, supra note 3, ¶ 4 (calling upon “the Portuguese Government not to receive at Beira oil
destined for Southern Rhodesia . . . .”).
193
CRYER, supra note 189, at 95. “[F]or the first time, the Security Council authorized a single member
of the United Nations to act in its own right with United Nations authority.” Id.
194
David M. Malone, Introduction, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST
CENTURY 10 (David M. Malone ed., 2004).
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Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) affirmed the necessity of protecting
freedom of navigation through such international waterways as the Suez Canal,
the Strait of Tiran, and the Gulf of Aqaba.195 The Italian representative to the
United Nations highlighted the issue was relevant to “the whole world and
particularly those countries which, like Italy, are separated from the oceans by
canals and straits.”196 Sir Paul Hasluck, Australian Minister for External Affairs,
agreed that “the question of freedom of passage [is too important] to be left out
of any permanent and lasting settlement.”197
Navigational freedoms represent a predominant focus area of Resolution
242, which sought to resolve a conflict between Israel and neighboring Arab
States.198 Called both “remarkably simple” and “perhaps the most famous
resolution in the council’s history, [Resolution 242] has been the starting point
for discussions on Middle East peace.”199
Resolutions 242 and 221 provided a platform for extensive law-of-the-sea
discussions in Turtle Bay and closely followed the entry into force of the 1958
Geneva maritime conventions.200 Diplomatic sentiments regarding the
importance of freedom of navigation would remain a key theme in Security
Council discussions over the next fifty years.
The hijacking of the Italian-flagged Achille Lauro and the murder of an
American Leon Klinghofer by members of a terrorist organization posing as
passengers on the cruise ship exposed gaps in international law, piracy, and
195

S.C. Res. 242, ¶ 5 (Nov. 22, 1967); see also Gross, supra note 176, at 145.
Gross, supra note 176, at 144 (“In addition, there is one most urgent and most dangerous issue of all:
the question of the right of passage for shipping of all nationalities through the Strait of Tiran. The maintenance
of the provisions of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea dealing with international navigation between
the high seas and territorial waters is of the gravest concern to my Government, as it must be to all engaged in
international trade.”).
197
U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 1542d plen. mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1542 (June 29, 1967).
198
Gross, supra note 176, at 137. On May 23, 1967, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson remarked, “[t]he
purported closing of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping has brought a new and very grave dimension to the
crisis. The United States considers the Gulf to be an international waterway and feels that a blockade of Israeli
shipping is illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace. The right of free, innocent passage of the
international waterway is a vital interest of the entire international community.” Id.
199
BOSCO, supra note 9, at 110. Henry Kissinger remarked “what [Resolution 242] lacked in precision, it
made up for in flexibility. It was well suited for beginning a negotiation in which reconnecting the different
interpretations of the parties would be one of the objectives.” Id.
200
The four conventions agreed to at Geneva on April 29, 1958 include: The Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone (entered into force September 22, 1964); the Convention on the High Seas, 450
U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force September 30, 1962); the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (entered into force March 20, 1966); and the Convention on the
Continental Shelf, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into force June 10, 1964). U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., 21st plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/L.58 (Apr. 27, 1958).
196
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maritime law enforcement. A U.N.S.C. Presidential Statement deplored the
attack and endorsed the U.N. “Secretary-General’s statement of 8 October 1985,
which condemns all acts of terrorism.”201 The Security Council subsequently
adopted Resolution 579 (1985), urging the development of “effective measures
. . . to facilitate the prevention, prosecution and punishment of all acts of hostagetaking and abduction as manifestations of international terrorism.”202 Over the
course of approximately three years, Member States at the International
Maritime Organization (IMO)—the specialized agency of the United Nations
responsible for the safety and security of shipping—drafted and completed an
anti-terrorism criminal law treaty that addressed several legal gaps in maritime
response authorities.203 While the Security Council’s response to the Achille
Lauro attack essentially amounted to a condemnation and exhortation for others
to take action, this limited approach was appropriate under the circumstances, as
a criminal prosecution in Italy would soon take place along with diplomatic
action at the IMO. The U.N.S.C. would adopt a more forceful approach to
enhanced authorities, the pursuit of illicit financing, and collaboration in the
context of terrorist activity following the attacks of September 11, 2001.204
Strikes on vessels during the Iran-Iraq War began in 1984 and subsequently
rose to a scale such that on of its engagements represents the “world’s largest
naval battle since World War II.”205 Approximately 441 ships were hit, and of
those ships, 239, or fifty-eight percent, were tankers.206 Often referred to as the
Tanker Wars, the conflict in the Persian Gulf spanned about four years (1984–
1988); approximately 400 people were killed, 115 ships were sunk or effectively
destroyed, and losses were estimated at more than $2.5 billion.207 The conflict

201

S.C. Note by the President of the Security Council S/17554 (Oct. 9, 1985).
S.C. Res. 579, ¶ 5 (Dec. 18, 1985).
203
International Maritime Organization, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 1992. Member State efforts at the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) culminated in the adoption of the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 1, 1992, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221, 27 I.L.M. 668
[hereinafter SUA Convention], which entered into force on March 1, 1992, and the Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 1, 1992, 1678
U.N.T.S. 304 [hereinafter SUA Protocols 1988], which also entered into force on March 1, 1992.
204
See S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 8 (Sept. 28, 2001). The Security Council also decided that States shall “take the
necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts . . . deny safe haven [and] prevent those who finance,
plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their . . . territories.” Id. ¶ 10.
205
HAROLD LEE WISE, INSIDE THE DANGER ZONE: THE U.S. MILITARY IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1987–1988
xiii (2007) (referencing Operation Praying Mantis, a naval battle that occurred in April 1988).
206
LEE ALLEN ZATARAIN, AMERICA’S FIRST CLASH WITH IRAN, THE TANKER WAR 1987–1988 386
(2008). See generally WISE, supra note 205, at xiii (concerning the conflict included protecting tankers operating
in the Persian Gulf).
207
ZATARAIN, supra note 206, at 386; WISE, supra note 205, at xiii.
202
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resonated globally, as the disruption of fuel from this key venue affected
virtually every State and its respective economies.
The Security Council addressed the Tanker Wars first with Resolution 552
(1984).208 “Convinced that these attacks constitute a threat to the safety and
stability of the area and have serious implications for international peace and
security,” the Security Council reaffirmed the right of free navigation in
international waters and sea lanes for shipping.209 The U.N.S.C. demanded that
such attacks cease “forthwith” and declared that in the “event of non-compliance
[it would] . . . consider effective measures that are commensurate with the
gravity of the situation in order to ensure the freedom of navigation . . . .”210
Initial U.N.S.C. mandates addressing the Iran-Iraq War, which did little to
alter the conflict favorably, were criticized. For instance, “[i]n 1985 the Security
Council looked as if it would be forever ineffective as a mechanism for
diplomacy. Efforts to end or limit the fighting had failed—the Security Council
gave the war only sporadic attention, Iran and Iraq rejected all offers of
mediation, and both insisted on unreconcilable terms . . . .”211 Change would
shortly come. Resolution 598 (1987) again deplored “attacks on neutral
shipping” and demanded an immediate cease-fire and halt to all military
action.212 But this time, unexpectedly, a new period in diplomacy emerged in
Turtle Bay: “According to [U.S.] Secretary of State [George] Shultz, never
before had the Soviet Union and the United States cooperated at the United
Nations on a security issue of such importance and complexity.”213
The Iran-Iraq conflict ended approximately one year after the adoption of
Resolution 598.214 For an institution frequently charged with inadequately
208
See S.C. Res. 552, pmbl. (June. 1, 1984); see also S.C. Res. 598, ¶¶ 1–7 (July 20, 1987). Importantly,
the “United Nations Security Council acknowledged the rights of neutral nations to engage in shipping when the
Security Council has not denominated an aggressor . . . and [secondly,] the right of visit and search was
reaffirmed.” Fielding, supra note 10, at 1228.
209
S.C. Res. 552, supra note 208, pmbl., ¶ 2.
210
Id. ¶¶ 5–6.
211
CAMERON R. HUME, THE UNITED NATIONS, IRAN, AND IRAQ: HOW PEACEMAKING CHANGED 4 (1994).
212
S.C. Res. 598, supra note 208, pmbl., ¶ 1.
213
HUME, supra note 211, at 71–72 (“The entry into the gulf of Western naval forces, particularly the U.S.
Navy, to protect shipping changed the fighting to Iran’s disadvantage . . . . The Soviet Union proposed forming
a naval peacekeeping force; the United States, backed by Britain and France, argued for an arms embargo against
Iran. Whether or not they agreed to adopt such measures, the permanent members were consolidating the practice
of collaborating among themselves and preparing for any subsequent crisis in which they might decide to use
the Security Council’s enforcement powers.”).
214
Resolution 598 was adopted on July 20, 1987. S.C. Res. 598, supra note 208, pmbl. The Iran-Iraq War
ended on August 20, 1988. SPENCER C. TUCKER, A GLOBAL CHRONOLOGY OF CONFLICT: FROM THE ANCIENT
WORLD TO THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 2584 (2009). “By 1987, both Iran and Iraq were exhausted” and had lost
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addressing threats,215 such collaboration amongst the permanent members
portended a transformed environment. “In 1987 the council’s permanent
members cooperated to seek an end to the Iran-Iraq War. By 1990, such
cooperation was an established practice, making possible for the first time the
use of the [U.N.] Charter’s progression of steps for collective security.”216
The first test of this new collaboration was Iraq’s illegal aggression in 1990.
The U.N.S.C. goal was the eviction of Baghdad from Kuwait and achieving it
would involve a significant maritime focus. Resolution 665 (1990) called, “upon
those Member States . . . to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping, in
order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict
implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in
resolution 661 (1990).”217
Resulting naval operations were “successful in that virtually all commercial
maritime traffic to Iraq and occupied Kuwait ceased.”218 The sanctions “aided
the success of the [U.N.] disarmament mission; helped convince the [Iraqi]
regime to accept [a] redrawn border with Kuwait; [and] contributed to military
containment of the Baghdad government.”219 Resolution 665 became a model
for Security Council enforcement measures on the water: “The objectives [i.e.,
interest in pursuing the war. BOSCO, supra note 9, at 153 (“It is possible that Tehran and Baghdad would have
reached an understanding even without a push from the [Security Council] . . . . There were few structural
reasons for the conflict to continue, but until the council initiative, there was no ready mechanism for ending it.
A diplomatic push by one of the great powers alone would have aroused the suspicion of the others, and the
council’s involvement allowed the diplomacy to appear as a joint initiative.” U.S. diplomat Cameron Howe
remarked that the Security “[C]ouncil managed to capture latent cooperation in the international system.”).
215
See Agenda for Peace, supra note 62, at ¶ 14 (“Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, over
100 major conflicts around the world have left some 20 million dead. The United Nations was rendered
powerless to deal with many of these crises because of the vetoes—279 of them—cast in the Security Council,
which were a vivid expression of the division of that period.”).
216
HUME, supra note 211, at 3; see also Agenda for Peace, supra note 62, at ¶ 3 (U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan remarked, “an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter[;] . . .
this opportunity must not be squandered.”).
217
S.C. Res. 665, ¶ 1 (Aug. 25, 1990).
218
See Fielding, supra note 10, at 1228–36. “The success of the maritime interception operations has been
attributed to ‘the professionalism of all the navies, innovative communications plans, and frequent coordination
meetings.’” Id. at 1193 (citation omitted). On the use of force, which is outside the scope of this Article, the U.S.
Navy reported, “Even though a total of 12,468 vessels have been challenged [between 1990 and November 1,
1991], disabling fire has never been used and no ships have been disabled.” Id. at 1220; see also Malone, supra
note 194, at 5 (“The success of the coalition’s military campaign against the Baghdad regime, in retrospect,
appears to have induced an era of euphoria in the Council, an era that could not have arisen during the Cold
War. . . . Having successfully tackled a conceptually straightforward challenge to international peace and
security in the form of Saddam Hussein’s attack on Kuwait, the Council now waded into the murkier waters of
civil wars and intercommunal strife, with which it had little experience.”).
219
David Cortright et al., UN-Authorized Sanctions, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL & WAR:
THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945 app. 679 (Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2010).
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required actions] designated were short, quickly attainable, and within the power
of Iraq, the target state. [Moreover,] there was a clear relationship between the
sanction and the remedy, with the onus clearly upon the target state.”220
The Security Council’s innovative approach regarding which Member States
could take action under the resolution would be replicated in subsequent
decisions. The key was to be flexible enough to encompass the coalition
members but not politically unacceptable states. For example, “[t]he ingenious
phrase ‘Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait’ served
both purposes admirably and built on the formula already deployed in
Resolution 665.”221
Addressing threats to the peace and acts of aggression that either occur in
the maritime environment or exploit its vast expanse has been a fundamental
concern of the Security Council since its creation and not simply a secondary
focus. Many of the U.N.S.C.’s greatest achievements from 1947 to 1990
vindicated security interests in, or related to, the maritime environment. Notably,
the U.N.S.C. institutionally overcame dozens of vetoes and scores of diplomatic
impasses during the early years to protect both sovereignty interests and core
law-of-the-sea principles. Turtle Bay collaboration would expand, and measures
adopted after 1990—in particular those beginning in 2008—to confront illicit
activity in the maritime environment represent the most prolific in the history of
the Security Council on such matters. Challenges in this new period both
paralleled earlier considerations (e.g., integrating freedom of navigation and flag
state authorities with the need to expeditiously provide enforcement authority)
as well as previously unexplored considerations (e.g., deceptive navigational
actions, ensuring a legal end-state, vessel destruction, and the maritime transport
of chemical, biological, and nuclear material, among others). The next section
examines how the U.N.S.C. approached these new considerations, lessons
drawn from earlier resolutions, and assesses their impact.

220
221

See Fielding, supra note 10, at 1236.
Berman, supra note 6, at 160.
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II. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS WITH AN IMPACT OR
POTENTIAL IMPACT IN THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT222
The increased frequency of resolutions with a maritime impact following the
Cold Warincludes a decisive spike that began in 2008223 The Turtle Bay pivot
reflects a dramatically altered political landscape: “The Council initially viewed
its role as preventing a third world war. As the Cold War came to define global
politics, the Council moved to tackle prevention of regional conflicts . . . from
spilling into a global conflagration.”224
This section discusses varied approaches to contemporary security threats
with each resolution model addressing a threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression:225
•

•

•

DPRK counterproliferation model: Largely eviscerating a Flag
State’s maritime capabilities; broad restrictions imposed on insurance,
registration, crewing services, classification services, and port entry for
designated vessels ;226
1540 model: Addressing an existential threat with comprehensive
requirements for Member State action to prevent the acquisition,
possession, or transfer or chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons,
including their means of delivery;227
Somali piracy model: Providing wide-ranging maritime- and landbased authorities to defeat a security threat within a designated
geographic area; employed when local capabilities are exceedingly

222
While many U.N.S.C. mandates provide authorization to conduct embargoes, primarily for brevity, this
Article focuses on resolutions that directly address the maritime environment and naval enforcement action.
223
DINSTEIN, supra note 44, at 292 (“The record of the Security Council over a period of forty-five years,
from the inception of the United Nations to the outbreak of the Gulf War, was disappointing in the extreme.”);
see also WALLENSTEEN & JOHANSSON, supra note 6, at 17–18 (“The end of the Cold War has been the single
most formative experience in the existence of the Security Council. . . . For the period 1946–1989 the annual
average number of passed resolutions was fifteen; since then the average has been more than sixty. The Council
has moved from roughly one decision per month to one per week.”); Andrea Bianchi, Assessing the effectiveness
of the UN Security Council’s anti-terrorism measures: the quest for legitimacy and cohesion, 17(5) E.J.I.L. 881,
889 (2006) (noting that the increase in the number of resolutions adopted under Chapter VII is based on an
expanded interpretation of what constitutes a “threat to the peace.”).
224
Malone, supra note 194, at 4.
225
U.N. Charter, supra note 30, art. 39.
226
This model references U.N.S.C. Resolutions 2397 (2017), 2375 (2017), 2371 (2017), and 2270 (2016),
among others.
227
This model references U.N.S.C. Resolution 1540 (2004).
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limited or nonexistent and the affected State formally requests
assistance;228
Mediterranean migrant-smuggling and trafficking-in-persons
model: Addressing a catastrophic humanitarian challenge and
transnational security threat with significant maritime measures;229
The embargo model: Preventing the maritime transport of illicit
weapons and technology by expressly authorizing an embargo and
implicitly authorizing high seas boardings of foreign flagged vessels
without flag State consent;230
Gulf of Guinea model: Hortatory declarations to cooperate in the
response to maritime security threats; resolutions in this category call
for enhanced cooperation and coordination, but provide no additional
enforcement, sanctions, or boarding authority.231

A. Democratic Republic of Korea Model
On December 22, 2017, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2397 to
combat the DPRK’s illegal counter proliferation activities.232 This Resolution,
the tenth over approximately a decade, sought to restrict the DPRK’s ability to
acquire resources central to the development of intercontinental ballistic
missiles.233 Providing a construct that globally bans designated ships, among
other mandates, highlights the crucial role of the maritime environment in Turtle
Bay action regarding the DPRK threat. A fundamental consideration included
overcoming the challenging chemical, biological, radiological weapons threat in
the maritime environment: ships generally do not transport fully assembled
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), rather, they carry component parts,

228
This model references U.N.S.C. Resolutions 1816 (2008), 1851 (2008), 1950 (2010), 2316 (2016), and
2383 (2017), among others.
229
This model references U.N.S.C. Resolutions 2240 (2015), 2312 (2016), 2380 (2017), and 2437 (2018).
230
This model references U.N.S.C. Resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011) as well as 2146 (2014) and
2292 (2016), among others.
231
This model references U.N.S.C. Resolutions 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012).
232
The U.N.S.C. has approved mandates in more than ten Resolutions to address illicit actions by the
DPRK, including Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016),
2356 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017). See S.C. Res. 2407, ¶ 1 (Mar. 21, 2018) (extending
the mandate of the Panel of Experts to April 24, 2019); U.N. SCOR, 8151st mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8151
(Dec. 22, 2017) (referencing a statement made by the United Kingdom that Security Council efforts were
designed to end North Korea’s “illegal nuclear and ballistic missile programmes”).
233
S.C. Res. 2397, ¶ 4 (Dec. 22, 2017) (“[A]ll Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply,
sale or transfer to the DPRK . . . using their flag vessels . . . of all crude oil, unless the Committee approves in
advance on a case-by-case basis. . . . “);see also id. ¶ 5 (prohibiting the use of Member State flag vessels to
supply, sell, or transfer to the DPRK “all refined petroleum products”).
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potentially buried beneath thousands of pounds of ostensibly legitimate cargo.234
Moreover, ship-to-ship transfers of illicit material on the high seas can occur
hundreds of miles from land or any naval asset, reducing the likelihood of
detection and enforcement action. Providing authority to seize a foreign flagged
vessel and dispose of thousands of pounds of coal, for example, could prove
logistically difficult. Regardless of complexities, Member State compliance with
resolution provisions is legally required and essential to effective
implementation.
A think tank report released in 2017, however, concluded forty-nine
countries “[were] complicit in various forms of alleged or proven violations of
[U.N.S.C.] sanctions resolutions on North Korea.”235 Between 2014 and 2018,
efforts to identify Member States that were complicit or that actively disregarded
DPRK Resolution provisions as well as highlight Member States that had taken
positive measures to implement U.N. obligations was unprecedented.
Following adoption of Resolution 2397, the government of South Korea
seized O/T Lighthouse Winmore while in port for previously transferring fuel to
a North Korean ship.236 The seizure was based on operative paragraph nine,
which provides “Member States shall seize . . . any vessel in their ports . . . if
the Member State has reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel was involved

234
See generally Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009), U.N.
President of the S.C., Letter dated March 3, 2014 from the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2014/147 (Mar. 3, 2014). “The incident involving the Chong Chon Gang
revealed a comprehensive, planned strategy to conceal the existence and nature of the cargo.” Id. ¶ 124. The
voyage of another DPRK-flagged and -owned vessel, O Un Chong Nyon Ho “presents a very similar pattern”
and “switched off” its Automatic Identification System. Id. Annex VIII, ¶¶ 33–34.
235
David Albright et al., Countries Involved in Violating UNSC Resolutions on North Korea, INST. SCI. &
INT’L SECURITY (Dec. 5, 2017), http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Countries_Involved_in_
Violating_NK_UNSC_Resolutions_5Dec2017_Final.pdf; see also Stefanie Valta, The International Court of
Justice (ICJ) Should Have the Power to Review UN Security Council Resolutions Adopted Under the Aegis of
Chapter VII of the UN Charter – An Article Drawing, Inter Alia, from the Scope of Judicial Review in Germany,
2 CAMBRIDGE STUDENT L. REV. 62, 64 (2006) (“Certainly, the League of Nations failed, inter alia, because of
the disloyalty of its members. But for what reasons do states comply with their [current] obligations [to United
Nations Security Council resolutions], given the fact that they have the power to do otherwise? The determinative
factor of allegiance is neither a cost-benefit analysis, nor the expectation to be favoured with similar assistance
in case of need, but the ‘political-moral pressure’ which ‘depends to a considerable degree on the members’
conviction of the legality and legitimacy of the Council’s action’ . . . .”) (citations omitted).
236
See, e.g., Jake Kwon & James Griffiths, South Korea Seizes Ship After It Claims Transferred Oil to
North Korea, CNN (Dec. 29, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/29/asia/north-korea-hong-kong-oilintl/index.html (“South Korea has seized a Hong Kong-registered ship that allegedly transferred oil to a North
Korean vessel in violation of United Nations sanctions. The South Korean Foreign Ministry said the Lighthouse
Winmore left the port of Yeosu in South Korea carrying refined oil which was then transferred to a North Korean
ship in international waters . . . . [One of the ships receiving oil was identified] as a sanctioned North Korean
vessel, the Rye Song Gang 1 . . . .”).
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in [prohibited activities].”237 While the seizure of vessels engaged in proscribed
activities is compulsory when in port, Resolution 2397 provides that such
seizures are discretionary when a suspect vessel is plying a state’s territorial
sea.238
This Resolution, particularly operative paragraph 9, is not a model of clarity,
and likely will confuse as it encourages Member State consultation with the flag
state of the vessel seized. Regarding disposition options, there is a waiting period
for states to take further action (after impounding a vessel) based on operative
paragraph 9, which asserts “after six months from the date such vessels were
frozen (impounded), this provision shall not apply if the [1718] Committee
decides, on a case-by-case basis and upon request of a flag [s]tate, that adequate
arrangements have been made to prevent the vessel from contributing to future
violations of these resolutions . . . .”
Member State enforcement action includes the Tanzanian president
temporarily banning the registration of foreign ships and “ordered over 400
vessels to be investigated for allegations of involvement in criminal activity.”239
President John Magufuli’s decision was made “after at least five foreign-owned
ships flying Tanzania’s flag were seized in various parts of the world carrying
illegal consignments of weapons and narcotics.”240 Additionally, the United
States prohibited the entry of more than one hundred North Korean flagged
vessels, among other actions.241
237

Id.; see also S.C. Res. 2397, supra note 233, ¶ 9.
See S.C. Res. 2397, supra note 233, ¶ 9 (“Member States . . . may seize, inspect, and freeze (impound)
any vessel subject to its jurisdiction in its territorial waters if the Member State has reasonable grounds to believe
that the vessel was involved in activities, or the transport of [proscribed] items . . . .”) (emphasis added).
239
Fumbuka Ng’wanakilala, Magufuli Bans Registration of Foreign Ships in Tanzania, Orders Probe,
REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-maritime/magufuli-bans-registration-offoreign-ships-in-tanzania-orders-probe-idUSKBN1F8221; see also Leo Byrne & James Byrne, Sierra Leone
Registers North Korea Linked Vessels in Potential Sanctions Breach, NK NEWS (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.
nknews.org/2018/02/sierra-leone-registers-north-korea-linked-vessels-in-potential-sanctions-breach/ (“Several
vessels recently removed from Panama’s registry have since been reflagged to Sierra Leone and are still
operating . . . . On February 18, the Panama Authority released a circular saying that it had deleted 20 vessels
from its registry because of their ties to North Korea . . . .”).
240
Fumbuka Ng’wanakilala, Magufuli Bans Registration of Foreign Ships in Tanzania, Orders Probe,
REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-maritime/magufuli-bans-registration-offoreign-ships-in-tanzania-orders-probe-idUSKBN1F8221.
241
See generally List of Prohibited Vessels, NATIONAL VESSEL MOVEMENT CENTER (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://www.nvmc.uscg.gov/nvmc/(S(ruh5axvoagd0mxp3cdvbpwjp))/CAATSA.aspx (including seven pages of
vessels “prohibited from entering the navigable waters of the United States . . . published pursuant to the North
Korea Sanction and Policy and Enhancement Act of 2016 and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA) as
amended by the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).”); see also U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK , ADVISORY ON NORTH KOREA’S
USE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/
238
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Maritime considerations in DPRK-focused measures began with Resolution
1718 (2006), which directed Member States to prevent “the direct or indirect
supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their
nationals, or using their flag vessels . . . whether or not originating in their
territories of [proscribed]. . . materials, equipment, goods and technology.”242
The continued security threat in North Korea led the U.N.S.C. to adopt
Resolution 1874 (2009), which called “upon all [s]tates to inspect . . . all cargo
to and from the DPRK, in their territory, including seaports” if there were
reasonable grounds to believe it was proscribed.243 The Resolution further called
upon “all Member States to inspect vessels, with the consent of the flag [s]tate,
on the high seas” if they have reasonable grounds and upon flag states that do
not consent to inspection to “direct the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and
convenient port for the required inspection by the local authorities . . . .”244 While
1874 unambiguously condemned the DPRK nuclear program, it surprisingly
failed to provide equally unambiguous authority to interdict vessels without flag
state consent on the high seas. This is particularly disconcerting where there are
reasonable grounds to believe cargo is being transported on a vessel registered
by a non-supportive flag state.
The Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen,
U.S. Navy, responded to a question from the press regarding high seas boardings
in view of the Turtle Bay mandate, saying:
[W]e intend to vigorously enforce the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1874 . . . . But the United Nations Security Council
resolution does not include an option for an opposed boarding or a
noncompliant boarding with respect to that. And if we get to that point
with a vessel that we suspect has material which is counter to—
unauthorized in accordance with UNSCR, that’s a report that goes
back to the United Nations . . . .245

Thus, the Security Council, likely in an effort to secure consensus on the
Resolution, failed—and has continued to fail—to authorize boardings on the
advisory/2017-11-02/DPRK%20Advisory%20FINAL%20508%20C.pdf. (“North Korean schemes being used
to evade U.S. and United Nations (UN) sanctions, launder funds, and finance the North Korean regime’s
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs.”). See generally U.S. DEPARTMENTS OF
TREASURY, STATE, & HOMELAND SECURITY, NORTH KOREA SANCTIONS & ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS ADVISORY
(July 23, 2018), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/dprk_supplychain_
advisory_07232018.pdf (regarding Risks for Businesses with Supply Chain Links to North Korea).
242
S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 3, ¶ 11 (emphasis added).
243
S.C. Res. 1874, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009).
244
Id. at ¶ 13.
245
News Transcript, Press Conference with Secretary Gates & Adm. Mullen (June 18, 2009),
http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4435 (emphasis added).
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high seas without flag state consent. While seizures may occur in port or in
internal waters, this authority is limiting because those engaged in illicit activity
have wide latitude to select their destinations and avoid states where a seizure is
likely. This latitude, however, is not insurmountable.
Resolution 1718 and subsequent affirmations, including U.N.S.C.
Resolution 1874 (2009), provided authority that led to Panama’s interdiction of
the North Korean–flagged Chong Chon Gang in 2013.246 Approximately
480,000 pounds of “arms and related materiel” on twenty-five shipping
containers was hidden under 220,000 sacks—more than twenty-one million
pounds—of sugar.247 Proscribed cargo found included:
•
•
•
•

Various components of SA-2 (C-75 Volga) and SA-3 (C-125
Pechora) surface-to-air missile systems;
Various parts for three SA-2 and six SA-3 missiles;
Two MiG-21 jet fighters . . . [both of which] had been disassembled
and . . . packed into several containers; and
[Ten] lots of shell casings . . . for various purposes (fragmentation,
high explosive, armour piercing and or tracer).248

A U.N. Report concluded that Chong Chon Gang’s deception amounted to
“extraordinary and extensive efforts to conceal the cargo of arms and related
materiel, and the contingency instructions found onboard the vessel for
preparing a false declaration for entering the Panama Canal, if required for
transit, point to a clear and conscious intention to circumvent the resolutions.”249

246
See Billy Kenber, North Korean Ship Seized in Panama Canal Carried Suspected Missile-System
Components, WASH. POST (July 16, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/northkorean-ship-seized-in-panama-canal-carried-suspected-missile-system-components/2013/07/16/0234ad22ee4f-11e2-9008-61e94a7ea20d_story.html?utm_term=.62493160c9d3; see also Rep. of the Panel of Experts
established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), in Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2014/147 (Mar. 3, 2014); N Korean Ship Seized with Cuban Weapons Returns to Cuba, BBC NEWS (Feb. 15,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-26210187; Mary Beth Nikitin, Specialist in
Nonproliferation, Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere Hearing on “A Closer Look at Cuba and Its Recent History of Proliferation,” (Sept. 26, 2013),
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130926/101353/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-NikitinM20130926.pdf.
247
U.N. Panel of Experts, supra note 246, at 4, 26, 70.
248
Id. at Annex VIII, at 71–76.
249
Id. A U.S. nonproliferation specialist noted the importance of Chong Chon Gang extended beyond the
interdiction: “All UN member states are authorized to stop and seize suspicious shipments to or from North
Korea and report them to the U.N. Security Council for inspection, but these measures are not always followed
. . . [and] implementation has been uneven . . . .” Nikitin, supra note 246. Nikitin added, “The Panamanian
government, however, did follow these procedures and this case may be considered a model for other
interdictions.” Id.; Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006), the
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The Panama Canal Authority released Chong Chon Gang after receiving
approximately $700,000 from Pyongyang for “failing to accurately disclose the
cargo and putting the canal and canal workers at risk.”250 The Panamanian
response, along with measures conducted by other states, highlighted DPRK
exploitation of the maritime environment as well as the necessity for
comprehensive Member State support.251
On March 2, 2016, the U.N.S.C. expressed its “gravest concern that the
DPRK’s ongoing nuclear, and ballistic missile-related activities have further
generated increased tension in the region and beyond” and determined “that
there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security . . . .”252
Resolution 2270 included requirements that:
[A]ll [s]tates . . . inspect the cargo within or transiting through their
territory, including in their . . . seaports . . . that has originated in the
DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK, or has been brokered or
Implementation Assistance Notice No. 5. The M/V Chong Chon Gang Incident, July 28, 2014 [hereinafter UNSC
Implementation Assistance Notice].
250
Panama Canal Authority Fines Detained North Korea Ship Smuggling Cuban Arms, REUTERS (Sept.
26, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-panama-northkorea-ship/panama-canal-authority-fines-detainednorth-korea-ship-smuggling-cuban-arms-idUSBRE98Q01720130927; N Korean Ship Seized with Cuban
Weapons Returns to Cuba, supra note 246.
251
U.N. Panel of Experts, supra note 246; see also MARY BETH NIKITIN, ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874 (Apr. 15, 2010),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R40684.pdf (“The first test case of sea-borne traffic (under S.C. 1874) was the North
Korean ship, the Kang Nam. The Kang Nam was shadowed by the U.S. Navy as it headed from North Korea,
hugging the coast of China as it approached the South China Sea. South Korean officials believed that the Kang
Nam was bound for Burma with a shipment of arms. However, before reaching the international waters of the
South China Sea, the Kang Nam turned back and returned to North Korea on July 7, 2009. . . . . [And, also in
2009,] three vessels were intercepted, which contained North Korean weapons . . . [believed to be] bound for
Hezbollah and Hamas. . . . . All three ships reportedly contained North Korean components for 122 mm Grad
rockets and rocket launchers [and one] shipment intercepted in Dubai contained 2,030 detonators for the Grad
rockets and related electric circuits and solid fuel propellant for rockets.”).
252
S.C. Res. 2270, pmbl. (Aug. 2, 2017). Following adoption of S.C. Resolution 2375 on September 11,
2017, global media coverage was again significant. BBC characterized the sanctions as “an attempt to starve the
country of fuel and income for its weapons programmes.” North Korea Threatens US with “Greatest Pain”
After UN Sanctions, BBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41242992. In part, the
U.N.S.C. Resolutions sought to counter extensive acts of deception that includes “a complex scheme that
depended on stealth, falsified documents and the heavily choreographed participation of officials and businesses
in at least three countries.” Joby Warrick, High Seas Shell Game: How a North Korean Shipping Ruse Makes a
Mockery of Sanctions, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
high-seas-shell-game-how-a-north-korean-shipping-ruse-makes-a-mockery-of-sanctions/2018/03/03/3380e1ec
-1cb8-11e8-b2d9-08e748f892c0_story.html?utm_term=.9de0e38578c9. “At least four different flags showed up
in August and September (2017) to dump anthracite onto a pile near [a Russian] harbor’s southern tip . . . . Then,
six other ships arrived to pick up coal from the same spot and deliver it to foreign markets. Between the voyages,
the harbor was witness to a kind of magic trick: Illicit North Korean coal was transformed into Russian coal,
which can be legally sold anywhere.” This scheme allowed, according to a Western diplomat, the North Koreans
to “literally ‘launder[]’ the coal,” by using, “the same tactic criminals use to launder ill-gotten cash.” Id.
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facilitated by the DPRK or its nationals, or by individuals or entities
acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or
controlled by them, or by designated individuals or entities, or that is
being transported on DPRK flagged aircraft or maritime vessels, for
the purposes of ensuring that no items are transferred in violation of
[operative] resolutions . . . .253

Member States were required to prohibit their nationals from insuring or
registering DPRK vessels, and to deny port entry to vessels reasonably suspected
of carrying proscribed cargo. U.N.S.C. Resolution 2270 further required that
Member States inspect proscribed “cargo within or transiting through their
territory . . . .”254 Most likely, this provision authorizes a coastal state to stop,
board, and search a vessel within its territorial sea if it reasonably believes a
vessel began its journey in, or is destined for, the DPRK, or is carrying
proscribed items, among other bases, but does not expressly so state.255
Resolution 2397 (2017) clarified that Member States “may seize, inspect, and
freeze (impound) any vessel subject to its jurisdiction in its territorial waters, if
the Member State has reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel was involved
in activities, or the transport of [proscribed] items . . . .”256 Not addressed are the
significant costs on a state taking enforcement action, such as impounding a
vessel for a sustained period of time. While Resolution 2397 improves the series
of measures on the DPRK, its construct of compulsory action (in port),
discretionary measures (in the territorial sea), and limited authority on the high
seas (flag state consent or designation by the U.N.S.C. 1718 Committee) has led
to differing views on enforcement capabilities.
The potential for varied understandings of the Resolution prompted the
Chinese Government to assert it “does not favour the arbitrary interpretation of
. . . sanctions.”257 Uneven application is likely with imprecise text, and DPRK
resolutions do not provide sufficient clarity on the parameters of innocent
253

S.C. Res. 2270, ¶¶ 18–19 (Mar. 2, 2016).
Id. at ¶ 18.
255
National-level implementation provides an instructive gauge regarding interpretation. Seoul, for
example, provided in correspondence with the United Nations that”[t]he Korean Government prohibits all
vessels flagged by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from entering the ports or passing through the
maritime jurisdictional area of the Republic of Korea.” S.C. Comm. established pursuant to resolution 1718,
Letter Dated 13 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United
Nations Addressed to the Chair of the Committee, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/AC.49/2017/4 (Feb. 13, 2017).
256
S.C. Res. 2397, supra note 233, ¶ 9 (emphasis added). This resolution also includes potentially
confusing terminology, such as the following three words in the same sentence in the context of a vessel: “seize”
“freeze” and “impound.” Id.
257
S.C. Comm. established pursuant to resolution 1718, Note Verbale Dated 20 June 2016 from the
Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations Addressed to the Chair of the Committee, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.49/2016/34 (June 20, 2016).
254
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passage, for instance, or, more broadly, whether this key law-of-the-sea concept
even exists amidst repeated violations of international law. LOS Convention
article 19 provides that:
[P]assage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good
order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in
conformity with this Convention and with other rules of international
law. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to
the peace, good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial
sea it engages in…[a] violation of the principles of international law
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations . . . .258

Challenges with varied interpretations over innocent passage have existed
since the LOS Convention was adopted, prompting the United States and the
Soviet Union, for example, to promulgate a joint statement on this issue.259 With
regard to inspections conducted within a Member State’s territorial sea, Seoul
officials noted in correspondence to the United Nations:
Korean maritime authorities can inspect a vessel when there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel is carrying weapons of
mass destruction, other weapons or related materiel in accordance with
the Coast Guard Act. Such inspections shall be carried out in
conformity with the treaties to which the Republic of Korea is a party
and with generally recognized rules of international law.260

The French representative to the Security Council cogently noted in 2017
“the North Korean threat is a threat to everyone’s safety, because every country
is now affected by the range of North Korean missiles.”261 The Italian
representative in the same hearing asserted that the provocative acts by the
DPRK deserved a “strong and unified response in defending our collective
security and the integrity of the non-proliferation regime, as well as the authority
of the Council.”262An explicit assertion by the Security Council that vessels
reasonably suspected of violating U.N.S.C. resolutions on the DPRK are not
entitled to innocent passage would provide necessary clarity.263 Resolution
2397, operative paragraph 9, for example, only provides Member States may

258

LOS Convention, supra note 23, arts. 19(1), 19(2)(a).
See Joint Statement with Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent
Passage, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Sept. 23, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1444 [hereinafter Jackson Hole Agreement].
260
S.C. Comm. established pursuant to resolution 1718, Letter Dated 5 June 2013 from the Charge
d’Affaires of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations Addressed to the Chair of
the Committee 6, U.N. Doc. S/AC.49/2013/8 (June 5, 2013).
261
U.N.S.C., 72nd Sess., 8151st mtg. at 5–6, U.N. S/PV.8151 (Dec. 22, 2017).
262
Id. at 7.
263
LOS Convention, supra note 23, art. 19(2) (a).
259
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seize, inspect, and freeze (impound) any vessel subject to its jurisdiction in its
territorial waters. While expressly providing that vessels reasonably suspected
of engaging in proscribed conduct are not entitled to innocent passage may be
diplomatically challenging, such a provision is legally within the remit of the
Security Council.
Resolution 2397 (2017) also reaffirmed provisions of earlier mandates that
Member States “shall prohibit its nationals . . . from providing insurance or reinsurance services to vessels it has reasonable grounds to believe were involved”
in proscribed activities.264 Resolution 2397 further affirmed that Member States
“shall de-register any vessel it has reasonable grounds to believe was involved
in activities, or the transport” of proscribed items.265 U.N.S.C. direction to deregister leaves unaddressed due process considerations, naval enforcement,
actions against stateless vessels, and law-of-the-sea issues. Immediately deregistering a vessel, for instance, on the high seas would result in the ship being
without nationality and thus subject to the jurisdiction of any state. The Panama
Maritime Authority in January 2018 began the process of “cancelling” and/or
rescinding the registration of Glory Hope 1 and Koti for suspected violations of
U.N.S.C. sanctions regarding fuel transfers to the DPRK, and other registries
have taken similar action.266 There is no internationally recognized process by
which a flag state may rescind or cancel registration, though a flag state may
seek to contact the owner of a vessel prior to de-registration as well as wait for
the vessel to be in port. Alternatively, a flag state could immediately de-register
a vessel upon receipt of information regarding illicit activity. Separate inquiries
could include whether domestic regulations permit compelling a vessel under its
registry to change its course or to abstain from taking action.
The U.N.-commissioned Palmer Report in 2011 examined the scope of flag
state authority in the context of a vessel under its registry seeking to breach a

264
S.C. Res. 2397, supra note 233, ¶ 11; see also S.C. Res. 2321, ¶ 22 (Nov. 30, 2016). This section further
provides that Member States shall prohibit persons subject to its jurisdiction and entities incorporated in its
territory or subject to its jurisdiction. Id.
265
S.C. Res. 2397, supra note 233, ¶ 12; S.C. Res. 2321, supra note 263, ¶ 24.
266
Michele Labrut, Panama Cancelling Registration of Two Vessels Linked to North Korea Trading,
SEATRADE MAR. NEWS (Jan. 5, 2018), http://www.seatrade-maritime.com/news/americas/panama-cancelledregistration-of-two-vessels-linked-to-north-korea-trading.html; see also Leo Byrne, St Kitts and Nevis
Deregisters Sanctioned North Korean Ship, NORTH KOREA NEWS (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.nknews.org/
2017/10/st-kitts-and-nevis-deregisters-sanctioned-north-korean-ship/ (discussing the Hao Fan 6). Panama, in
2017, also “began the process of deregistering the vessel Lian De.” S.C. Comm. established pursuant to
resolution 1718, Note Verbale Dated 1 December 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Panama to the United
Nations Addressed to the Chair of the Committee, U.N. Doc. S/AC.49/2017/128 (Dec. 1, 2017).
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blockade.267 On this issue, the report concluded “[w]e think States have a duty
to take active steps to warn their citizens of the risks involved in running a
blockade and to endeavour to dissuade them from doing so, even though they
may not have the legal power to stop the conduct.”268 Compliance with a
Security Council mandate, in contrast, imposes a superior legal obligation on the
flag state to affirmatively prevent violative conduct, and along with issuing an
order to the vessel, other measures include de-registration, similar to action
taken by Tanzania, or the initiation of criminal prosecutions consistent with
national-level authorities.
The adverse financial, logistical, and potentially environmental
consequences following the seizure of a vessel in port for violating a U.N.S.C.
resolution initially resides with the state taking enforcement measures, a
potentially disproportionate burden that could exceed one million dollars in
environmental remediation, storage, and maintenance fees.269 In this regard, the
Security Council has repeatedly missed opportunities to more effectively
support Member State compliance by not explicitly authorizing that vessels
seized for engaging in illicit activity may be disposed of—including being
scuttled—similar to authority provided in Somalia piracy, migrant smuggling
and human trafficking resolutions. 270
Continued misuse of electronic systems designed to advance safety and
security interests in the maritime environment was addressed in Resolution
2397. The Security Council expressed concern over “deceptive maritime
practices” of DPRK-flagged, controlled, chartered, or operated vessels seeking
to “evade UNSCR sanctions monitoring by turning off [their AIS] to mask their
full movement history.”271 Contemporary focus on AIS highlights the evolution
of this technology from its use solely for collision avoidance to its current
employment as both collision avoidance and a ship tracking system. AIS data
acquired from ocean-going vessels in use across the globe is both voluminous
and instructive; one study examined thirty-two billion AIS messages over a six
year period.272 Separately, a U.N.S.C.-directed panel of experts report detailed
267
U.N Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla
Incident, ¶ 159 (Sept. 2011).
268
Id. (emphasis added).
269
Jim Bronskill, Migrant Ship MV Sun Sea Now Sits Rusting, Toxic on B.C. Coast, GLOBE & MAIL (July
11, 2018); Stephanie Joyce, F/V Bangun Perkasa Finished Long Journey to Scrapyard, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA
(July 5, 2013).
270
See S.C. Res. 2184, ¶ 11 (Nov. 12, 2014); S.C. Res. 2240, supra note 4, ¶ 8.
271
S.C. Res. 2397, supra note 233, ¶ 13.
272
Nathan A. Miller et al., Identifying Global Patterns of Transshipment Behavior, 5 FRONT. MAR. SCI.
240, 1 (2018).
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the scope of DPRK deception and illicit activity in the maritime environment,273
including North Korea’s theft of confidential information on warships and
submarines, including “cold launch” technology, which could be used for the
submarine-launched ballistic missile programme of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea. The Panel views such activity as constituting evasion of the
arms embargo, given that such technological information could directly
contribute to the development of the operational capabilities of the armed forces
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”274
In addition to Chong Chon Gang, other noteworthy naval engagements
involving DPRK include the M/V Kang Nam 1,275 suspected of carrying missile
components; and M/V Light,276 believed to be transporting proscribed weapons.
And, on March 5, 2016, the Philippine government impounded the North
Korean-flagged cargo vessel M/V Jin Teng, which arrived in Subic Bay on
March 3, 2016, one day after the approval of Resolution 2270.277 Philippines
Presidential Communications Undersecretary Manolo Quezon III remarked that
his government’s “obligation is essentially to impound the vessel and not allow
it to leave port and that the crew must eventually be deported.”278 Further,
Egyptian authorities seized the Cambodian-flagged Jie Shun in Ain Sukhna port,
along with “30,000 rocket-propelled grenades of North Korean production,
hidden under bins of iron ore.”279 And, on June 27, 2018, the Japanese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs released a statement and photographs of the North Korean
tanker Yu Phyong 5 participating in activities that Japan “strongly suspects
[were] ship-to-ship transfers banned by UNSCR.”280 Notably, the statement on
Yu Phyong was one of ten by Japan on illegal ship-to-ship transfers between
January and July of 2018.281

273

SCOR President, Panel of Experts Letter, S/2018/171, (March 5, 2018).
Id. ¶ 121.
275
Choe Sang-Hun, Test Looms as U.S. Tracks North Korean Ship, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/world/asia/22korea.html.
276
William Wan & Craig Whitlock, North Korean Ship Turned Back by U.S. Navy, WASH. POST (June
13, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/north-korean-ship-turned-back-by-usnavy/2011/06/13/AG7wxLTH_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3bcdf85db720.
277
Stanglin, supra note 19.
278
Id.
279
Erofey Schkvarkin, Chinese Freighter with North Korean Arms Seized in Egypt, MAR. BULL. (October
2, 2017), http://maritimebulletin.net/2017/10/02/chinese-freighter-with-north-korean-arms-seized-in-egypt/.
280
Suspicion of illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods by YU PHYONG 5, North Korean-flagged tanker,
and small vessel of unknown nationality (June 21 & 22, 2018), JAPANESE MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. (June 27,
2018), https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page4e_000757.html.
281
Japan-North Korea Relations; Suspicion of illegal ship-to-ship transfers of good by North Korearelated vessels, JAPANESE MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. (June 22, 2018), https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page4e_
000757.html.
274
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Implementation of obligations regarding the response to illicit DPRK
activity frequently involves the integration of multiple agencies within a
government including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice,
Maritime Administration, Ministry of Treasury, Ministry of Commerce, Coast
Guard, and the Navyamong other agencies.282 National-level decisions could
include, among others, whom a master or crewmember should notify that their
vessel may be involved in a violation and separately, whether the U.N.S.C.
mandates support criminal prosecutions against the master, crew-members, and
owner for knowing violations.283 Several States have conducted interagency
table-top exercises to examine the aligned response by multiple agencies as well
as to ensure there is national-level consensus on resolution terms and
obligations.284 Such engagements represent a best-practices approach to
assessing resolutions with complex provisions, though there is no internationally
provided guidance or a single recognized model in this regard.
Holistically, the Security Council has essentially decided that because of
sustained violations of international law, disregard for U.N.S.C. resolutions, and
repeated deceptive practices in the maritime environment, North Korea forfeited
its right to be a fully functioning flag State. The Security Council did not
explicitly state the DPRK’s registry—ordinarily a right of “every State, whether
coastal or land-locked”285—no longer exists, but restraints on insurance,
registration and de-registration, crewing services, classification services, and
port entry has eviscerated DPRK’s flag state status.
While the Security Council has authorized expansive measures involving
North Korean-flagged vessels based on the gravity of this threat, it is astonishing
that DPRK resolutions do not explicitly authorize naval forces to conduct time282
The obligations of state governments are wide-ranging and include seizure and de-registration of
DPRK vessels and freeze the assets of DPRK and DPRK nationals. See S.C. Res. 2397, supra note 233, ¶¶ 9,
12; S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 3, ¶ 8(d).
283
See 22 U.S.C. § 287(c) (Economic and communications sanctions pursuant to U.N. SCOR Res.).
284
See SCOR President, Panel of Experts Letter, S/2017/742, August 28, 2017; see also Note verbal dated
1 December 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Panama to the U.N. addressed to the Chair of Committee.,
S/AC.49/2017/128, (December 1, 2017) (“By Executive Decree No. 129, issued on 5 April 2017, Panama
established a national inter-agency plan for preventing and responding to threats and incidents involving
chemical, biological, radioactive, nuclear and explosive weapons and their means of delivery, under the
leadership of the National Security Council. The aim is to build national capacity to respond to such incidents
from a procedural and training perspective and through the acquisition of special equipment.”).
285
LOS Convention, supra note 23, § 90 (“Every State, whether coastal or land-locked, has the right to
sail ships flying its flag on the high seas.”). “Nationality of ships, (1) Every State shall fix the conditions for the
grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships
have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the
State and the ship. (2) Every State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its flag documents
to that effect.” See id. §§ 92, 94.
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sensitive high-seas boarding without flag state consent.286 Also, as noted above,
express authorization that vessels suspected of violating resolutions on DPRK
do not enjoy the right of innocent passage would be beneficial. A separate
consideration is ensuring awareness of the various provisions of multiple
resolutions that address a similar threat. Immediately prior to the adoption of
Resolution 2397 (2017), the Security Council-drafted summary of DPRK
measures spanned twenty-one pages, highlighting the varied, intersecting, and
frequently complicated elements of mandates related to North Korea.287 The
U.N.S.C.’s approach to confront the illicit possession and transport of WMD
involving DPRK by integrating multiple agencies within a government, and
multinational cooperation, though inadequate on the issues of boarding
authorities and innocent passage, has relevance in the pursuit of counter
proliferation across the globe.
B. U.N.S.C. Resolution 1540 Model
Resolution 1540 (2004) declared the Council’s “resolve to take appropriate
and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security
caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and
their means of delivery.”288 Though Resolution 1540 did not explicitly authorize
naval interdictions or even mention the maritime environment, this resolution
contributes to maritime security. The Security Council called upon states to
“take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls” to those
ends, “including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials.”289
The resolution, decided under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, has
spawned considerable discussion, focus, attention, and the creation of a UN
committee.290 Rudiger Wolfrum, then-President of ITLOS, agreed that
Resolution 1540 “provides that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
constitutes a threat to international peace.”291
A 2005 study, which examined nuclear weapon acquisition, delivery,
responses, and the maritime environment, underscored the gravity of the
286

See S.C. Res. 2375, supra note 135, ¶¶ 8, 10; S.C. Res. 2087, ¶ 7 (Jan. 22, 2013).
Fact Sheet: Resolution 2375 (2017) Strengthening Sanctions on North Korea, U.S. MISSION TO U.N.
(Sept. 11, 2017), https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7969.
288
S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 3, ¶ 4.
289
Id. ¶ 3.
290
See S.C. COMM. ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RES. 1540 (April 28, 2004), http://www.un.org/en/sc/
1540/; see also Brian Finlay, WMD, Drugs, and Criminal Gangs in Central America: Leveraging
Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs with UN Security Council Resolution 1540,
STIMSON CTR. & STANLEY FOUND. (2009).
291
Wolfrum, supra note 126, at 9.
287
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threat.292 Describing a “simple” gun-type weapon, the report stated, “a mass of
uranium highly enriched in the fissile isotope 235 (highly enriched uranium, or
HEU) is shot down a tube (resembling an artillery tube) into another HEU mass,
creating a supercritical mass and nuclear explosion.”293 The study also discussed
possible scenarios involving the maritime environment, including “smuggling a
nuclear weapons in a shipping container” and “the use of an oil tanker to
transport a nuclear weapon” (including challenges with masking radiation
signatures).294
In 2017, the Chair of the 1540 Committee, Sacha Soliz, stated that the main
purpose of the resolution was to keep illicit chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons and material “from falling into the hands of non-[s]tate actors,
including terrorists. . . . [and] is unique in this regard as it is the only legally
binding instrument dealing with preventing the proliferation of all three types of
weapons of mass destruction. [And further, R]esolution 1540 (2004) has become
one of the key components of the international regime to prevent the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of
delivery.”295
As background, Resolution 1540 included many distinctive elements. “To
fully implement the resolution—a mere 4 pages and 12 clauses—states are
required by the Security Council to adopt some 300 measures (specified by the
1540 Committee) in order to prevent proliferation, from export controls to
physical protection around nuclear sites and materials.”296 A comprehensive
U.N. study reported that as of 2016, Member States had recorded 30,632
measures since the adoption of Resolution 1540.297 One measure, for example,
is the requirement “to adopt and enforce appropriate and effective laws which
prohibit any non-State actor to [sic] manufacture, acquire, possess, develop,

292
JONATHAN MEDALIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32595, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: NUCLEAR
TERRORISM: A BRIEF REVIEW OF THREAT AND RESPONSES (2005), https://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32595.pdf.
293
Id. at 2. (noting that the Hiroshima bomb used the “gun-type” approach, asserting, “its designers had
such high confidence in it that they did not test this type of weapon prior to using it.”)
294
Id. at 7–9.
295
Statement by the President, Ambassador Sacha Soliz, The Global Effort to Prevent the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction to Non-State Actors, U.N. SCOR OPEN DEBATE (June 28, 2017).
296
Daniel Sallisbury & Ian J. Stewart, After a Decade of UN Resolution 1540, Is the World a Safer Place?,
CONVERSATION (April 29, 2014), http://theconversation.com/after-a-decade-of-un-resolution-1540-is-theworld-a-safer-place-26014.
297
Rep. of the S.C., Comm. Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540, ¶ 28, S/2016/1038 (2004).
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transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their
means of delivery.”298
The contentious path to a Security Council decision in 2004 prompted the
U.N.S.C. President to acknowledge, “[t]he negotiation process was not easy.”299
The debate over Resolution 1540 is emblematic of the challenges in collectively
confronting the illicit possession and transfers of nuclear, biological, and
chemical material and weapons. The United Kingdom representative at Turtle
Bay stated that the resolution’s “Chapter VII legal base stresses that we are
dealing with a clear threat to peace and security. It underlines the seriousness of
our response and the binding nature on all States of the obligation it contains.”300
The representative from Spain agreed, asserting, “[w]ith regard to Chapter VII,
we believe that the resolution is not intrusive because it enables States to
translate the obligations conferred by it into domestic law as they wish. My
country believes that this resolution has been adopted under Chapter VII for two
reasons: to make it legally binding in an unequivocal way and to send a strong
political message.”301 And the Romanian representative proclaimed, “[w]ith the
adoption of this resolution, the Council lives up to its responsibilities, addressing
one of today’s most ominous challenges to international peace and security.”302
Not all members, however, positively viewed the decision to take action
under Chapter VII. Brazil “continue[d] to think that there was no need to put the
whole resolution under the enforcement provisions of the United Nations
Charter.”303 Pakistan argued, “the Security Council cannot assume the
stewardship of global non-proliferation and disarmament issues. The Council,
composed of 15 States, is not a representative body. It cannot enforce the
obligations assumed by five of its members which retain nuclear weapons, since
they also possess the right of veto in the Council.”304 Amidst disagreement in
Turtle Bay regarding the Security Council’s approach to this transnational threat,
a single word in the resolution, surprisingly, generated consensus.305 The
Pakistani representative welcomed “the insertion of the word ‘henceforth’ in the

298
Id. ¶ 54 (basing the requirements of paragraph 2 of Resolution 1540 (2004), also including prohibitions
on non-state actor “attempts to engage in those [listed] activities [or] participate in them as an accomplice, assist
or finance them.”).
299
Gunter Pleuger (President of U.N. SCOR), Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 9–10,
S/PV.4956 (Apr. 28, 2004).
300
Id. at 7.
301
Id. at 8.
302
Id. at 9.
303
Id. at 8–9.
304
Id. at 2–4.
305
Id.; see also S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 3, ¶ 3.

WILSON_PROOFS

2018]

12/17/2018 12:20 PM

THE TURTLE BAY PIVOT

57

fifteenth preambular paragraph,” maintaining this addition “makes it explicit
that the provisions of the resolution are not retroactive, but would apply only to
events from the date of the adoption of the resolution.”306
Though novel, Resolution 1540 wasn’t the first Turtle Bay mandate to
address proliferation. Resolution 1373 (2001), among others, noted “the close
connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime,
illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement
of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials.”307
Member State comments in a United Nations report from 2016 are instructive
on the urgency of combatting WMD:
•

•
•

“Effective national action and global cooperation on counterterrorism, and on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
terrorism issues, must continue to ensure terrorists do not acquire or
use weapons of mass destruction[;]”308
“Our country shares the deep concern about the risk of linkages
between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in the current
international context[;]”309 and
“Terrorism is intrinsically associated with the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.”310

Also in 2016, the Security Council favorably referenced Resolution 1540 in
one of its mandates on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.311 The
Security Council reaffirmed Resolution 1540 “obligates all States to take and
enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of
delivery . . . and notes that these obligations are complimentary to the obligations
in [DPRK-focused] resolutions.”312 And, an academic study from 2017 on
supply system security and resilience recommended linking Resolution 1540
obligations with “the global port security requirements embedded in the
[International Ship and Port Facility Security] code . . . .”313

306

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, supra note 299.
S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 204, at 4.
308
U.N. Secretary-General, Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction,
¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/71/122 (July 8, 2016).
309
Id. at 6.
310
Id. at 12.
311
S.C. Res. 2321, supra note 263, ¶ 37.
312
Id. (emphasis in original).
313
Stephen E. Flynn, A New International Framework for Bolstering Global Supply System Security and
Resilience, NE. U. GLOB. RESILIENCE INST. 29 (October 2017) (explaining that linking 1540 obligations to the
307
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Resolution 1540 has remained relevant through the ambitious work of the
U.N.S.C.-directed 1540 Committee, which between 2011 and 2016, held “33
formal and 25 informal meetings, as well as a number of informal
consultations.”314 From compiling and disseminating national points of
contact—names, organizations, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses—to
documenting experiences, lessons learned, and effective practices, the
Committee has built a durable framework. A thirty-seven-page submission to
the Committee from the United States regarding national practices for the
implementation of Resolution 1540 described several maritime and transport
practices.315 Thus, even if Resolution 1540 did not expressly reference the law
of the sea or naval interdictions, it is an instructive construct in collectively
approaching urgent, grave maritime security threats.
The Security Council decided Resolution 1540 under Chapter VII, as noted
above, though it did not expressly authorize the employment of “all necessary
measures” opting instead to affirm the “proliferation of nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery constitutes a threat to
international peace and security,” and direct States to “develop and maintain
appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect,
deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when
necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items . . . .”316 Resolution
1373 (2001), which addressed a substantively different threat, provided greater
clarity on enforcement measures when it reaffirmed that “acts of international
terrorism constitute a threat to international peace and security” and provided
under its Chapter VII authorities that States shall “[t]ake the necessary steps to
prevent the commission of terrorist acts . . . .”317 Resolution 2249 (2015), among
others, also condemned terrorism and reaffirmed that those committing terrorist
acts “must be held accountable,” calling upon Member States that have a
capacity to do so to take “all necessary measures” to prevent and suppress
terrorist acts by designated individuals and groups.318
ISPS Code would enable “global standards and procedures that ensure that containerized cargo is not wittingly
or unwittingly being used to transport prohibited nuclear materials and contraband”).
314
U.N. Chair of the S.C. Committee, Letter dated 9 December 2016 from the Chair of the Security
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2016/1038 (Dec. 9, 2016).
315
U.S. Miss. to the U.N., Letter to Amb. Oh Joon, Resolution 1540 Comm. Chair, Effective U.S. National
Practices for the Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (Sept. 29, 2014).
316
S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 3, pmbl. and ¶ 3(c). The preamble of Resolution 1540 states that there is an
“urgent need for all States to take additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical
or biological weapons and their means of delivery[.]” Id. at pmbl.
317
S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 204, pmbl. and ¶ 2(b).
318
S.C. Res. 2249, ¶¶ 4, 5 (Nov. 20, 2015).
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There is no consensus on whether maritime enforcement measures may be
taken on the high seas under the authority of a resolution directing member states
to take “all necessary measures” to address a threat that doesn’t expressly
reference the maritime environment. Regardless of lack of unanimity on this
issue, the most likely conclusion is that there is no legal impediment to such
enforcement action if based on reasonable grounds of illicit conduct and the
response is proportionate. Former ITLOS President Rudiger Wolfrum asserted
in 2008,
Measures taken in the face of the threat of terrorism may result in a
temporary limitation of the freedom of navigation. . . . [and U.N.S.C.
resolutions may] form the necessary international law basis for
maritime interception operations undertaken by various naval units in
the Indian Ocean and off the coast of Somalia. Flag States may not
object to ships under their flags being investigated by warships of other
States, as long as the measures taken are proportionate.319

The context of the threat to the peace, urgency to take immediate action, and
authority vested in the Security Council supports the conclusion that, similar to
Judge Wolfrum’s position, “[t]here seems to be no reason why ‘necessary
means’ could not cover the use of force directed at ships at sea in addition to the
use of force on land and in the air, which are both clearly covered.”320
Key elements of the U.N.S.C.’s approach to combatting DPRK, WMD, and
terrorism—sustained diplomatic, economic, and operational attention—would
be crucial in effectively confronting transnational security threats in the Gulf of
Aden.
C. Somali Piracy Model
The response to the dramatic increase in strikes against merchant shipping
by Somali pirates highlights the significance of maritime collaboration. A
strategically important and narrow corridor,321 the Bab El-Mandeb Strait, which
connects the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, lies next to crushing poverty
and instability and yet carries 3.3 million barrels of oil daily.322 In a two year

319

Wolfrum, supra note 126, at 10.
Robin R. Churchill, Conflicts between United Nations Security Council Resolutions and the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and Their Possible Resolution, 84 INT’L L. STUD. 143, 145
(2008).
321
See U.S. Energy Information Administration, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, July 25, 2017, at 11
(noting that the Bab El-Mandeb Strait is eighteen miles wide at its narrowest point.)
322
U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related
to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, ¶ 28 (Jan. 24, 2011) [hereinafter Lang Report].
320
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period—from December 12, 2008 to December 31, 2010— approximately 1,900
people were taken hostage by Somali pirates on more than one-hundred
vessels.323 Pirates exploited the difficulty of naval forces in protecting merchant
shipping across an expansive sea area off a coastline spanning 3,333
kilometers,324 as well as gaps in the law that allowed them to operate with
apparent impunity within the Somali territorial sea.325 To be sure, Somali
challenges extend well beyond the water, and while meaningfully addressing
land-based economic, development, and governance considerations represent a
foundation to lasting improvements, those issues are outside the scope of this
Article.
As a criminal endeavor that has existed for thousands of years, piracy is a
universal crime expressly referenced in the LOS Convention,326 yet there was
not a strong interest by many states in prosecuting Somali pirates or even a
national ability to do so.327 At different times and in various geographic areas,
piracy has ebbed and flowed, but the devastatingly effective Somali threat was
unlike any other piracy in the modern period. This challenge required immediate
regional action and international support. But the question arose as to whether
the challenge should be addressed under the aegis of the U.N.S.C., and if so,
what additional authorities it could provide.328 When the Somali threat was taken
up in Turtle Bay in 2008, the Security Council had adopted more than 1,800
resolutions since its inception on a variety of issues, but not one provided
Chapter VII enforcement authority exclusively focused on piracy.
From 2008 to 2017, the Security Council ambitiously adopted sixteen
resolutions that emphasized the importance of collaboration, legal authorities,
and naval measures. More than thirty countries would deploy operational assets

323

Id. ¶ 29 (referring between December 12, 2008 and January 24, 2011).
U.N. Secretary-General, On the Situation with Respect to Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea off the
Coast of Somalia, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/2016/843 (Oct. 7, 2016) (“[T]erritories considered safe havens for pirates
have shrunk from significant swathes of the 3,333km-long coastline of Somalia to a roughly 150km-long stretch
between Xarardheere and Garacad.”).
325
See generally Lang Report, supra note 321 (“The fight against [Somali] piracy has led to unprecedented
operational solutions in an innovative legal context. The ‘reverse right of pursuit’ posited in Security Council
resolution 1816 (2008) allows naval forces cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government to enter the
territorial waters of Somalia in other to pursue and detain persons suspected of piracy.”). Id. ¶ 37.
326
LOS Convention, supra note 23, arts. 100–107, 110.
327
See generally Lang Report, supra note 321, ¶ 43 (referencing 2,000 Somali pirates that were
apprehended between December 2008 and May 2010).
328
See, e.g., Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], A.1025(26), Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of
Piracy and armed Robbery Against Ships (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/
PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/A.1025.pdf. Noteworthy accomplishments by member States at the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) are outside of the scope of this Article.
324
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to the Gulf of Aden to implement U.N.S.C. mandates.329 The impact was
extraordinary: between 2012 and 2017, there were only three successful acts of
piracy reported330 in what was previously the most dangerous maritime space on
earth.331 Naval forces, as well as the use of private security and best management
practices by merchant shipping, criminal prosecutions, and military
engagements on land, among other actions, were also pivotal in a changed
environment. Not all issues were sufficiently addressed during the first years of
focus on Somali piracy—the financial pursuit of illicitly obtained ransom
payments,332 greater use of the Egmont Group, network disruption, and
economic development on land, and others—but Security Council mandates
contributed to the restoration of international peace.
The resolutions adopted by the Security Council are instructive for
comprehensively addressing a security challenge geographically focused in a
zone where local and regional capacity to do so is inadequate, with a backdrop
of the enduing vulnerability of the maritime environment, legal difficulties, and
the law of the sea. Despite contentions by some that the resolutions didn’t
provide enhanced legal authorities333—entry into the Somali territorial sea, for
instance, was authorized by the Transitional Federal Government, and an
internationally recognized ability to repress acts of piracy already exists—the
mandates were fittingly characterized as providing “unprecedented operational
solutions in an innovative legal context.”334

329
U.N. Secretary-General, On the Situation with Respect to Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea off the
Coast of Somalia, ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. S/2017/859 (Oct. 12, 2017).
330
Id. ¶ 64 (“The achievements made demonstrate high levels of local, national, regional and international
cooperation in addressing piracy, which remains a threat to international peace and security.”). That said, the
report also noted concern “about the incidents of piracy that have occurred over the past eight months (2017),
which were the first in five years. . . . The limited number of incidents, however, also demonstrates the at least
partial effectiveness of counter-piracy measures, including international naval presence and escorts;
multinational counter- piracy operations[.]” Id. ¶ 59; see also Colin Freeman, Somali Pirates Hijack First
Commercial Ship in Five Years, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 14, 2017, 11:19 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
2017/03/14/somali-pirates-hijack-first-commercial-ship-five-years/; INT’L CHAMBER COM. INT’L MAR. BUREAU
(ICC IMB), Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: 2017 Annual Report 20 (Jan. 2018), https://www.iccccs.org/reports/2017-Annual-IMB-Piracy-Report.pdf.
331
Lang Report, supra note 321, ¶ 29. (demonstrating that from December 12, 2008 through the December
31, 2010, approximately 2,000 people were held hostage by Somali pirates).
332
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2383, supra note 135, pmbl., ¶¶ 4, 11, 18. The U.N.S.C. focus on financial flows
and those who “illicitly finance or profit” from piracy came in later resolutions. Id.
333
PROELSS, supra note 68, at 56–60.
334
Lang Report, supra note 321, ¶ 28.
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Resolution 1816 (2008) represented the first Security Council measure
solely focused on addressing the modern threat of Somali piracy,335 authorizing
“[entry] into the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts
of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with such action
permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international
law[.]”336
Among other things, Resolution 1816 sought to ensure that pirates did not
evade capture by exploiting gaps in the law or the incapacity of the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG)—as of 2012, the Federal Government of Somalia
(FGS)—to conduct interdictions in the Somali territorial sea. Some provisions,
such as authorizing entry into Somali territorial sea, were adopted by TFG’s
consent.337 In 2008, four resolutions with a primary focus on defeating Somali
piracy were adopted. Discussions that year addressed the use of force, the impact
of the resolutions on customary international law, and enhancement of
cooperation, issues that remain relevant today. Later resolutions would reaffirm
the authority to enter the Somali territorial sea and meet other evolving security
and governance challenges, such as private security; illegal, unregulated, and
unreported (IUU) fishing; and linkage between terrorism and piracy.
Resolution 1838 (2008) called upon states “interested in the security of
maritime activities” to take part in the “fight against piracy . . . by deploying
naval vessels and aircraft.”338 Warships and aircraft would deploy to the Gulf of
Aden complement assets already in the area. In contrast to this positive security
development is the inability of many states to criminally prosecute pirates.
Without a legal end-state, the likely result would be capturing pirates only to
have them return to Somalia, where they could reengage in piracy.
A potential legal option was the application of the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts of 1988 (SUA) Convention against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,

335
S.C. Res. 2383, supra note 135; S.C. Res. 2316 (Nov. 9, 2016); S.C. Res. 2246 (Nov. 10, 2015); S.C.
Res. 2184, supra note 270; S.C. Res. 2125 (Nov. 18, 2013); S.C. Res. 2077 (Nov. 21, 2012); S.C. Res. 2020
(Nov. 22, 2011); S.C. Res. 2015 (Oct. 24, 2011); S.C. Res. 1976 (Apr. 11, 2011); S.C. Res. 1950 (Nov. 23,
2010); S.C. Res. 1918 (Apr. 27, 2010); S.C. Res. 1897 (Nov. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 24); S.C.
Res. 1846, supra note 25; S.C. Res. 1838, supra note 24; S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 4; see also S.C. Res. 733,
¶ 5 (Jan. 23, 1992) (stating that the Security Council was “gravely alarmed at the rapid deterioration of the
situation in Somalia,” and under Ch. VII, decided that all States, “ . . . immediately implement a general and
complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment. . . . “).
336
S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 4, ¶ 7(a).
337
Id. at pmbl.
338
Id. ¶ 2.
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drafted by Member States at the International Maritime Organization.339 As of
July 2018, there were 166 States Parties to the SUA Convention, which
proscribes unlawfully and intentionally seizing or exercising control of a ship,
among other illicit activity, and requires extradition or prosecution.340 Though
some elements of SUA proscribe action not within the customary law of piracy,
other provisions could apply to acts committed by Somali pirates, such as
unlawfully, intentionally, and forcibly seizing or exercising control over a ship
by force.341 Capabilities provided by SUA, when combined with the LOS
Convention, prompted a Security Council member to assert “the international
community already has sufficient legal authority and available mechanisms to
apprehend and prosecute pirates.”342 But unanimity on the issue was lacking,
with a minority view contending that SUA, as a counterterrorism convention,343
was generally not applicable to acts of piracy.344
The uncertainty of the legal end-state could have tremendously damaged the
nascent counterpiracy mission. The Security Council, in turn, could have
deferred to international legal venues or allowed the legal disagreement to
continue. Instead, the U.N.S.C. confronted this important issue and in
Resolution 1846 (2008), among other mandates, declared SUA a viable legal

339
S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 24, ¶ 15; see also SUA Convention 1988, supra note 203; see also, e.g.,
Kraska & Wilson, supra note 69, at 241 (“The SUA Convention was created in response to the hijacking, hostage
taking, and murder committed on board the Italian-flagged passenger liner Achille Lauro in 1985. At the time of
the attack on the cruise ship, many states did not have criminal legislation for extradition or prosecution for
vessel hijacking. Over a three-year period, member states at the IMO developed and adopted SUA, which entered
into force in 1992. A key SUA offense is to unlawfully and intentionally seize or exercise control over a ship by
force or threat or other form of intimidation.”).
340
Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of which the
International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General performs depositary or other functions 428–32
(Dec. 8, 2017); see also SUA Convention (1988), supra note 203, art. 3.1.1.
341
SUA Convention (1988), supra note 203, art. 3.1.1. This SUA Convention (1988) article also
proscribes such actions if taken under threat or any other form of intimidation. Id.
342
U.N. SCOR, 6046th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6046 (Dec. 16, 2008). Condoleezza Rice discussed
the situation in Somalia that led to the adoption of Resolution 1851 (2008). Id. The authorities referenced
included the LOS Convention, prior UNSC Resolutions, and the Convention for SUA against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (1988). Id. Rice continued that adopting a resolution was nevertheless necessary because
“sometimes the political will and the coordination have not been there. . . . “ Id.
343
International Legal Instruments, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM,
http://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/legal-instruments.shtml (including SUA as one of “19 international legal
instruments to prevent terrorist acts.”); see also SECURITY COUNCIL COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE,
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/laws.html.
344
See Workshop Commissioned by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN to
Somalia, Piracy off the Somali Coast: Assessment and Recommendations 26, Nairobi, Kenya (Nov. 10–21,
2008).
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instrument in the fight against Somali piracy.345 This clarification allowed
counterpiracy discussions to move forward in other key areas as well, such as
information sharing, operational collaboration, and the pursuit of illicit
financing. Unfortunately, between 2008 and 2017 there was, to the Author’s
knowledge, only five prosecutions globally for SUA violations involving a
criminal act that could meet the elements of both piracy and SUA (1988).346 In
part, a lack of use by Member States to prosecute under the SUA Convention is
emblematic of challenges with maritime law enforcement, and the difficulties of
conducting boardings at sea; responding to ships that may be registered in one
country, ownership in another, and crewmembers from multiple other states;
diplomatic relations regarding potential waivers of jurisdiction; ensuring the
maintenance of a chain of custody for evidence seized on the high seas; detention
conditions on a warship; judicial competency, investigative capacity, and
promptly bringing suspects before a magistrate. Those challenges can all be
overcome but require sustained attention by the Security Council as well as
continued engagements by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP), among others.
Resolution 1851 (2008) authorized Member States to take “all necessary
measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the purpose of suppressing acts of
piracy and armed robbery at sea.”347 This extraordinary provision allowed
military strikes on land, with six caveats: (1) the affected Member State requests
such authority; (2) the resolution applies only to those States cooperating with
the TFG; (3) advance notification is required; (4) authorization is for a limited
time period; (5) authorization is for a limited purpose: to suppress piracy and
armed robbery at sea; and (6) any use of force “shall be undertaken consistent
with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law.”348

345
See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 24, ¶ 15 (noting that the SUA Convention (1988) “provides for parties
to create criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery of persons responsible for or suspected of
seizing or exercising control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation; urges States
parties to the SUA Convention to fully implement their obligations under said Convention and cooperate with
the Secretary-General and the IMO to build judicial capacity for the successful prosecution of persons suspected
of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. . . . “).
346
See United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Salad, No. 2:11cr34, 2012
WL 12953886 (E.D. Va. Nov. 16, 2012); Muse v. Daniels, 815 F. 3d 265 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Beyle v. United
States, 269 F. Supp. 3d 716 (E.D. Va. 2017); United States v. Salad, 907 F. Supp. 2d 743 (E.D. Va. 2012). Since
the adoption of the SUA Convention, the Author is aware of only one other criminal prosecution, unrelated to
piracy, which also involved a U.S. proceeding. See United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2008). In total,
as of November 2018, there have been six criminal convictions under national-level legislation that implemented
the provisions of the SUA Convention (1988).
347
S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 24, ¶ 6.
348
Id.
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Another issue addressed by the Security Council involved the destruction of
ships reasonably suspected of being involved in piracy. There are only three
recognized bases for intentionally sinking or destroying a vessel interdicted on
the high seas suspected of engaging in illicit activity: enforcement of a U.N.S.C.
resolution; safety, where a navigational hazard exists if the ship were to remain
in its place; or where judicially/administratively ordered, if consistent with
internationally recognized due process standards.349 Without explicit Security
Council mandates, could warships be exposed to claims for compensation if they
scuttled vessels? In U.N.S.C. Resolutions 1846, 1851, 1897, 1976, 2184, and
2383, among others, the Security Council appropriately provided express
authorization to seize and dispose of vessels when reasonable grounds existed
to believe they had been used in piracy. U.N.S.C. Resolution 2184 (2014)
provides an example of an operative provision on this issue, stating “consistent
with this resolution and international law” Member States “take part in the fight
against piracy . . . by seizing and disposing of boats . . . used in the commission
of piracy . . . .”350
Along with extending authorization to conduct operations within the Somali
territorial sea, Resolution 1897 (2009) invited consideration of special
agreements with countries to take custody of pirates and urged states support
investigations.351 Resolution 1976 (2011) underlined the need to investigate
those who “illicitly finance, plan, organize or unlawfully profit from pirate
attacks” both on land and on the water; strengthen “anti-money-laundering
laws[;]” and establish Financial Investigation Units.352 Resolution 2077 (2012)

349

See WILSON, supra note 129, at 305–12.
S.C. Res. 2184, supra note 270, ¶ 11(emphasis added); see also S.C. Res. 2383, supra note 135, ¶ 12
(“Renews its call upon States and regional organizations that are able to do so to take part in the fight against
piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and
international law, by deploying naval vessels, arms, and military aircraft, by providing basing and logistical
support for counter-piracy forces, and by seizing and disposing of boats, vessels, arms, and other related
equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting such use[.] . . .”) (second emphasis added).
351
S.C. Res. 1897, ¶¶ 6, 15 (Nov. 30, 2009).
352
S.C. Res. 1976, supra note 335, ¶¶ 15, 17 (Apr. 11, 2011). The issue of whether inciting or facilitating
an act of piracy, consistent with LOS Convention art 101(c), occurring on land enjoys universal jurisdiction has
not been addressed in Security Council resolutions. That said, the Netherlands noted “in 1956 that the ILC’s
[International Law Commission] drafting – in omitting references to the high seas [in inciting or facilitating] –
would allow this provision to provision to apply elsewhere.” PROELSS, supra note 68, at 743–44; see also U.S.
v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
350
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encouraged flag States and port States to develop regulations for the deployment
of privately contracted armed security personnel.353
Subsequent resolutions would extend the mandate to operation within the
Somali territorial sea354 and various other danger areas and recognition of those
deploying and supporting collaborative efforts. Somali representative Abukar
Dahir Osman welcomed acknowledgement in Resolution 2383 (2017) that
“illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in Somalia’s exclusive economic
zone results in a loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in lost revenue and could
lead to the destabilization of the coastal communities of Somalia.355 Fishing
licenses issued by the Somali authorities will not be attractive to fishing
companies, as they cannot compete in the market with those who get it free of
charge—that is, illegally.”356 Resolution 2383 also noted that “piracy
exacerbates instability in Somalia by introducing large amounts of illicit cash
that fuels additional crime, corruption, and terrorism[;] . . . “357 Unfortunately, it
is unclear what information the Security Council relied upon for this assertion,
as the resolution did not cite any study affirming a link between piracy and
terrorism, nor has any U.N.S.C.-directed report expressly documented such a
connection.
Diplomatic responses to the Somali piracy threat in Turtle Bay (as well as in
London, at the International Maritime Organization) appropriately did not result
in recommendations to develop a new treaty or amend an existing instrument.
353
S.C. Res. 2077, supra note 335, ¶ 30. The Security Council called upon States to develop regulations
“through a consultative process, including through the IMO [International Maritime Organization] and ISO
[International Organization for Standardization].” Id.
354
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 24, ¶ 10 (“States and regional organizations cooperating with the
TFG . . . may . . . enter into the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and
armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with such action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy
under relevant international law. . . . “).
355
See U.N. SCOR, 8088d mtg. at 2–3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8088 (Nov. 7, 2017); see also U.N. SecretaryGeneral, On the Situation with Respect to Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea off the Coast of Somalia, ¶ 6, U.N.
Doc. S/2016/843 (Oct. 7, 2016) (“The complex linkage between piracy and illegal, unreported and unregulated
fishing continues to be of concern. The rise in the number of seafarers held by pirates in 2015 is largely
attributable to hijackings of small fishing vessels. Many local communities view ransom payments for hostages
as compensation for what they perceive as fishing revenue lost through illegal, unreported and unregulated
fishing by such vessels, and, to that extent, the perception and the reality of illegal, unreported and unregulated
fishing activities can be a driver for piracy”).
356
U.N. SCOR, 8088th mtg., supra note 355. The Somali representative added, “According to Kofi
Annan, former Secretary-General and current Chairperson of the Africa Progress Panel, “natural resources
plunder is organized theft disguised as commerce.” Id. at 3. Mr. Annan further asserted “commercial trawlers
that operate under flags of convenience and unload in ports that do not record their catch are unethical and
illegal.” Id.; see also S.C. Res. 2383, supra note 135, at pmbl. (referencing illegal, unregulated, and unreported
fishing prominently).
357
S.C. Res. 2383, supra note 135, ¶ 2.
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Security Council resolutions, however, provided enhanced authorities—such as
permitting naval interdictions within the Somali territorial sea, the intentional
destruction of vessels reasonably believed to be engaged in prohibited activity,
and engagements on land—and collectively represent a model that would, in
part, be employed in response to migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean Sea
for addressing subsequent transnational maritime threats where coastal State
capabilities are extremely limited or nonexistent.
D. Mediterranean Migrant-Smuggling and Trafficking-in-Persons Model
Dangerous maritime journeys of people seeking entry into Europe have
collectively been called the greatest humanitarian crisis of our time.358 During
discussions on Resolution 2240 (2015), Security Council member Cherif
Mahamet Zene (Chad) noted somberly, “[t]he Mediterranean has become a
cemetery for thousands of essentially African migrants, who leave their
countries and take enormous risks to reach Europe in search of a better life.”359
A predicate question at Turtle Bay was not whether the situation was horrific—
it unquestionably was and remains so to date—but rather, whether Security
Council involvement was appropriate and if so, whether approval of measures
under Chapter VII was warranted.
The prohibitive majority of maritime transits occur on overcrowded and
unseaworthy boats; the data between 2014 and 2017 are both stunning and
disturbing: there were approximately 1,765,216 arrivals into Europe from the
Mediterranean Sea and 15,486 dead and missing during transit.360 In other
words, every day on average over the four years more than 1,209 people crossed
the Mediterranean seeking entry into Europe, and approximately ten perished or
went missing.
Extensive criminal involvement with smuggling and trafficking is powering
the situation. A U.N. Report estimated that the revenue generated from illicit
transit is “between 5 billion and 6 billion euros in 2015.”361 A subsequent U.N.
Report noted, “[o]rganized transnational criminal networks continued to exploit
the conflict and security situation in Libya to conduct their smuggling and
358

2015),
crisis.
359

Zeina Karam, Q & A: Syria’s Civil War at the Root of Migrant Crisis, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 3,
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/04477bebf2074f73ad56a0c5fabf444e/qa-syrias-civil-war-root-migrant-

U.N. SCOR, 7531st mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7531 (Oct. 9, 2015).
See The Mediterranean Situation, OPERATIONAL PORTAL REFUGEE (Dec. 31, 2017), http://data2.unhcr.
org/en/situations/mediterranean.
361
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution
2240, supra note 11, ¶ 6.
360

WILSON_PROOFS

68

12/17/2018 12:20 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

trafficking operations, which in turn has fueled instability and undermined
governance structures.”362
Three Security Council resolutions adopted between 2015 and 2017 focused
on the Mediterranean situation, and the authorities they provide are case studies
on impact and imprecision. The maritime domain is their predominant focus:
until land-based security, governance, and development improve, naval assets
will be called on to conduct boardings and rescues363 and, as appropriate, to take
law enforcement measures. U.N.S.C. decisions adopted under Chapter VII were
not met with unanimous support. During debate on Resolution 2312 (2016)
Venezuela expressed misgivings similar to those it had offered on Resolution
2240 (2015):
We reiterate our doubts that the resolution is an adequate instrument
to comprehensively an appropriately address the tragedy being lived
out by thousands of human beings . . . . The complexity and
multidimensional nature of the phenomenon requires a comprehensive
approach that goes beyond a merely military and security-oriented
[approach], including recourse to Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations, as some States within this organ claim to encourage.
Venezuela once again therefore rejects the security- and
criminalization-oriented approach to the issue of asylum seekers,
refugees and migrants.364

Despite the lack of consensus, the transnational security threats of smuggling
migrants and trafficking in persons warranted Security Council intervention.
The U.N.S.C. provided authorities to address both an emergent humanitarian
crisis and a continuing security threat. Special Representative Martin Kobler,
Head of United Nations Support Mission in Libya, convincingly described the
intersecting humanitarian and security challenges, noting in 2017, “[f]ive
hospitals have been bombed this year and humanitarian supplies cannot reach
many regions of Libya due to insecurity[;]”365 particularly “[w]ith respect to the
362
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution
2312, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/2017/761 (Sept. 7, 2017).
363
See LOS Convention, supra note 23, art. 98 (“Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its
flag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: (a) to render
assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; (b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue
of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected
of him . . . .”); see also RICK BUTTON, International Law and Search and Rescue, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV.
25–63 (2017) (providing a comprehensive analysis of search and rescue (SAR) background, context, and current
operational considerations).
364
U.N. SCOR, 7783d mtg. at 3–4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7783 (Oct. 6, 2016).
365
U.N. SCOR, 7961st mtg. at 2–4, 20–21, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7961 (June 7, 2017) (“[Kobler] floated the
idea with the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court as to whether it would be possible to consider
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illegal flow of arms, Libya has 20 million weapons. With a population of only 6
million people, that is really a problem.”366 This resolution model—seeking to
bridge safety and security considerations—represents a pioneering formula, but
in this instance it brought textual ambiguity and imprecise guidance.
After months of discussion, the Security Council approved Resolution 2240
(2015), which contained three operative elements: (1) inspections are authorized
on the high seas (outside of the twelve-mile territorial sea) off the coast of Libya,
given reasonable suspicion of migrant smuggling and “good faith efforts” to
contact the flag state for consent; (2) disposal of vessels involved in migrant
smuggling or human trafficking interdicted is authorized only if “in accordance
with applicable international law;” and (3) member states may “use all measures
commensurate to the specific circumstances . . .” in confronting migrant
smugglers, consistent with “international human rights law.”367
The authorities provided in U.N.S.C. Resolution 2240, along with
Resolution 2312 (2016), and Resolution 2380 (2017), were unquestionably
beneficial. Between June 2015 and August 2017, European Union Naval Force
Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med) reported rescuing “39,818 persons in the
southern central Mediterranean. . . . [and] estimate[d] that since October 2016
around 140,210 persons have been rescued by different vessels in the central
Mediterranean Sea.”368
The three mandates had a positive operational impact, notwithstanding
language that was in important instances vague and imprecise. One such
example is the regrettable reference in Resolution 2240 to “good faith efforts”
to obtain the consent of the flag state.369 Even more ambiguity arises in their
provision on the intentional sinking—disposal—of vessels interdicted on the
human trafficking as a crime against humanity, given the thousands of people who have drowned and the
irresponsible behaviour and the lack of accountability of human traffickers operating in Libya.”).
366
U.N. SCOR, 7927th mtg. at 2–4, 20-21, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7927 (April 19, 2017).
367
S.C. Res. 2240, supra note 4, ¶¶ 5–8, 10.
368
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution
2312, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/2017/761 (Sept. 7, 2017). (“As at 31 August 2017, some 99,105 people, originating
largely from sub-Saharan African countries, had arrived in Italy in 2017.”).
369
See S.C. Res. 2240, supra note 4, ¶ 7. Contra U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, U.N. Doc. 2241 U.N.T.S. 507 (Nov. 15,
2000) (addressing criminal activity associated with the smuggling of migrants). Article 8(2) provides that a
“[s]tate that has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel . . . flying the flag or displaying the marks of registry
of another State Party is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea may so notify the flag [s]tate, request
confirmation of registry and, if confirmed, request authorization from the flag [s]tate to take appropriate
measures with regard to that vessel.” Id. at 5. Article 8(5) provides that, “[a] State Party shall take no additional
measures without the express authorization of the flag State, except those necessary to relieve imminent danger
to the lives of persons or those which derive from relevant bilateral or multilateral agreements.” Id.
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high seas engaged in proscribed conduct. Resolution 2240 is confusing because
it identifies the issue of vessel destruction but does not provide express
directions resolving the issue.370 In contrast, Resolution 2184 (2014) authorized
states engaged in Somali counterpiracy operations to, among other things, seize
and dispose of boats “consistent with this resolution and international law”371
while Resolution 2240, vaguely provided such actions were authorized only “in
accordance with applicable international law.”372
On the issue of good-faith efforts to obtain the consent of the vessel’s flag
state, the Security Council called upon “flag States that receive such requests to
review and respond to them in a rapid and timely manner . . . “ but provided no
further direction.373 A EU submission to the U.N. Committee on Resolution
2240 implementation “consider[ed] four hours a suitable time frame to qualify
an effort to obtain consent by a flag State as being undertaken in good faith.”374
The EU’s position of “good-faith” is judicious, and at least two international
instruments375 have addressed the presumption that may be taken when after the
passage of four hours, a flag state has not responded to a request for a
confirmation of registry. None, however, have asserted that consent could be
presumed without the flag state’s prior agreement.

370
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution
2240, supra note 11, ¶¶ 5–8, 10. Months after implementation of the resolution as well as a U.N. Report, no
international authority was specifically identified to support vessel destruction: A European Union submission
to the Resolution 2240 Committee noted that its military operation “towed or transported vessels to Italy, insofar
as possible . . . in view of the potential value to investigations and prosecutions. Otherwise, it disposed of them
to avoid any risk to the safety of seafarers, navigation and the marine environment, in line with relevant
international law and standards.” Id. at ¶ 15 (emphasis added). The EU’s approach is prudent, though the
likelihood of varied interpretations is not beneficial in responses that seek to involve naval forces from multiple
countries. The Security Council missed an opportunity to unambiguously state with detail what action was
authorized, and potentially identify documentation and evidentiary requirements; due process elements; and
environmental considerations.
371
S.C. Res. 2184, supra note 270, ¶ 11.
372
S.C. Res. 2240, supra note 4, ¶ 8 (emphasis added).
373
Id. ¶ 9.
374
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 2240, supra note 11,
¶ 17(“To date (September 7, 2016), however, no such requests [to a flag State to confirm registry and conduct
an inspection] have [been] made.”).
375
See Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Doc. :EG/CONF.15/21, Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (Nov. 1, 2005) (2005 SUA Protocols,
art. 8bis (5) (d), which provides a State Party may notify the IMO Secretary-General “with respect to ships flying
its flag or displaying its mark of registry, [that] the requesting Party is granted authorization to and search the
ship . . . if there is no response from the first Party within four hours of acknowledgement of receipt of a request
to confirm nationality.”); see also Maritime and air counter narcotics agreement in Caribbean, 2005 DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ch. 3, § 21, https://www.state.gov/s/l/c22824.htm.
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Also, the EU reported “that it could not board, inspect and seize all vessels
suspected of being used for smuggling and trafficking off the coast of Libya for
legal reasons, given that the Security Council, in its resolution 2240 (2015), did
not address presumed places of departure other than Libya.”376
Resolutions 2312 (2016) and 2380 (2017) authorized measures against
vessels suspected of illegal smuggling from Libya, providing high seas
inspections of vessels could occur “with the consent of the flag State” where
reasonable grounds exist to suspect proscribed conduct.377 Resolutions 2312 and
2380 also renewed the operative provisions in Resolution 2240 that authorize
boarding a foreign flagged vessel without flag state consent, provided good faith
efforts are first made to obtain consent.378 The inclusion of the “good faith” in
the same paragraph that emphasizes the urgency of saving migrants and human
trafficking victims under “exceptional and specific circumstances” combined
with a requirement that Member States conducting naval measures “keep flag
States informed of actions taken with respect to their vessels”379 supports the
conclusion that a boarding may occur without flag state consent (provided good
faith efforts are made to first obtain approval). While this mandate can
reasonably be interpreted to authorize a boarding without flag State consent on
high seas, a lack of precision on a seminal law-of-the-sea issue has generated
disparate enforcement measures and inevitably led to an uneven approach.380
These measures have supported naval engagements, again affirming the
unique position and authoritative force of the Security Council in the maritime
environment. This resolutions model could be applied to other threats involving
both humanitarian and security issues, though the operative provisions warrant
refinement to remove ambiguity and imprecise terms.
E. Embargo Model
Resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011), along with ten subsequent
mandates adopted through 2017, sought to stem deteriorating security conditions
376
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 2240, supra note 11,
¶ 54 (“The European Union assesses that, with changing and emerging routes to Europe, its military operation
is not able to counter the issue to the best extent possible. The operation is of the view that, while its presence
and activities have limited the freedom of maneuver of migrant smugglers and affected their operations and
tactics, effective measures have to be taken on land and at sea.”).
377
S.C. Res. 2380, ¶ 6 (Oct. 5, 2017); S.C. Res. 2312, ¶ 6 (Oct. 6, 2016).
378
S.C. Res. 2312, supra note 377, ¶ 7 (Oct. 6, 2016) (“Decides that, for a further period of twelve months
from the date of adoption of this resolution to renew the authorizations as set out in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of
resolution 2240 (2015) . . . .”) (emphasis in original); see also S.C. Res. 2380, ¶ 7 (Oct. 5, 2017).
379
S.C. Res. 2240, supra note 4, ¶¶ 7, 9 (Oct. 9, 2015).
380
Id.
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in Libya, in the midst of an unfolding humanitarian crisis, that allowed weapons
transfers to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also referred to as
Da’esh, as well as other terrorist groups.381 Other Security Council resolutions
have sought to prevent the illegal export of oil from Libya.382 The Security
Council decided in Resolution 1970 that Member States immediately take
necessary measures to block the movement of prohibited arms and materiel on
their flagged vessels, by their nationals, and through their territories.383
Resolution 1973 (2011) called on Member States “to ensure strict
implementation of the arms embargo . . . [and] inspect in their territory,
including seaports . . . and on the high seas, vessels . . . bound to or from the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, if the State concerned has information that provides
reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains [prohibited] items . . . .”384
Authorization to enforce an arms embargo involving Libya parallels
direction provided to address other transnational security threats, discussed
herein, which are unfortunately not models of precision from a law-of-the-sea
perspective.
Resolution 1973 is emblematic of imprecision on the issue of high seas
boarding authorities. This mandate called upon flag states “to cooperate with
such inspections and authorizes Member States to use all measures
commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections.”385
This provision is vague regarding whether flag state consent is required.
However, additional resolution provisions requiring Member States to report the
results of any inspection, including “whether or not cooperation was provided,”
and provide the United Nations with details of the vessel inspection, seizure, and
disposal of proscribed material reasonably supports concluding flag state
consent is not required.386 Resolution 2292 (2016), affirming the Libyan arms
embargo, again employed the undefined “good faith efforts” standard with
regard to obtaining flag state consent prior to boarding a foreign flagged

381
See S.C. Res. 2420 (June 11, 2018); S.C. Res. 2357 (June 12, 2017); S.C. Res. 2292, supra note 135;
S.C. Res. 2278 (Mar. 31, 2016); S.C. Res. 2214 (Mar. 27, 2015); S.C. Res. 2213 (Mar. 27, 2015); S.C. Res. 2174
(Aug. 27, 2014); S.C. Res. 2144 (Mar. 14, 2014); S.C. Res. 2095 (Mar. 14, 2013); S.C. Res. 2040 (Mar. 12,
2012); S.C. Res. 2009 (Sept. 16, 2011). Further, while there are extensive legal issues associated with embargos,
the focus of this section is solely on the impact of an embargo on law-of-the-sea principles.
382
See S.C. Res. 2362 (June 29, 2017); S.C. Res. 2278, supra note 381; S.C. Res. 2213, supra note 381;
S.C. Res. 2146, supra note 135.
383
S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 9 (Feb. 26, 2011).
384
S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 4, ¶ 13 (Mar. 17, 2011).
385
Id.
386
S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 4, ¶ 15 (emphasis added).
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vessel387 (discussed above in the context of smuggling migrants and trafficking
in persons). Resolution 2292, extended in Resolutions 2357 (2017) and 2420
(2018), also urged Member States “conducting inspections to do so without
causing undue delay to or undue interference with the exercise of freedom of
navigation.”388
Despite the operative provisions of Resolution 2292, the Chinese
representative to the Security Council asserted, “The inspection of related
vessels should be undertaken only with the consent of the flag States and in
accordance with the resolution.”389 The Venezuelan representative first agreed
with the Chinese position, then acknowledged the Resolution’s expansive
authorities applied only to Libya:
In authorizing the interdiction of ships on the high seas suspected of
transporting arms to be used by [ISIL] . . . respect for international law
must be upheld, which includes obtaining the consent of the vessel’s
flag State prior to any inspections . . . . We believe that the practice of
interdicting vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya with a view
to combating the traffic in arms and related materiel should not be
extrapolated to other possible cases.390

Diplomatic focus of the dire situation in Libya was both appropriate and
urgently needed. U.N.S.C. measures resulted in, among others, the U.S. Navy
diversion of a ship containing, “laboratory items,” “chemicals,” “hardware,”
“machines,” and “spare parts” in 2011,391 and the Lebanese seizure in 2012 of
rocket-propelled grenades and heavy caliber ammunition seized from the Sierra
Leone flagged Letfallah II.392 Further, on January 6, 2018, after Greek officials
identified Andromeda operating near Crete, special forces boarded the Tanzania-

387

S.C. Res. 2292, supra note 135, ¶ 3.
Id. at ¶ 4 (emphasis added).
389
U.N. SCOR7715th mtg., supra note 139, at 4. China in 2017 again asserted its position that the
resolution did not provide authority to conduct a boarding without flag State consent. U.N. SCOR, 72d Sess.,
7964th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7964 (June 12, 2017) (“States should . . . strictly abide by the relevant
principles of international law and respect the sovereignty and legitimate rights and interests of flag States.
Measures taken by States should not infringe upon the exclusive jurisdiction of flag States over their ships.”).
390
U.N. SCOR 7715th mtg., supra note139, at 5–6 (emphasis added).
391
Reply in Support of the United States’ Motion to Dismiss at 2, Tarros v. United States, 982 F. Supp.
2d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13 Civ. 1932).
392
Dominic Evans, UPDATE 1-Lebanon Impounds Ship Carrying Libyan Weapons, REUTERS (Apr. 28,
2012, 12:30 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/syria-lebanon-ship/update-1-lebanon-impounds-shipcarrying-libyan-weapons-idUSL6E8FS1CT20120428.
388
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flagged vessel and seized explosives, detonators, and other proscribed cargo
destined for Libya in violation of U.N.S.C. mandates.393
Another security challenge in Libya, the illicit export of crude oil, prompted
the Security Council to adopt Resolution 2146 (2014). This mandate authorized
inspections on the high seas of designated vessels and the return of crude oil,
with the consent of, and in coordination with, the Government of Libya provided
the consent of the vessel’s flag state is first sought.394 Thus, designated vessels
could be boarded without flag state consent so long as flag state approval was
sought. The resolution then noted the authorization to address the Libyan threat,
“shall not affect the rights or obligations or responsibilities of Member States
under international law, including the general principle of exclusive jurisdiction
of a flag state over its vessels on the high seas.”395
Approximately one week before the Security Council adopted Resolution
2146, special forces from the United States, at the request of the Libyan
Government, “boarded and took control of the commercial tanker Morning
Glory.”396 Carrying 200,000 barrels of oil, this vessel was transiting the
Mediterranean after escaping “a blockade of Sidra imposed by the government
in Tripoli.”397 Initially sailing under the registry of North Korea, “following the
revocation by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its flag” the
Morning Glory was without nationality.398 A U.N. panel of experts399 concluded
that because of “the cargo manifest and other relevant documents of the Morning
393
Press Release, Ministry of Maritime and Island Policy, Greece, Detection and confiscation of a foreign
flag ship with explosives at the port of Hereaklion, Crete (Jan. 2018), https://translate.google.com/
translate?hl=en&sl=el&u=https://www.yen.gr/&prev=search (“It was revealed [during a preliminary
investigation] that the master of the ship was instructed by his owner to go to the port of [Misrata] in Libya in
order to unload and deliver the entire cargo . . . .”).
394
S.C. Res. 2146, ¶¶ 5–9 (Mar. 19, 2014) (explaining, in ¶6, “that Member States, before taking measures
authorized in paragraph 5, first seek the consent of the vessel’s flag State . . . .”).
395
Id.
396
Jeanette Torres, Navy SEALs Seize Oil Freighter “Morning Glory” in Mediterranean, ABC NEWS
RADIO (Mar. 17, 2014), http://abcnewsradioonline.com/world-news/navy-seals-seize-oil-freighter-morningglory-in-mediterranea.html.
397
Id.
398
U.N. Security Council, Letter dated 23 February 2015 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant
to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶ 234, U.N. Doc. S/2015/128 (Feb.
23, 2015); see also LOS Convention, supra note 23, arts. 92, 110. A ship without nationality is also referred to
as stateless, and warships or other government vessels from all nations can board such a ship on the high seas
and subject it to all appropriate law enforcement actions. Id.
399
U.N. Security Council, Letter dated 23 February 2015 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant
to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶ 235, U.N. Doc. S/2015/128 (Feb.
23, 2015) (“Although the [Morning Glory] dated from before the adoption of resolution 2146 (2014), the Panel
decided to investigate the case in order to gain knowledge of the networks organizing these illegal exports, as
well as their modus operandi.”).
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Glory . . . the smuggling network may have links with companies in different
countries.”400 Moreover, there were “allegations of a potential link between the
oil smuggling network and the financing of arms transfers in violation of the
arms embargo.”401
Resolution 2146 requires Member States to take “necessary measures to
prohibit the provision by their nationals or from their territory of bunkering
services” to designated vessels, and to “require their nationals and entities and
individuals in their territory not to engage in any financial transactions with
respect to such crude oil from Libya aboard” designated vessels.402 Though this
Resolution has not had a notable operational impact, it is a model for future
U.N.S.C. action—Resolution 2146 provided authorities to support naval
interdictions on the high seas of vessels illicitly smuggling oil while
appropriately considering navigational freedoms and the interests of the affected
state.403
The Security Council responded to an unrelated security threat in Resolution
1929 (2010), “[b]anning Iran from investing in nuclear and missile technology
abroad, including investment in uranium mining[,]” and “[e]stablishing a
complete arms embargo on Iran, banning the sale of ‘battle tanks, armoured
combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack
helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems’ to Iran.”404 This effort
represented one of eight U.N.S.C. resolutions aimed at Iran’s nuclear program,
among other issues, adopted between 2006 and 2015 that also included demands
that “Iran suspend its uranium enrichment program, as well as undertake several
confidence-building measures[.]”405
In the maritime environment, Resolution 1929 (2010) called on states to
“inspect . . . all cargo to and from Iran, in their territory, including seaports . . .
if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to
believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is

400

Id. ¶ 236.
Id. ¶ 237; see also Libya to Release Crew of Oil Tanker, VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS (Mar. 24, 2014 6:27
PM), http://www.voanews.com/a/libya-to-release-crew-of-oil-tanker/1878353.html (regarding why the Libyans
opted not to prosecute the Morning Glory crew members).
402
S.C. Res. 2146, supra note 135, ¶ 10.
403
See S.C. Res. 2146, ¶¶ 5–9.
404
Kelsey Davenport, UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran, ARMS CONTROL ASSOC. (Aug. 6, 2017),
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Security-Council-Resolutions-on-Iran.
405
Id.; see also S.C. Res. 2231, ¶ 3 (July 20, 2015); S.C. Res. 1835, ¶¶ 3–4 (Sept. 27, 2008); S.C. Res.
1803, ¶ 15 (Mar. 3, 2018); S.C. Res. 1747, ¶ 9 (Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res. 1737, ¶ 1 (Dec. 27, 2006); S.C. Res.
1696, ¶ 2 (July 31, 2006).
401
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prohibited . . . .”406 The resolution further noted, “consistent with international
law, in particular the law of the sea [a state] may request inspections of vessels
on the high seas with the consent of the flag State, and [called] upon all States
to cooperate in such inspections if there is information that provides reasonable
grounds to believe the vessel is carrying [prohibited] items . . . .”407 Member
States were directed to submit reports to the United Nations regarding the results
of inspections and in particular, whether flag state cooperation was provided.408
The most likely interpretation of this resolution is that flag state consent is
required, though it is unquestionably imprecise.
Regardless of precision, measures imposed against Iran have had a blistering
economic impact. As a result of U.N.S.C.-directed sanctions and embargos,
Iran’s oil exports had fallen to 700,000 barrels per day (bpd) by May
2013, compared with an average 2.2 million bpd in 2011. In January
2013, Iran’s oil minister acknowledged for the first time that the fall
in exports was costing the country between $4bn and $8bn (£2.5bn£5bn) each month. Iran is believed to have suffered a loss of about
$26bn in oil revenue in 2012 from a total of $95 bn in 2011.409

The meaningful financial consequences of the resolutions are consistent with a
U.N. report, the drafters of which had been “informed that some shipping
companies and freight forwarders had adopted policies to refrain from business
with the Islamic Republic of Iran, including transporting cargo to Iranian ports.
A number of large cargo transportation firms announced over the past year a
suspension or limitation in shipments involving Iranian ports.”410
Resolution 2182 (2014) focused on the continued security threat in Somalia
and the enforcement of an arms embargo and charcoal ban. This mandate
authorized inspections in Somali territorial waters and on the high seas of vessels
bound to or from Somalia that a Member State had reasonable grounds to believe
were: “(i) [c]arrying charcoal from Somalia in violation of the charcoal ban; (ii)
carrying weapons or military equipment to Somalia, directly or indirectly, in
violation of the arms embargo on Somalia; (iii) carrying [proscribed] weapons
406

S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 4, ¶ 14.
Id. ¶ 15 (first emphasis added).
408
S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 4, ¶ 17.
409
Iran Nuclear Crisis: What Are the Sanctions?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-middle-east-15983302.
410
U.N. Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council, ¶ 154, U.N. Doc. S/2012/395
(June 12, 2012) (quoting Jonathan Saul, Sanctions Blowback Crippling Iran’s Shipping Trade, REUTERS (Dec.
1, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-shipping-idUSTRE7B01PG20111201 (“Iran’s vital seaborne
trade is suffering from escalating sanctions pressure as shipping companies scale down activities or pull out,
with the Islamic Republic facing more hurdles in transporting its oil . . . .”).
407
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or military equipment to [designated] individuals or entities.”411 The illicit
movement of charcoal may not enjoy “front page” media attention, but it is
directly linked to terrorist groups. The United Kingdom representative to the
Security Council noted, “Al-Shabaab has kept up to one-third of the revenues of
the $250-million annual trade. Charcoal is giving Al-Shabaab a lifeline.”412
The mandate regarding illicit Somali activity called upon flag states “to
cooperate with such inspections” and requested that Member States “make goodfaith efforts to first seek the consent of the vessel’s Flag State prior to any
inspections . . . .”413 Resolution 2182 further decided that “any Member State
that undertakes an inspection . . . shall promptly notify the [United Nations]
Committee and submit a report on the inspection containing all relevant details,
including . . . efforts made to seek the consent of the vessel’s Flag State[.]”414
Thus, the “good faith efforts” provision implicitly provides that boarding of
foreign flagged vessels may occur without flag State approval, so long as
consent is first sought. Because the provision on boarding wasn’t explicit,
however, China unilaterally asserted that “any inspection of such vessels needs
the prior consent of the flag States concerned,”415 a position not supported by
the text of the resolution.
The seizure of MSV Raj Milan is characteristic of the beneficial impact of
Security Council resolutions involving the maritime environment.416 The Raj
Milan departed the Kismayo Port in Somalia in 2015 with false documents and
almost 25,000 bags of charcoals.417 Several days later, United Arab Emirate
officials in Port Rashid confiscated the shipment and disposed of the charcoal
“through resale at a public auction.”418 And, in 2016 HMAS Darwin, an
Adelaide-class guided-missile frigate in the Royal Australian Navy, interdicted
a vessel en route to Somalia carrying proscribed weapons.419 After searching the
411

S.C. Res. 2182, supra note 135, ¶ 15.
U.N. SCOR 7286th mtg., supra note 127, at 2.
413
S.C. Res. 2182, supra note 135, ¶ 16.
414
Id. ¶ 20.
415
U.N. SCOR 7286th mtg., supra note 127, at 4.
416
U.N. Security Council, Letter dated 9 October 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee
pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President
of the Security Council, Annex 8.3, ¶¶ 4-6, U.N. Doc. S/2015/801 (Oct. 19, 2015).
417
Id.
418
Id. “Data collected on the vessel’s Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions confirmed that
it had docked off the coast of southern Somalia before sailing northwards to the United Arab Emirates.” Id. at
316 n.5.
419
See HMAS Darwin Seizes Large Weapons Cache, COMBINED MARITIME FORCES (Mar. 6, 2016),
https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2016/03/06/hmas-darwin-seizes-large-weapons-cache/ (“After assessing
the vessel to be stateless, HMAS Darwin searched the vessel and discovered 1989 AK-47assault rifles, 100
412
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vessel, Darwin seized “1,989 AK-47 assault rifles, 100 rocket propelled grenade
launchers,” as well as machine guns and mortar tubes.420
Along with condemning attacks by Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) and “ongoing unilateral actions taken by the Houthis,” the Security
Council authorized an arms embargo in Yemen that included weapons and
ammunition.421 This mandate was decided under Chapter VII and directed that
Member States “immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct
or indirect supply, sale or transfer to, or for the benefit of [identified individuals
and entities.]”422 Resolution 2216 further called upon Member States, “to
inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and
consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea . . . all cargo to
Yemen . . . .”423 Member State naval forces have seized more than 8,000 AK47—also referred to as the Kalashnikov—assault rifles under authority provided
by this resolution.424
Court documents from a civil proceeding in the United States involved the
boarding of M/T Androussa off the Yemini coast by Coalition Forces enforcing
the arms embargo authorized by Resolution 2216.425 The vessel was confiscated
along with both legitimate cargo and proscribed material that included three
“ballast tanks contained traces of highly explosive materials primarily used for
military purposes” [and] “a large quantity of steel pipes which been had
modified to be used as firearm components for military purposes.”426 The
admiralty complaint filed in the United States that sought more than $30 millions
in damages further alleged “the vessel owners and crew tampered with the maps
and navigation devices in the vessel by deleting evidence that the vessel called
at the ports of Bandar Abbas and Lavan Island, in Iran,” and while the Androussa
was berthed in those ports, “the Inmarsat C2 and Automatic Identification
System were switched off, making it impossible to track the vessel’s
position.”427

rocket propelled grenade launchers, 49 PKM general purpose machine guns, 39 PKM spare barrels and 20 60
mm mortar tubes. These weapons were seized from the vessel that was heading towards the Somalia coast.”).
420
Id.
421
S.C. Res. 2216, supra note 4, ¶¶ 14–17.
422
Id. ¶ 14.
423
Id. ¶ 15.
424
U.S. 5th Fleet Pub. Affairs, supra note 21.
425
Verified Compliant at 5–7, 21, Swaidan Trading Co. v. M/V Donousa, 2018 WL 1226119 (D. Or. Mar.
7, 2018) (alleging negligence and fraud, among other things, in a civil complaint seeking $32,948,417.30 in
damages from the ownership group of M/T ANDROUSSA).
426
Id. at 4–5.
427
Id. at 5.
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The diplomatic challenge in securing approval of a resolution in Turtle
Bay,428 particularly in the maritime environment, underscores why mandates
may not expressly state that high seas boardings are authorized without flag state
consent. Regardless of the reasons for constructive ambiguity, resolutions
involving embargos represent a missed opportunity for the Security Council to
provide explicit operational direction. Turtle Bay mandates have authorized
embargos for decades. In 1992, the Security Council addressed “massive and
systematic violations of human rights . . . and of the grave breaches of
international humanitarian law” in Bosnia and Herzegovina.429 In Resolution
787, the U.N.S.C. targeted vessels owned or operated by a “person or
undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) . . . regardless of the flag under which the vessel sails”430 and
authorized diversions, calling on Member States “to halt all inward and outward
maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations
and to ensure strict implementation of [previous resolutions]”431 without
expressly requiring flag state notification or consent. Also in 1992, the Security
Council focused on challenges in Somalia in a resolution decided under Chapter
VII that directed “a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons
and military equipment to Somalia until the Council decides otherwise.”432
In a subsequent resolution, the Security Council noted its desire to “promote
free and unhindered navigation on the Danube . . . .”433 Addressing violence and
instability in Haiti, Resolution 875 (1993) similarly called upon Member States
“to halt inward maritime shipping as necessary in order to inspect and verify
their cargoes and destinations[.]”434 This resolution also encouraged Member

428
See U.N. SCOR, 72d Sess., 8151st mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8151 (Dec. 22, 2017) (“Many hours are
spent in the United Nations and the Security Council in discussions, and hundreds of documents are drafted in
consideration of the importance of crafting realistic and implementable decisions that reflect the political
concerns and mutual responsibilities of the parties. When we addressed the specific country situation in this
case, such standards were overlooked. Consequently, the agreement reached comprises with artificial timetables
while the wording was amended only minutes before the voting . . . . Such disregard constitutes a breach of the
consensus-based agreements reached on the Council.”).
429
Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 46, at 65; see also S.C. Res. 787, supra note 3, pmbl. On the issue of
adopting embargos and sanctions in the context of State responsibility, “It is clear from the Draft Articles [to the
U.N. Charter], commentaries and debates . . . UN mechanisms for peace maintenance are encompassed as legal
sanctions.” Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 46, at 58.
430
S.C. Res. 787, supra note 3, ¶ 10 (emphasis added); see also S.C. Res. 757, ¶ 4 (May 30, 1992) (also
decided under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter).
431
S.C. Res. 787, supra note 3, ¶ 12.
432
S.C. Res. 733, supra note 335, ¶ 5.
433
S.C. Res. 992, pmbl. (May 11, 1995).
434
S.C. Res. 875, supra note 3, ¶. 1; S.C. Res. 841 (1993); S.C. Res. 873 (Oct. 13, 1993); S.C. Res. 917
(May 6, 1994); S.C. Res. 944 (Sept. 29, 1994).
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States conducting interdictions to cooperate with the Government of Haiti to
support sanctions enforcement.435 While these sanctions had limited impact,
they convinced the “military junta to negotiate the return of civilian power, but
the resulting Governors Island accord was not enforced and gave way to military
intervention.”436And, the Security Council again focused on the maritime
environment in Resolution 1132 (1997), which addressed instability and a
military coup in Sierra Leone. This measure directed that the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) halt “inward maritime shipping
in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations . . . .”437
The embargo model employed in U.N.S.C. resolutions regarding Libya, as
well as in Iran and Somalia, among others, has application in future threats
occurring in or near areas that are ungoverned or where State capacity is
uncooperative, limited or nonexistent. U.N.S.C. resolutions of Libya authorizing
an arms embargo, for instance, reasonably may be interpreted to include
authorization, albeit implied, to conduct boardings without flag state consent
(provided good faith efforts are first made to obtain consent), and resourcefully
addressed a difficult security challenge and merits consideration in future Turtle
Bay discussions. That same resourcefulness will be necessary for approaching
transnational maritime challenges off the West Coast of Africa, where national
capabilities and legal authorities are limited.
F. Gulf of Guinea Model

Increasing violence in the Gulf of Guinea prompted the Security Council to
adopt Resolutions 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012). The resolutions addressed an
urgent maritime security and governance challenge, encouraged regional
cooperation, but did not provide enforcement, sanctions, or boarding
authorization. Complementary regional efforts produced a nonbinding Code of
Conduct approved by twenty-five heads of state in 2013.438 Zonal engagements
435

S.C. Res. 875, supra note 3, ¶ 1.
VAUGHN LOWE ET AL., THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR, THE EVOLUTION OF
THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945 678 (David Cortright, et al. eds., 2008).
437
S.C. Res. 1132, supra note 3, ¶ 8.
438
CODE OF CONDUCT CONCERNING THE REPRESSION OF PIRACY, ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS, AND
ILLICIT MARITIME ACTIVITY IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA (2013) (Yaound. . . Code of Conduct)
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Documents/code_of_conduct%20signed%20from%20E
COWAS%20site.pdf. Efforts to draft the Code, which began in 2010, predate U.N.S.C. Resolutions 2018 and
2039. As of December 2017, with the addition of Rwanda, 26 States (and three regional organizations: the
Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, the Economic Community of Central African States,
ECCAS, and the Gulf of Guinea Commission, GGC) have agreed to the Yaound. . . Code of Conduct. See also
Africa Center’s Assis Malaquias Recognized for Work on Maritime Security, AFRICAN CENTER FOR STRATEGIC
STUDIES July 30, 2015 http://africacenter.org/spotlight/malaquias-recognized-work-maritime-security/.
436
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have likewise resulted in collaborative maritime frameworks to enhance
information sharing and an aligned response.439 Resolutions 2018 and 2039
correctly recognized that the situation in West Africa—and thus solutions to it—
warrant a different approach than in East Africa, the Gulf of Aden, Libya, or
North Korea.440 Kamal-Deen Ali, Executive Director of the Center for Maritime
Law and Security, Africa (CEMLAWS) in Accra, Ghana, opined that
Resolutions 2018 and 2039 “charted a course for cooperative international
engagement in the Gulf of Guinea, and have explicitly sanctioned ongoing
regional and global efforts as being fundamental for the operationalization of
regional maritime security cooperation.”441
A U.N.S.C. Presidential Statement in April 2016 commended collaborative
initiatives and called upon the Member States to transform the Code of Conduct
into a binding instrument.442 The statement further welcomed “the establishment
of the Inter-regional Coordination Centre in 2014 in Cameroon.”443 The visually
impressive facilities in Yaoundé reside in a compound that is staffed and
organized across five divisions: (1) legal and judicial cooperation; (2) education
and training; (3) information management and communication; (4) political
affairs and international cooperation; and (5) administration and finance.444
The prospect exists for the Inter-Regional Coordination Center to flourish,
but will require increased, and sustained, support. Cameroon, Nigeria, and
Ghana, among others, have contributed,445 but assistance from other States is
needed. Regardless of whether the Yaoundé Code of Conduct is transformed

439
See generally the Multilateral Agreement on the Establishment of Maritime Zone E
(Benin, Niger, Nigeria and Togo) to Eradicate Illegal Maritime Activities in West Africa, July 13, 2013. Article
8, Combined Maritime Operations (providing detailed ship rider provisions) (Copy on file with author).
440
S.C. Res. 2018, supra note 4; S.C. Res. 2039 (Feb. 29, 2012) (Gulf of Guinea).
441
KAMAL-DEEN ALI, MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE GULF OF GUINEA, at 7 (2015) (This
insightful book represents the most comprehensive study of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea). “The
maritime opportunities of the Gulf of Guinea are . . . being drowned in the waves of multiple maritime crimes
epitomized by ravaging piracy . . . [and] decades of illicit transshipment and trafficking in narcotic drugs fuels
crime and imperils governance institutions; illegal migration by sea frequently leads to maritime accidents and
disasters; while trafficking in weapons has contributed to multiple internal conflicts and widespread instability.”
Id. at 2–3.
442
S.C. Pres., Statement by the President of the Security Council, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2016/4 (Apr.
25, 2016).
443
Id. at 3.
444
For the Implementation of Regional Strategy for Maritime Safety and Security in Central and West
Africa,
INTERREGIONAL
COORDINATION
CTR.,
http://cicyaounde.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/
CodeofConduct-EN.pdf.
445
See Code of Conduct Concerning The Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit
Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa, INTERREGIONAL COORDINATION CENTRE, http://cicyaounde.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/04/CodeofConduct-EN.pdf.
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into a binding instrument or remains a durable nonbinding political construct,
the agreement provides a platform for, among others, information sharing and
coordination in the response to piracy, armed robbery at sea, IUU fishing, and
illegal bunkering.
Multistate collaboration in February 2016 of the pirated oil tanker MT
Maximus, which culminated in a high seas interdiction conducted by the
Nigerian Navy, demonstrates the benefits of a regional approach to maritime
security in West Africa.446 While notable, the response also highlighted that
broader challenges exist, including the development of legal authorities and
investigative prosecutorial as well as judicial capabilities and infrastructure.
Resolutions 2018 and 2039 are encouraging, appropriately avoided use-offorce authorization or a directive approach, and sagely seek to support a uniquely
West African response to this threat. The Yaoundé Code of Conduct and the
establishment of the Inter-Regional Coordination Centre were praised at the
June 2018 U.N. Arria-Formula meeting that focused on maritime crime.447
Inexplicably, however, from 2012 through July 2018 the Security Council has
not adopted a resolution on this threat to the peace (issuing instead only a single
Presidential Statement) despite ongoing security challenges. The development
of national laws in multiple Gulf of Guinea States to support criminal
prosecutions for acts of piracy, along with judicial capacity, for example,
represents an urgent focus area. As primarily hortatory, Resolutions 2018 and
2039 cannot be measured against resolutions that provide express boarding
authorities or enforcement direction. That being said, resolutions that encourage
cooperation have merit in West Africa as well as in other geographic areas,
particularly where a regional approach is the most appropriate response to
security challenges. Further, this type of resolution has merit where capacity,
capabilities, and legal authorities possibly exist but are limited and would benefit
from international assistance.

446
Michael Faul, Navies from the United States, Ghana, Togo and Nigeria Track Hijacked Tanker through
Waters off Five Countries before Nigerian Naval Forces Storm Aboard, US NEWS (Feb. 27, 2016),
http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-02-26/us-nigerian-navies-ship-rescue-success-forcooperation. Maximus was carrying 4,700 tons of diesel fuel. Id. The Nigerian interdiction involved support
from the Benin, France, Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe, Togo, and the United States. Id.
447
Maritime Crime as a Threat to International Peace Security–United Nations Security Counsel Open
Arria Formula Meeting, UN WEB TV (Jun. 13, 2018), http://webtv.un.org/search/maritime-crime-as-a-threat-tointernational-peace-and-security-united-nations-security-council-open-arria-formula-meeting/5797556512001/
?term=&lan=english&page=2; see also U.N. Office Drugs & Crimes, Concept Note on the “Arria-Formula”
Meetings of the Security Council Members, https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/upload.teamup.com/908040/
qgR6SQjQBmKzIY5p0XIc_180613pm-arria-maritime-crime.pdf.
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The resolution models discussed in this section are characteristic of a shared
approach to transnational security threats, and the imperative of integrating
diplomatic, judicial, economic, and operational integration. Importantly, the
DPRK, 1540, Somali piracy, Mediterranean migrant-smuggling and traffickingin-persons, Libya/embargo, and Gulf of Guinea models each reflect months,
sometimes years, of collaborative development. While they individually
addressed specific threats, collectively they provide a blueprint for approaching
the next generation of maritime security challenges.
III. JUDICIAL EXAMINATION OF U.N.S.C. RESOLUTIONS WITH A
MARITIME NEXUS
In addition to an increased number of resolutions with a maritime focus
beginning in 2008, the Turtle Bay pivot has resulted in both expanded naval
engagements and opportunities for judicial review. The case of Tarros v. United
States was a federal tort suit where the plaintiff sought damages for an
interdiction that occurred pursuant to U.N.S.C. Resolutions 1970 (2011) and
1973 (2011).448 The court dismissed the claim, filed under the Suits in Admiralty
Act and Public Vessels Act, following action by USS Stout (DDG 55) that
“blockaded and diverted” a vessel in furtherance of U.N.S.C. resolutions against
Libya.449
Resolution 1970 expressed its “grave concern” about the situation in Libya,
condemned “the violence and use of force against civilians,” and decided that
Member States must immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the
direct or indirect supply of weapons and ammunition to the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya.450 Resolution 1973 called upon Member States “to ensure strict
implementation of the arms embargo . . . [and inspect] on the high seas, vessels
and aircraft bound to or from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” transporting
prohibited cargo.451
The United States’ pleadings asserted that “[t]here is no clear-cut standard
of care, as if in a tort context, for a warship’s interception of a foreign-flagged
merchant vessel bound for a war-torn nation under an international arms
embargo imposed by the U.N. Security Council.”452 Government pleadings

448
449
450
451
452

Tarros, supra note 17, at 327.
Id.
Id. at 330; S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 383, at 1.
S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 4, ¶ 13.
Brief for Petitioner at 8, Tarros v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 2d (2013) (No.13 Civ. 1932).
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further noted the manifest of the diverted ship contained “broad descriptors such
as ‘laboratory items,’ ‘chemicals,’ ‘hardware,’ ‘machines,’ and ‘spare parts.’”453
The Tarros court held:
The decision as to whether to divert a vessel bound for a wartorn nation
in order to enforce an international arms embargo is a “delicatelycalibrated [one] based on military judgment, experience, and
intelligence-gathering.” Far from an “ordinary tort suit,” adjudication
would require the Court to wade into the heart of military operations,
“interjecting tort law into the realm of national security and secondguessing judgments . . . that are properly left to the other constituent
branches of government[.]454

The Court further held that U.N.S.C. resolutions “constitute international
obligations,” but are not domestically enforceable obligations. In the Vento case,
the plaintiff sought “a determination that the Stout’s officers and crew acted
unreasonably under the circumstances.” However, the court held that a judicial
review of “discretionary military decisions related to military operations” is
generally precluded.455
A United States District Court in Maryland in 2014 also dismissed a tort suit
that sought damages for naval measures that implemented a Security Council
resolution.456 The plaintiff in Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States (Li-Shou)
asserted that the rescue of a fishing vessel seized by Somali pirates led to the
wrongful death of the fishing vessel’s master and the negligent destruction of
his vessel. The mission was conducted by military forces embarked on the USS
Stephen W. Groves (FFG 29), an element of NATO Task Force 508 in Operation
Ocean Shield. The stated legal mandate of Ocean Shield is “relevant United
Nations Security Council Resolutions relating to Somali-based piracy.”457
A government pleading in Li-Shou referenced the adoption of multiple
U.N.S.C. resolutions, “urging Member States to take action to combat piracy . .
. [and that] near the time of the incident alleged here, the U.N. Security Council
adopted Resolution 1976, expressing grave concern about the growing threat of
piracy off the coast of Somalia.”458 The government pleading further referenced

453

Brief for Respondent at 2, Tarros v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 2d (2013) (No.13 Civ. 1932).
Tarros, supra note 17, at 334 (citations omitted).
455
Tarros, supra note 17, at 343.
456
Wu Tien Li-Shou, supra note 107, at 186.
457
Operation Ocean Shield Fact Sheet, N. ATL. TREATY ORG. (Nov. 2014), https://www.nato.int/nato_
static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/141202a-Factsheet-OceanShield-en.pdf.
458
Brief for Petitioner at 2, Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States, 997 F.3d (2015).
454
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U.N.S.C. Resolution 1976’s call upon Member States “‘to take part in the fight
against piracy,’ through, among other things, ‘seizures and disposition of boats
used . . . in the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of
Somalia, or for which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting such use.’”459
The Li-Shou suit for damages was appropriately dismissed, “because
allowing this action to proceed would thrust courts into the middle of a sensitive
multinational counter-piracy operation and force courts to second-guess the
conduct of a military engagement[.]”460
With the likelihood of more challenges in federal court, as well as in
international judicial venues, regarding sanctions enforcement and other naval
measures taken in accordance with U.N.S.C. direction, development of a
consistent (national-level) judicial approach would be beneficial, particularly
with respect to Article 103, human rights compliance, claims, and appropriate
operational deference.
CONCLUSION
The peaceful use of the oceans, which provide the connective thread for
commerce, trade, and transit, is now being challenged in more geographic areas
than any other period of the modern era. The narrative, however, is not one of
violence or instability or the increased number of resolutions adopted by the
Security Council. Rather, these multiple simultaneous threats are redefining the
modern day role of the U.N.S.C. and prompting reexamination of existing lawof-the-sea principles.
Drafters of the U.N. Charter sagely identified a link between the stability of
the maritime environment and global security with express references to the sea
in Chapter VII. Within eighteen months of the first resolution adopted by the
Security Council, the U.N.S.C. would address a maritime conflict. Over the
following seven decades the Security Council confronted threats involving the
maritime domain, more than once a year, on average. While some of the
resolutions with an impact on naval operations were incidental to the sanctions
they impose, others primarily focused upon the maritime environment.

459
460

Id. at 20; see S.C. Res. 1976, supra note 335, pbml.
Wu Tien Li-Shou, supra note 107, at 180.
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The Turtle Bay pivot, which took form after the Cold War, extends well
beyond addressing threats on the water.461 Though many diplomatic and
operational factors contributed to the dramatically increased number of
resolutions adopted between 2008 and 2017, responses to Somali threats (piracy,
an arms embargo, and Al-Shabaab activity), instability in Libya, and the illicit
DPRK nuclear program greatly contributed. The turn to the Security Council is
not about an elastic interpretation of what constitutes a threat to the peace, breach
of the peace, or an act of aggression. Rather, contemporary threats involve
heightened levels of multistate involvement along with complexity, deception,
and lethality. U.N.S.C. response measures in this ten-year period underscore that
the maintenance of international peace is frequently tethered to maritime
security, and that fundamentally, “our world is an ocean world.”462 While the
challenges are separate and are unfolding with unprecedented frequency,
authorities provided by the Security Council have comparable elements. It is
thus essential that there be greater recognition of the intersecting nature of
resolutions involving maritime threats going forward, and where necessary,
deviation from law-of-the-sea principles.
Since inception, Security Council decisions have led to naval approaches or
boardings of more than 50,000 ships, the destruction of 3,500 vessels, and the
maritime rescue of 40,000 people in the response to the transnational security
threats. The extraordinary operational impact is not simply about naval
engagements; resolutions have supported a rationale, structured approach to
transnational security threats in the maritime environment. Awareness of the
history of the United Nations Security Council, including diplomatic, legal and
operational authorities previously provided, will be essential going forward.
Diplomats at Turtle Bay have not yet opted to singularly address maritime
drug trafficking in a resolution. Future discussions in New York could examine
the characterization of maritime drug trafficking in the context of international
peace and security. States could be authorized to conduct, among other activities,
a right-of-visit boarding on the high seas without flag State consent,463 for
461
See WALLENSTEEN & JOHANSSON, supra note 6, at 17–19 (noting that in a study of all resolutions from
1946 to 2002, “The Council has moved from roughly one decision per month to one per week.” Moreover,
“Ninety-three percent of all Chapter VII resolutions passed from 1946 to 2002 have been adopted since the end
of the Cold War. . . . “).
462
WILLIAM LANGEWIESCHE, THE OUTLAW SEA 3 (North Point Press, eds., 2004) (“Since we live on land,
and are usually beyond sight of the sea, it is easy to forget that our world is an ocean world, and to ignore what
in practice that means.”).
463
See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 204, ¶ 4 (noting “the close connection between international terrorism
and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs . . . and in this regard, emphasiz[ing] the need to enhance
coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global

WILSON_PROOFS

2018]

12/17/2018 12:20 PM

THE TURTLE BAY PIVOT

87

vessels reasonably suspected of transporting certain quantities of narcotics in
known drug trafficking areas. The Security Council President in 2010 noted with
concern the transnational security threat posed by “drug trafficking” and “the
increasing link…between drug trafficking and the financing of terrorism.”464
Over the next few years, the nexus between illicit narcotics and terrorist
financing became a fundamentally recognized connection. On November 7,
2017, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres expressly noted in the context
of Mediterranean migration that illicit narcotics is “generating deadly spillover
effects, such as increased drug use and health crises.”465 And, on June 13, 2018,
the Security Council held an Arria-Forumla meeting where the head of the U.N.
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Global Maritime Crime Program
(GMCP) Alan Cole accurately asserted maritime crime—including illicit
narcotics—represents a threat to international peace and security.466
Laudable efforts by the UNODC’s GMCP have improved Member State
capabilities and capacity to stem the flow of narcotic trafficking by sea. And, the
continued implementation of the U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, the “Vienna Drug Convention,”
specifically Article 17, which encourages cooperation between State Parties to
combat narcotic trafficking by sea through the development of bilateral and
multilateral agreements, is also beneficial.467 More can be done.
In this regard, there is not a legal impediment to the Security Council
adopting a resolution singularly focused on maritime crime, including drug
trafficking, and deciding, potentially, that flag State authorization to conduct a
boarding on the high seas is not required where reasonable grounds exist to
suspect the vessel is engaged in smuggling illicit narcotics.468 So too, the
response to this serious challenge and threat to international security”); see also S.C. Res. 2253, supra note 4,
pmbl. (“Recognizing the need to take measures to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, terrorist
organizations, and individual terrorists . . . .including from the proceeds of organized crime, inter alia, the illicit
production and trafficking of drugs and their chemical precursors. . . . “).
464
S.C. Pres. Statement 2010/4, at 1 (Feb. 24, 2010). The statement “welcome[d] further briefings.” Id at
2.
465
U.N. SCOR, 72 Sess. 8106 mtg, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8106 (Nov. 17 ,2017). Kairat Umarov
(Kazakhstan) noted “organized crime involving arms, drugs and trafficking in persons . . . [among others]
generate an atmosphere of fear, distrust and intense hostilities.” Id. at 16–17.
466
UNODC CO-ORGANIZES SECURITY COUNCIL ARRIA-FORMULA MEETING TO DISCUSS MARITIME CRIME
(2018),
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2018/July/unodc-co-organizes-security-council-arriaformula-meeting-to-discuss-maritime-crime.html?ref=fs1.
467
See United Nations Conventions against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances, Dec.
20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI19&chapter=6&clang=_en . As of June 2018, the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
and Psychotropic Substances has 190 states parties. Id.
468
U.S.C.A § 841 (2010).
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Security Council could clarify that enforcement action—and not solely a right
of visit—against vessels that are stateless, whether through an invalid claim of
nationality, no claim of nationality, or assimilation of a vessel as one without
nationality is consistent with international law.469 And, as recommended by the
UNODC’s GMCP in June 2018 at the Aria-formula meeting, a U.N.S.C.
Presidential Statement could spark the creation of a maritime-focused network
of investigators and prosecutors to address gaps in capacity/capabilities.470 The
U.N.S.C. could explicitly declare maritime drug trafficking is a threat to the
peace and direct specific Member State action. This continuing transnational
security threat provides the U.N.S.C. with an opportunity from which to forge a
new resolution model that recognizes freedom-of-navigation principles yet
balances those considerations with expanded maritime enforcement authorities
to enable expeditious boardings on the high seas of vessels suspected of
engaging in illicit activity.
Another debate in Turtle Bay could include whether to more extensively
authorize necessary measures to address maritime migration and human
trafficking. Resolutions 2240 (2015), 2312 (2016), 2380 (2017), and 2437
(2018) were adopted to confront transnational criminal activity in the
Mediterranean Sea as well as to stem the devastating loss of human life at sea
occurring daily. While the adoption of measures that authorize the use of force,
consistent with international law, in the context of maritime rescues would not
be inconsistent with the U.N. Charter, U.N.S.C. authorities, or jus cogens, the
broader policy question regarding whether Security Council action is prudent
must be a central focus area. Some legal commentators have lamented “the
fundamental humanitarian purpose of Search and Rescue (SAR) is under threat
because of the securitization and, increasingly, the militarization of boat
migration.”471 The Security Council may also examine the viability of
broadening the responsibility to protect472 concept (currently discussed in the
context of threats that include genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity)473to primarily maritime rescues. Regardless of the next steps at Turtle
469

See LOS Convention, supra note 23, art. 110.
Maritime Crime as a Threat to International Peace Security, supra note 447.
471
Daniel Ghezelbash et al., Securitization of Search and Rescue at Sea: The Response to Boat Migration
in the Mediterranean and Offshore Australia 67 ICLQ 315, 349. The article also discussed an “increase in
militarization, lack of transparency and accountability, developments relating to disembarkation and nonrefoulement, criminalization, commodification, and impediments to effective cooperation.” Id. at 317.
472
U.N. Secretary-General, In larger freedom: towards development, security, and human rights for all,
follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit, ¶ 132 A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005). “We must also move
towards embracing and acting on the ‘responsibility to protect’ potential or actual victims of massive atrocities.”
Id. at 34–35.
473
Id. at 59.
470
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Bay on this issue, it will be critical that any resolution ensures that the priority
to render assistance to those in distress at sea remains, and that the established
global SAR system, including the safe disembarkation to a place of safety of
those rescued, as well as the continued effectiveness of rescue coordination
centers, are not disrupted.
Further issues at the Security Council could include addressing a 497%
increase in “explosive-precursor liquid chemicals seized in international
customs” over a recent three-year period474 or separately, again, giving
permission to enter another State’s territorial seas to pursue illicit activity.475
The global swath of the oceans underlines the imperative for consistent legal
authority and multilateral collaboration. As noted in the preamble to the LOS
Convention, “the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to
be considered as a whole . . . .”476 Towards that end, nations are impressively
cooperating to address security threats that include piracy, drug trafficking, and
the illicit transport of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. Security Council
actions complement, and at times expand, these efforts. The certainty of an
evolving threat environment and speed with which the Security Council can
adopt measures ensure that Member States will continue to turn to the U.N. with
the frequency that began in 2008. Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov fittingly
summarized the pivot to the Security Council when he stated, “[t]here is no
alternative to the United Nations.”477
Subsequent U.N.S.C. action would benefit from a greater emphasis in the
strategic intersection of previous resolutions with a maritime focus. The models
of U.N.S.C. resolutions examined in this Article can provide starting points for
deliberations in Turtle Bay. Drafting considerations for resolutions with a
maritime nexus should include continued acknowledgment of such law-of-thesea principles as freedom of navigation478 and the general concept of exclusive
flag state jurisdiction479 and deviation from those principles where necessary.
474
European Union Maritime Security Strategy, Responding Together to Global Challenges—A Guide
for Stakeholders, EUROPEAN COMM’N (2014), https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/sites/maritimeaffairs/
files/leaflet-european-union-maritime-security-strategy_en.pdf. The Strategy further asserted “€11.6 billion a
year in damage to marine ecosystems from plastic waste.” Id.
475
S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 4, ¶ 7(a).
476
LOS Convention, supra note 23, pmbl.
477
Andre Zolotov Jr., Ivanov Plays Down Differences on Iraq, MOSCOW TIMES (May 13, 2003); BOSCO,
supra note 9, at 242.
478
See JAMES KRASKA & RAUL PEDROZO, THE FREE SEA: THE AMERICAN FIGHT FOR FREEDOM OF
NAVIGATION, (Naval Institute Press, eds. 2018) (representing the definitive examination of the topic).
479
Alex G. Oude Elferink, The Genuine Link Concept: Time for a Post Mortem?, NETH. INST. L. SEA 1,
14 (1999) (discussing the “exclusive focus on the flag state . . . has [already] been progressively abandoned
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In addition, textual precision should remain a priority. Perfect clarity need
not be the goal, as there are frequently legitimate reasons for constructive
ambiguity. That being said, the probative inquiry should not be whether there
are valid reasons for constructive ambiguity, but rather, the deleterious effect of
unclear text in naval operations. Thus, greater focus by the Security Council on
removing ambiguity from provisions with an operational effect will be
tremendously beneficial. Vigorous compliance480 and the continuation of Panels
of Experts working groups are key enablers to impactful resolutions.481 Lastly,
resolutions authorizing naval measures must avoid diluting the unique influence
and impact of U.N.S.C. measures.
The Turtle Bay pivot is a positive security development. Security Council
resolutions have provided an indispensable tool kit with which to address a
multitude of maritime threats. Noted historian John Keegan writes, “[f]our times
in the modern age men have sat down to reorder the world. . . .”482 Applied in a
maritime context, while many would point to Grotius’s Mare Liberum (1609),
the Geneva Conventions (1958), and the LOS Convention (1982), it is now time
to also include the U.N. Charter (1945) as a reordering of the global maritime
security architecture, particularly in view of the tremendous influence of
U.N.S.C. resolutions in the pursuit of rogue states, nuclear proliferators, pirates,
and migrant smugglers among other transnational security threats.

. . .”). In part, this article correctly notes, “coastal states and especially port states already have certain
possibilities to act if ships do not comply with international standards.” Id.
480
See U.N. Secretary-General, High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: A More Secure
World—Our Shared Responsibility, A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004). “The United Nations was never intended to be a
utopian exercise. It was meant to be a collective security system that worked.” Id. The U.N.S.C. has lamented a
lack of enforcement of adopted resolutions. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 24, ¶ 9 (noting with concern, “that the
lack of enforcement of the arms embargo established by [a prior resolution] has permitted ready access to the
arms and ammunition used by the pirates and driven in part the phenomenal growth in piracy”).
481
S.C. Pres. Statement 2006/997 (Dec. 22, 2006). “One of the significant innovations in the work of the
Security Council in recent years is the creation of independent expert groups to monitor the implementation of
sanctions.” Id.
482
John Keegan, Book Review: Paris 1919 by Margaret MacMillan, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2002),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/08/AR2009070802958.html. The four events
referenced by Keegan include “at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 after the Thirty Years War, at the Congress
of Vienna in 1815 after the Napoleonic Wars, in Paris in 1919 after World War I and in San Francisco in 1945
after World War II.” Id.

